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EDITOR'S NOTE
My hope for this issue of the Water Law Review is that each of our
readers will take some time to consider the true status of our most
valuable resource. We should all be increasingly concerned about
both the quantity and quality of water, not just in Colorado, not just
nationally, but globally.
The world's ever-increasing population and corresponding development are simultaneously straining the world's supply of water.
Shipping water from far off rivers, streams, and aquifers to meet the
need has become increasingly expensive. Today, however, we have to
be concerned about another matter that was not in the minds of early
water users-water quality. As the population increases, it becomes
more difficult than ever to re-purify our finite supply of fresh water.
We must think globally. It is essential that we recognize our environment, and its assorted ecological systems, in the bigger picture of
the planet that supports it. We simply cannot continue to waste, to
contaminate, and to overuse water. What will happen if we do? Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons comes to mind-water, a common pool
resource used to its fullest capacity and, thus, contaminated beyond
safe recovery, only to remain available to a privileged few who can afford to pay for it. We all should be very concerned.
Common sense dictates that we cannot keep managing our water
resources the way we always have. We nonchalantly accept that water is
a commodity; however, unlike a product or service it cannot be duplicated through manufacture, and no human can live more than three
days without it. We must use common sense, or "he who has the most
pure water" will be the only person who wins, which means no one will
win.
In this issue, we are pleased to present our first international water
law article-Ali Ahmad's survey of Islamic Water Law. The article presents an interesting history of the evolution of Islamic water law.
Rather than focusing on ownership of the resource, Islamic water law
focuses on protection and preservation of water for all people. If laws
of all nations support sound ecological practices, it should not be as
difficult to encourage global protection. Obviously, one cannot be naive enough to ignore all the other factors in the equation (e.g., economics, political institutions and ideologies, etc.); however, it is nonetheless comforting to realize that people are people everywhere, and
we all have the same basic desire to survive.
Of course, all nations have a seemingly insurmountable enforcement problem. Even the United States, boasting comprehensive environmental protection laws like the Clean Water Act, seems unable to
curb our water pollution dilemma. As idealistic as it sounds, lawyers
have a professional and ethical responsibility to mold and enforce the
law on behalf of all humanity, and are in a unique position to stop the
devastation of our water supplies. Don't just sit back-be involved,
take notice, and drink each glass as if it were your last. After all, if we
continue to pretend that we will always have enough, one day it will be
your last!
Debra Eiland
Editor-in-Chief

RAPHAEL

J. MOSES

IN TRIBUTE
The Water Law Review respectfully dedicates its Spring 1999 issue to
Raphael J. Moses, a man who has dedicated his life to western water
law. Mr. Moses was born in Girard, Alabama in 1913, and moved to
Alamosa, Colorado at the age of one year where he was raised by his
Aunt Rosa and Uncle Albert.
Mr. Moses pursued a career as a lawyer, following in the footsteps
of his great-grandfather, Raphael J. Moses I, and his Uncle, Albert L.
Moses. He attended the University of Colorado School of Law from
which he received his LL.B. and JD degrees in 1937. Mr. Moses was
admitted to the Colorado Bar in 1938, and after a short time in practice, he joined the Navy and served on a World War II destroyer from
1942-1945. Upon his return, he resumed private practice in Alamosa,
Colorado.
Governor Thornton appointed Mr. Moses to the Colorado Water
Conservation Board in 1953. He served as attorney for the Board from
1958-1977, and as Special Assistant Attorney General on Interstate
Water Matters from 1958-1976. During that time, Mr. Moses represented Colorado in all its interstate water matters, including the Rio
Grande and Colorado River Compacts, and numerous local water projects such as the Wagon Wheel Gap dam project in the San Luis Valley.
He was instrumental in helping to organize the Colorado River Water
Users' Association. From 1966-1977, Mr. Moses also served on the
Western States Water Council, and was its Chairman from 1966-1969.
In 1973, Mr. Moses helped establish the firm Moses, Wittemyer,
Harrison, and Woodruff in Boulder, Colorado, where he continued to
practice water law until his retirement in 1992. Mr. Moses' distinguished career included representation of numerous ground water users, serving as lead counsel on the landmark case City of Colorado
Springs v. Bender, and serving as consultant to Clyde 0. Martz, Colorado's Special Assistant Attorney General on the Rainbow Bridge case
(Badoni v. Higginson),heard before the 10th Circuit in 1980.
For a more in-depth view of Mr. Moses life and career, see the Practitioner'sPerspective section of this issue.
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This article analyzes traditional law regulating water pollution in
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Mr. Ahmad received his LL.B. with honors from Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria in

1988. He was a law professor at Bayero University Law School from 1990 to 1996, and
practiced law in Kano from 1992 to 1996. He obtained a LL.M. from Harvard Law
School in 1997, and is currently a S.J.D. (Doctor ofJuridical Science) candidate from
the Environmental Law Program at George Washington University Law School.
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reclaim its quality and enhance optimum utilization of available
resources in those societies.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The water laws of many developing countries are still based on or
influenced by Islamic law. Considering the traditional worldview of
Islam on water resources and water quality maintenance, it is a
paradox that in Muslim countries water quality continues to
deteriorate without any appreciable effort either by the public or the
authorities to abate it. Islamic law treats water as distinct from other
environmental elements, removes it from the pack of normal legal
entitlements, and assumes its constant purity. Available data shows
that water quality in Muslim nations is deteriorating due to enormous
Thus, water quality
development challenges and rapid growth.
degradation is an emerging pollution problem in these countries that
needs to be arrested quickly.
This article attempts to examine that part of Islamic law relevant to
the maintenance of water quality. Its' premise is that when modern
codes are strengthened in accordance with the Islamic water law
scheme and its enforcement procedures, the quality of water resources
will improve considerably. This article, therefore, focuses on water
pollution or damage to water, rather than water availability, its utility,
procedures for resolving conflict among competing users, or
obligations regarding its operation and maintenance.' This article
does not address damage done &ywater.4
The simplicity of the water pollution aspect of Islamic law, together
with the effective regulation of the hydrological cycle, presents an
alternative viewpoint for maintaining water quality to the wider
international community. This article outlines the nature of Islamic
law and sources of water law. Next it examines the basic rules
regarding water pollution. Finally, these rules are applied to current
trends and compared to relevant principles in other jurisdictions,
especially those in the United States.

1. DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL 68 (1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW] ("In spite of
subsequent written water laws introduced by external powers or other governments,
the basic principles of Islamic water law are still observed and strictly followed, as local
customs and usages, by the population.").

2.

THE WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY:

TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at vi, The World Bank Rep. No. 13601-MNA
(Feb. 1995). According to estimates, water quality degradation will escalate rapidly,
especially the concentration of dissolved salts, heavy metals, and toxic organic
substances. Due to the shared water resources in the Middle East, degradation of
freshwater quality in one country will adversely affect others. Id. at 16.
3. Each of these issues is effectively discussed in D. A. CAPONERA, WATER LAWS IN
MOSLEM COUNTRIES (1973).
4. This is more appropriately addressed by traditional Islamic tort law (ta'adds) or
property law.
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HI. ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC WATER LAW
Before the advent of Islam, the Arab Bedouins largely settled near
watercourses and water was a constant source of tribal feuds.' Islam
changed the concept of water by introducing a new doctrine focusing
primarily on rights of use. The source materials for Islamic law are
known to be the Holy Qur'an and the Hadiths (recorded sayings and
practices of the Prophet Muhammad). These are developed in detail
by jurists to meet the demands of the specific time and age. The
principal objective of Islamic law is the approval of God; thus, seeking
harmony between the temporal and the spiritual. The age-old notion
of law was re-echoed recently by the Director of the Center for Islamic
and Middle East Law School of Oriental and African Studies:
Strictly speaking, the whole of the Quran is law in the Islamic sense of
law as belief and as a set of obligations on the individual as to the
ideal conduct required by God. Little distinction is therefore made
between the moral and the legal in the western sense. The Quran the word of God - purports to regulate the whole of a man's life; the
word 'Muslim' refers to submission to the religion of Islam and its
concomitant obligations.8
Obligations in Islamic law are broadly twofold: one owed to God,
generally referred to as 'ibadat (rituals-these are the five pillars of
Islam: faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage) and the other
owed to society, referred to as mu'amalat (laws governing human
relation). 9 According to a widely accepted classification, all human
actions are subsumed under five categories: the strictly commanded
(fard), the recommended actions (mandub), acts to which the law is

CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAw, supra note 1, at 69.
6. The approval of God as the principle objective of Islamic law contrasts sharply
with the object of law in Western countries. Law in Western countries is widely
considered utilitarian. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 2 (C. K.
Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., 2nd ed. 1950) ("Utility is an abstract term. It
expresses the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or to procure some
good."). It can also be seen as a morally-neutral command in the Austinian sense. See
W.G. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 14-16 (5h ed. 1967) (" [T]he concept of law means a
norm of conduct set for a given community-and accepted by it as binding-by an
authority equipped with the power to lay down norms of a degree of general
application and to enforce them by a variety of sanctions."). If we must extend it to
contemporary Muslim communities, the Austinian philosophy of law must be divided
into two broad segments. First, it is true that in Islamic countries law is a command of
the 'sovereign.' However, the sovereign is God. He alone is the lawgiver; state
apparatuses are enforcers. The second segment of Austinian philosophy, separating
law from morality, cannot be accommodated under Islamic law. God, much less His
representatives, will not command what He considers immoral.
7. The technical term for Islamic law is Shari'ah,meaning the right path.
5.

8.
9.

ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY at xvi-xvii (Ian Edge ed., 1996).
C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENcE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECIVE 31

(1988) ("It is important to remember, of Islamic law, that it deals with two broad
aspects of regulation. First there is the set of laws dealing with man's duties towards
God .... There then follow the laws governing human relations (mu'amalat) such as
marriage, divorce, succession.").
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indifferent (ja'iz), acts that are advisable to refrain from (makruh), and
finally acts that are strictly prohibited (haram). Islamic law is strictly
concerned with the activities that fall under the first and last
categories.
To a large extent Islamic law is not molded by society because
human minds can easily be led astray; rather, law controls society. The
will of God, not public opinion, is the source of law. In this regard the
Islamic doctrine of certitude ('Jim al-yaqin) applies. The doctrine
implies that in the matter of Good and Evil, we as humans lack the
ability to differentiate. What is absolutely beautiful and moral and
what is absolutely ugly can only be determined for certain by God."
For that reason divine law shows humankind the "right path"
(Shari'ah) to be traveled in order to achieve salvation." The ideal life
was that lived in conformity with this law. The sources of Islamic law in
general, which also invariably serve as sources of water law, will be
considered next.
A. SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW

Islamic law sources fill two broad categories: primary sources,
comprised of both the Qur'an and Hadiths, and secondary sources,
which are means for discovering the law as expressed in the primary
sources. The secondary sources are comprised of ijma' (consensus)
and ijtihad (reasoning). Various modes of exercising ijtihad include
the generally accepted qiyas (analogy), and less accepted 'istislah
(welfare of the community) and 'istihsan (choice of one out of two
Hadiths bearing on the same subject).
1. The Qur'an
All periods of Islamic legal history and all strands of Islamic jurists
hold the Qur'an as the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence. A United
Nations document summarizes its position thus: "The Qur'an, the
word of God, is perfection itself-it is unchallengeably true, infallibly
just.""' Each text of the Qur'an contains layers of meaning which only
learning and devotion can reveal.' 4 Few books in the history of

10. J.N.D. ANDERSON, ISLAMiC LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3 (1959). For instance,
fulfillment of terms of agreements is fard, additional prayers are mandub, certain kinds
of fish are makruh, eating pork, drinking wine, or dealing in usurious transactions are
haram, and a host of other things such as air travel are ja'iz.
11. ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 15 (4h ed. 1974) ("We in our
weakness cannot understand what Good and Evil are unless we are guided in the
matter by an inspired Prophet.").
12. "Law, therefore, does not grow out of, and is not moulded by, society as is the
case with Western systems. Human thought, unaided, cannot discern the true values
and standards of conduct .... In the Islamic concept, law precedes and moulds
society; to its eternally valid dictates the structure of State and Society must, ideally,
conform." N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY Or ISLAMIC LAw 85 (1995).
13. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 9, at 32 (quoting UN Doc. Vol. XIV at 375-79 based
on the UN Conference on International Organization (1945)).
14. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 9, at 34.
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mankind have received such attention and arduous and continuous
learning as the Qur'an. It is not uncommon
that one verse of a few
5
lines takes a whole treatise to expound.
Islamic law is founded on the teachings that are contained in the
Holy Qur'an. The Qur'an is the apex of authority not only on legal
affairs of Muslims, but also on their social and political matters. The
primacy of the Qur'an on the orderings of Muslims' daily affairs cannot
be overemphasized. Proper recognition of this simple fact will help in
appreciating the labor that Muslims, over the past fourteen centuries,
have striven with candor to espouse. It is mentioned in the Qur'an
that the substance of this law existed in its perfect and most complete
form in the "Mother Book." 6 The only difference is that norms of
natural law exist in nature, to be discovered by reason, while "the
norms of Islamic law were 'discovered' by (or revealed to, in Islamic
conception), Allah's Apostle."'7
It is not an afterthought that the Qur'an stands so high-Islamic
law is a part of the whole culture of Islamic faith. It is a fundamental
tenet of the faith that mankind completely submits to the will of God.
"Law," then, in any sense that a Western lawyer recognizes the term, is
but a part of a combined whole of the Islamic system. It is true that
most legal systems have sometime in their history been connected with
religion but, as rightly observed, "the two great Semitic systems-the
Jewish and the Islamic, are probably unique in the thoroughness with
which they identify law with the personal command of a single
Almighty God.""
2.

The Hadiths

The second primary source of law is the Prophetic Traditions,
known as either Sunnah or Hadith. Technically, Hadith refers to the
sayings, deeds, and acquiescence of the Prophet. On the other hand,
Sunnah means the rule of law deduced from Hadith. Nevertheless,
both terms have generally been used interchangeably to mean the
"practice" of the Prophet.' Both the Qur'an and Hadith, compositely
referred to as nass (binding ordinance), are considered to be
revelations from God. The difference is that the Qur'an is a direct
revelation while the Hadith is an indirect revelation, since they are

15. "The foreign observer is continually surprised at the number of scholars who
know the Qur'an by heart, from cover to cover, carrying every word in their minds,
together with the principal interpretations placed upon it over the centuries." Id. at
55.
16. Majid Khadduri, Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, 22 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 3, 8
(1953) [hereinafter Nature and Sources]. The Qur'an states: "And verily, it [this
Qur'an] is in the Mother Book, before Us, indeed exalted, full of wisdom." Qur'an
43:4.
17. Khadduri, Nature and Sources, supra note 16, at 8.
18. S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the Shari'a, in LAw IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, 85, 85 (Majid Khadduri & HerbertJ. Liebesny eds., 1955).
19. FYZEE, supra note 11, at 20.
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expressed in the words of the Prophet.0 The Hadith is a source of law
that is to be consulted if the Qur'an is silent or requires interpretation.
The Prophet also rendered decisions on specific matters and all these
became binding.
3.

Ijma'

The third source of Islamic law, absent a passage from the Qur'an
21
or the Hadith, is consensus among Islamic scholars of a particular age.
Such consensus cannot be inconsistent with the Qur'an or Sunnah. A
rule so arrived at becomes part of law binding on subsequent
generations. The authority for consensus as a means for determining
the law is a Hadith from the Prophet saying, "My nation will not agree
unanimously in error. " 2
An obvious limitation to utility of consensus, despite its potentiality
in law development, is that it has been difficult to put into practice
since scholars have always been scattered throughout the Islamic
empire.2 3 Thus, consensus has seldom been used in Islamic history.
However, it still poses tremendous challenges to the present
generation ofjurists; even as the advantages of technology are utilized,
the procedure for achieving unanimity has not been defined and
articulated.
4.

Qiyas

If for any reason the above three sources do not address a
particular issue of concern, then scholars resort to the qiyas, reasoning
by analogy and logical inferences.24 Only scholars who are familiar
with the law and are highly learned can perform this process of ijtihad,
or reasoning.21 Consequently, the Qur'an, Hadith, consensus (ijma),
and analogy (qiyas) are the four main sources of Islamic law agreed
upon and employed by jurists as they attempt to distill positive rules in

20. Id.
21. However, to Imam Shafi'i, consensus is that of the community at large. "So we
accept the decision of the public because we have to obey their authority, and we know
that wherever there are sunnas of the Prophet, the public cannot be ignorant of them,
although it is possible that some are, and we know that the public can neither agree on
anything contrary to the sunna of the Prophet nor on an error." MUHAMMAD IBN
ISMAIL AL SHAFI', ISLAMICJURISPRUDENCE: SHAFI'I'S RISALA 286 (Majid Khadduri trans.,
1961).
22.

WEERAMANTRY, supra note 9, at 39.

23. Khadduri, Nature and Sources, supra note 16, at 16.
24. This is not dissimilar from the common law notion of precedent. See John
Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 33 Am. J. Comp. L. 63 (1985) (citing
authority for legal deduction in Islam).
25. The Prophet sent Mu'adh IbnJabal as a judge to take charge of legal affairs in
Yemen and asked him on what he would base his legal decisions. "On the Qur'an,"
Mu'adh replied. "But if that contains nothing to the purpose?" asked the Prophet.
"Then upon your usage," answered Mu'adh. "But if that also fails you?" asked the
Prophet. "Then I will follow my own opinion," said Mu'adh. Then the Prophet
approved his method. DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY,
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 86 (1965).
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For obvious reasons, legal
accordance with God's command.
reasoning was bound to give rise to differences of opinion among
jurists and this gave rise to schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence.
B.

SCHOOLS OF LAW

Due to the position they occupy in development of the law, jurists
need special mentioning in any analysis of the development of Islamic
schools of law. Jurists have employed the above sources in a unique
manner so that their teachings later crystallize as distinct from each
other. An understanding of jurists and their schools of law in Islam is
important to grasping their continued impact on Islamic
jurisprudence. As in most legal systems, differences of opinion do
occur among jurists on different legal issues. 6 The difference in
Islamic law is thatjurists occupy a unique position probably unfamiliar
to other legal traditions. In the absence of any formal council or body
whose pronouncements would carry authority, as in the Christian
tradition, or in Buddhism, which also has a sacred law, individual
Muslim jurists came to earn respect and prestige solely on account of
their great learning and piety.
This absence of institutionalization meant that divergent opinions
could not be unified through a majority poll effectively discarding that
of the minority. Each view carried the force of law. Pupils of the
founders of each school thereafter applied the rules in their respective
territories according to their established norms. Historical data points
to the fact that most of the founders of these schools did not know in
their lifetimes that they were establishing formal and distinct schools;
the charisma and erudition of their later pupils identify and
distinguish these founders."
The first and largest school of law today is that of Abu Hanifa
(699-766 A.D., 80-150 A.H.-Muslim calendar) in Kufa (Baghdad,
Iraq). Named after the founder, the Hanafi School is considered the
most liberal of all due to its extensive reliance on qiyas or analytical
deduction. Hanifa had two great disciples who extensively elaborated
on his teachings: Abu Yusuf-who became the Chief Judge, and
Muhammad al-Shaybani-the foremost proponent of Islamic
international law. It should be noted that qiyas represents a structured
26. Weeramantry posits in IslamicJurisprudence:
In Greek philosophy for example Aristotle pointed out (Nichomachean
Ethics, Book V) that the general language of a statute must always be
tempered by equitable interpretation to meet the particular needs of a case.

In China there was a bitter debate between legalists who argued for a strict
and stern interpretation of the law and the Confucians who argued for a
flexible and equitable interpretation. The Romans were divided between the
Proculian and Sabinian schools who differed on the question of literal and
liberal interpretation. Today in modern common law we see different judges
contending for different approaches to interpretation.
WEERAMANTRY, supra note 9, at 47.
27. Abu Hanifa, founder of the first school, left no legal writings for posterity. His
views were organized and expounded by his immediate pupils. MACDONALD, supra
note 25, at 96.
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process of the wider doctrine of the use of ra'y (systematic reasoning),
which the Hanafis were credited to have developed. 8 They and other
Iraqi jurists were referred to as "people of opinion" (ahl al-ra'y) while
their contemporary jurists in Medina were referred to as "people of
tradition" (ahl al-hadith).2
It is hard to contest the reason given by Fyzee as responsible for
this reliance: the science of Hadith had yet to fully develop and
therefore there were no recognized collections available. 0 Historical
facts tend to support geographical factors as a reason for the school's
heavy reliance on ra 'y. The jurists of Arabia were not under pressure
to resort to personal opinion because the traditions and customs of
Arabia, as approved by Islam, were known to them. In Iraq, Arabs
came in contact with different civilizations and customs.
This
intermingling exerted enormous pressure on jurists there to be
creative and sometimes speculative. A new and developing capital of
the Islamic state, Iraq was a melting pot of various people, and
interpolation of Hadiths was more probable in Baghdad than in
Medina.
The Maliki School, named after Imam Malik Ibn Anas (713-795
A.D., 90-179 A.H.), developed in Medina, Saudi Arabia. Unlike the
Hanafi School, it de-emphasized ra'y and placed heavy reliance on
Hadith or tradition.' His book, The Beaten Path or AI-Muwatta' is the
first book of law in Islam. 2 It is a reflection of the practice of Medina
and, since most of his followers were practicing lawyers, the book
addressed practical issues rather than speculative ones (as Abu Hanifa
did) ."'

The third school is that of Imam Shafi'i (767-820 A.D., 150-204
A.H.), known as the Shafi'i School. A pupil of Imam Malik, Shafi'i is
regarded as the founder of classical Islamic jurisprudence known as
'usul (literally meaning the "roots" of the law; in comparison with furu'
or positive law). His work has attracted a great deal of attention from
Western scholars. He carried technical legal thought "to a degree of
competence and mastery which had not been achieved before and was
hardly equaled and never surpassed after him."" His greatness lies in
striking a balance between the extreme views of the Iraqi rationalists,
and the Medinese traditionalists. The former do not pay sufficient
attention to traditions while the latter aspire to a thorough traditional
foundation of their doctrine so much that they accept traditions from
transmitters from whom it would be better not to accept them. 5
The Hanbali School was founded by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal
28. WEERAMANTRY, supranote 9, at 50.
29. Khadduri, Nature and Sources, supra note 16, at 18.
30. FVZEE, supra note 11, at 34.
31. JOSEPH SCHACHT, ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADANJURISPRUDENCE 6 (1950).
32. FYZEE, supra note 11, at 34.
33. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 9, at 51.
34. SCHACHT, supranote 31, at 1.
35. Id. at 36.
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(780-855 A.D., 164-241 A.H.), who was sometimes considered more of
a theologian or traditionalist than a jurist.s6 It is regarded as the
strictest of the schools, holding that the only roots of the law were the
Qur'an and the Sunnah"
The door of ijtihad or independent
reasoning was thought to have been closed in the fourth century of
Islamic era and jurists merely became exponents of one of the canons
of one of these schools. The books of these founders became the
standard law texts and later jurists could only annotate these works.
Muslims of one school may cross over to another without remorse
since all the schools are considered orthodox.
Apart from the four Orthodox or Sunni schools of law, another
group that is considered as distinct is the Shi'ah. The fundamental
difference between the Shi'ite and Sunni notion of law is the Shi'ite
doctrine of imamate, entitlement to the Caliphate only by descendants
of the Prophet.m The imam is infallible and sinless (ma'sum) and is the
repository of Islamic truth. This makes the Shi'ite concept of law more
authoritarian than its Sunni counterpart.3 9 However, the Shi'ah also
accepted that the Qur'an is the primary source of law without question,
and the Hadith is also accepted, but only if it is relayed by an imam. 40
"The differences between the Shiite and Sunni law in matters of detail
(furu'),"writes Khadduri, "are hardly more marked than those between
one Orthodox Sunni school of law and another. Apart from the
doctrine of the imamate,... the 41Shiite system might have constituted a
fifth madhhah, or school of law."
I. WATER POLLUTION LAW
A.

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENVIRONMENT

A thorough analysis of water quality is necessary to comprehend
the manner in which Islamic law constructs the whole phenomenon of
nature or environment.42 The word "environment," strictly meaning
36. FYZEE, supra note 11, at 35.
37. A latter Hambali scholar who elevated the school from 1260-1327 A.D. was Ibn
Taymiyyah, who improved quality of reasoning by analogy.
38. Khadduri, Nature and Sources, supra note 16, at 20. The division between Sunni
and Shi'ite Muslims became open after the demise of the fourth Caliph, Ali, in 622 A.D.
(40 A.H.). Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. The Caliphate should
have gone to one of the sons of Ali instead of the Umayad dynasty. The doctrine of
the imamate holds that the Prophet designated Ali and after him his descendants in
direct line as Caliphs. Accordingly, the twelfth imam, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan alAskari, became an imam but mysteriously disappeared in 874 A.D. No other imam has
been selected since then because his ghaybah, or absence, is temporary and he will
return as a messiah to dispense justice. During the Imam's absence, scholars may
interpret the law as agents of the Imam. Id. at 20-22.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id.at 23.
41. Id.
42. SeeJames P. Pinkerton, Enviromanticism: The Poety of Nature as PoliticalForce, 76
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 5-6 (1997). Presently, it has become fashionable to extol the virtues
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the aggregate of land, water, and air, including their organisms (or its
current connotation in Arabic, bi'ah), does not appear as such in the
Qur'an. 43
However, the various components that constitute the
environment receive abundant mention. Sea, land-locked water, rain
water, land and its varied vegetation and organisms, and outer space
are detailed therein.
Scholars have also referred to human
environment as tabi'a, also a non-Qur'anic term. Despite its apparent
similarity with bi'ah, tabi'ais not derivative but is sometimes also known
to mean nature." The most extensively used word in the Qur'an that
encompasses the environment is kaun, literally meaning the thing that
exists, presuming that it was preceded by non-existence. Kaun is based
on Islam's worldview of existentialism, the manner in which God
ordered the existence of the universe from
the command, kun or
45
"be!," God's act of initiating all that exists.
Islamic environmental philosophy indicates that all creatures exist
independent of their utility to human beings.46 The universe, and
every thing therein, is a creation of God, and humans must love and
admire the objects of the world, human and non-human. The reason
for this love is the fact that the world's objects are made by God.
of natural resources conservation. Some strands of the current biocentricism stress
equality between humans and other forms of life, see id. at 5, and others emphasize
innate and emotional affiliation of human beings to other organisms, which has been
referred to as 'biophilia,' see id. at 6.
43. Bi'ah has been used in Arabic to connote surrounding, as in a fetus' womb, a
house, the globe, or the universe. It is now used specifically to mean environment.
RASHID AL-HAMD & MUHAMMAD SAID SABARINI, AL-Bi'AT WA MUSHILATUHA 14-29 (3'

ed. 1986).
44. There is no consensus over the meaning or nature of tabi'a. The meaning
ascribed to it reflects the debate about "nature" as an intelligible, independent being
that possesses volition and reacts to effects. Consequently, tabi'a has many uses either
as a philosophical term or as a universal function. Avicenna sees it as an essential first
principle (mabda' awwal. To the Ikhwan al-Safa, (a group that was concerned about
the structure of the universe) tabi'a is one of God's angels who carries out God's
orders. Unlike the philosophers, theologians used the term tabi'a in the context of
causality to mean natural disposition of the physical entity that determines its
behavior.

See S. NOMANUL HAQ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 25-28 (1998) (defining the

word tabi'a).
45. "But His command, when He intends a thing, is only that he says unto it: Bel
[kun] and it is." Qur'an 36:81. The universe is therefore a thing that "is" through this
command.
46. "The Seven Heavens and Earth and all beings therein celebrate His praise, and
there is not a thing but hymns His praise." Qur'an 17:44. All organisms such as bees,
ants, trees, and mountains hallow the praise of God in their own way though humans
do not comprehend this. Id. See SEWVED HOSSEIN NASR, RELIGION & THE ORDER OF
NATURE 281 (1996).

47. Islam is entrenched with the notion that every creature is a symbol (ayat)
revealing an attribute of God, enjoining Muslims to contemplate the wonders of God
in nature. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Environmental Crisis, in SPIRIT AND
NATURE 86, 88-89 (Steven C. Rockefeller &John C. Elder eds., 1992). Therefore, the
purpose of creation, apart from being an avenue for appreciating the beauty and
order of nature, is related to knowing God and submission to him, and nature is the
contemplative symbol of this realityjust as the Qur'an represents the intellectual sign.
"Those who.., think deeply about the creation of the heavens and the earth, (saying):
'Our Lordl You have not created (all) this without purpose."' Qur'an 3:191.
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Humans must not condemn any object since they, their acts, and all
other creatures derive from God. Humans must be justified in
depriving any organism of its primary habitat by lofty ideals that are
consistent with their role as stewards or vicegerents of God. Excessive
exploitation of the environment driven by insatiable consumerism,
individual economic gain, or limitless development, is hardly
consistent with the trusteeship of humankind over all other matters. 8
Islam insists that humankind, despite its recognized elevation, is
closely interrelated with all other organisms, and rejects the notion
Islamic
that no other creature, apart from humans, matters. 9
environmental philosophy is not merely about romanticizing
wilderness, pantheism, equating other organisms with humans, or
demeaning nature as a dead matter. Islam views protection of the
environment as a sacred duty of humankind based upon the exalted
position the environment occupies as a higher authority responsible
for the treatment of lesser creatures. 50
B.

PUBLIC CHARACTER OF WATER

Based on the holistic nature with which Islam constructs the
universe and the interrelationship of all organisms, it is not surprising
how it seeks to regulate water quality. The development of water law
in Islam has been thoroughly studied by Muslim jurists. Much of the
interest may be due to the fact that the law permits only unpolluted
water for use in all rituals. Regulation of water quality therefore is not
a domain where one finds substantial divergence in jurists' opinions.
Islamic law adopted a system of water law that recognizes riparian
rights, establishes a community of water use, and strictly controls
appropriative rights. 1
48. Islam considers humans to be a part of a single structure of the universe that is
intimately interrelated. Humans are at the apex of this structure on earth wherein
they are to act as representatives of God, taking God's due and giving them their own
due. Qur'an 2:30. The Qur'an also states, "[wie offered the Trust to the heavens and
the earth and the mountains, but they drew back from bearing it and feared to do so.
It is Man who bore it." Id. 33:72. Man's position in this structure does not imbue him
with the power to destroy, to re-create, or to rule over nature; otherwise, man would
have taken ultimate authority.
49.

SEWED HOSSEIN NASR, MAN AND NATURE: THE SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF MODERN MAN

94 (1968).
50. It is reported from the Prophet Muhammad that one of the previous prophets
once sat down under a tree and was bitten by an ant whereupon he ordered the tree
and the ant colony to be burnt. Allah reproached him, saying, "Have you destroyed a
whole community that glorifies Me because of an ant that bit you?" 4 SAHIH ALBuKHARi, THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 162 (Muhammad

Muhsin Khan trans., 1985).
51. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAw, supra note 1, at 69.
No one can refuse surplus water without sinning against Allah and against
man. Also animals must not be allowed to die of thirst, and the water which
remains after a man has quenched his thirst must be given to them. It would
seem that the Prophet Mohammed declared that water should be, together
with pasture and fire, the common entitlement of all Moslems, that he
prohibited the selling of it, and that he had established a community of water
use among men (citations omitted).
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Generally, the law requires a person to exercise a higher standard
of care where his action adversely affects the interest of the public or
may cause injury to it. 52 Thus a person may undertake any kind of
activity on his land to the extent that he does not degrade it or expose
any beings, human or non-human, to danger. 5 This requirement is
more pronounced in the case of water which, unlike land, is a resource
held in common by society. "The fundamentals of Islamic water law
purport to ensure that water is available to all members of the Moslem
community. This is why in many modem Moslem countries water
legislation considers water resources as belonging to the whole
community, i.e., the state, or the public domain. 54 An individual's
water right is limited by its priority of use, and it is not a commodity for
exclusive ownership, despite personal expenses in its acquisition or
purification.5
The Majallahprovides that people have the right to use water from
all sources, including those on private property. Private acquisition
or sale of water or water rights is still uncommon in the Islamic world.
Although water may be acquired through ownership of land on which
it is located, the right of the public to use such water for specific
purposes cannot be denied. 7 Water is considered common property.
Therefore, exclusive proprietary interests are not ordinarily permitted.
If an ownership right entitles one to an exclusive use, and to freely
dispose of a commodity, then under Islamic law water cannot be the
Id.
52. It is obvious also that a private injury is tolerated in order to ward off a public
one. MAJALLAH, art. 26. Majallah is the first compilation, and codification as such, of
civil Islamic law. It was promulgated by the Ottoman Empire in 1869 for the use of the
newly established Civil Courts, and was later found in various forms in most Islamic
territories of the time. F. M. Goadby, The Moslem Law of Civil Delict As Illustrated by the
Mejelle, 21 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INTL' L. 62, 62 (1939). See Au IBN BAKR, THE HEDAYA, OR
GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE MUSSULMAN LAW (Charles Hamilton trans., Islamic
Book Trust 1982).
53. ABUBAKAR AHMED BAGADER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN ISLAM 9 ( 2 d
ed. 1994).
For to cause the degradation of this gift of God, upon which so many forms
of life depend, is to deny His tremendous favors. And because any act that
leads to its destruction or degradation leads necessarily to the destruction
and degradation of life on earth, such acts are categorically forbidden.
Id.
54.

CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW, supra note 1, at 68.

55. Jurists laid down in great detail the priority of water usage in various
circumstances, such as drinking, domestic, and industrial rights. For instance, the
order of priority for riparian users begins with users nearest to the water, followed by
earlier established water rights, and ending by lands located on a higher ground. Id.
at 71-72.
56. MAJALLAH, art. 1263. Majallah is the first compilation, and codification as such,
of civil Islamic law. It was promulgated by the Ottoman Empire in 1869 for the use of
the newly established Civil Courts, and was later found in various forms in most Islamic
territories of the time. F. M. Goadby, The Moslem Law of Civil Delict As Illustratedby the
Mejelle, 21 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 62, 62 (1939). See ALI IBN BAKR, THE HEDAYA, OR
GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE MUSSULMAN LAw (Charles Hamilton trans., Islamic

Book Trust 1982).
57. D. A. CAPONERA, WATER LAWS IN MOSLEM COUNTRIES 38-39 (1973).
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subject of private appropriation." The Prophet set forth the principle
when he said: "All members of the community are equal partners in
three things: water, fire, and pasture."59
C. WATER QUALITY

Having established that water may not be exclusively appropriated,
the next concern lies in examining rules of Islamic law that regulate
sources and discharges of pollutants into water bodies. In its natural
condition, all water is presumed clean. Water must be conserved.
Further, the government must place water pollution prevention in
high priority. As a common resource, everyone is obliged to keep all
waters clean. Regarding the water of rivers, the Prophet said, "Its water
is clean. '6° In this regard, clean water does not necessarily suggest
suitability for human consumption. Water is clean (tahir)when it is in
its natural state or distilled form.6'
Jurists extensively elaborate on water quality that may be utilized
for ritual purposes. Water loses its purity when a contaminant changes
its color, taste, or odor and, therefore, pollutes it (najis).62
Accordingly, the law has classified water into four categories with
respect to its quality. According to Sayyid Sabiq, the first is mutlaq
water and is constituted by rainwater, snow and hail, sea water, altered
water, and water from the Zamzam Well in Mecca.' All other natural
bodies of water are also mutlaq, even where they become altered.
However, the alteration must be due to long-term storage resulting
from its natural course or location. Altered water also includes water
that is mixed with natural substances that cannot be removed, such as
algae or tree leaves. The second classification of water is used water,
which refers to water that has been used for ablution (ghusl). Third is
water that is mixed with pure elements. All water mixed with pure
elements is legally clean. Finally, there is water that is mixed with
impure elements. This last classification is further divided into two
58. Reviews of water laws of leading Muslim countries reflect this principle. "It
appears that in Moslem countries modern codifications of water law aim at
institutionalizing, in one form or another, the concept of community of interest in
water resources which constitutes the traditional basis of Moslem customary water law."
CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAw, supra note 1, at 75.
59. BAGADER, supranote 53, at 7; see also CAPONERA, supra note 1, at 69.
60. This was said in the context of questioning cleanliness of rivers. One of his
companions, apparently a seaman, complained about the inadequacy of potable water
on the high seas for ritual washing. MAUK IBN ANAS, AL-MUwATrA', § 27 (Abdel-Magid
Turki ed., 1994).
61. "And We send down pure water from the sky." Qur'an 25:48. "And He caused
rain to descend on you from heaven to cleanse you therewith." Id. 8:11. In their
natural state, different waters perform different functions: "It is He Who has made the
sea of service, that you may eat thereof flesh that is fresh and tender, and that you may
bring forth from it ornaments to wear, and you see the ships therein that plough the
waves, that you may see His bounty." Id. 16:14.
62. J.C. Wilkinson, Islamic Water Law with Special Reference to Oasis Settlement, 1 J. ARID
ENV'Ts 87, 89 (1978).
63. SAYYiD SABiQ, FIQH Us-SUNNAH 1-2 (Muhammad Sa'eed Dabas &Jamal al-Din M.
Zarabozo trans., 1991).
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subcategories.
First is impurity that does not alter any of its
characteristics (taste, color, and odor). This is also considered clean
for ritual purposes. Second is impurity that overwhelms the water such
that one of its characteristics of taste, color, or odor is adversely
affected. Only this subcategory is considered unclean and polluted
under the law." The presumption of Islamic law is that water cannot
be anything but clean. "The rationale is simple: everything that falls
under the general term of water, without any further qualifications, is
considered pure ...""
Good management and water conservation are express
requirements of the law. There is no acceptable reason to engage in
water waste, not even for what is considered the most important of all
uses-washing for prayer. An encounter between a companion who
was washing for prayer and the Prophet himself illustrates this point.
The Prophet observed his companion's extravagance in his use of
water and asked, 'What is this wastage, 0 Sa'ad?" Sa'ad said, "Is there
wastage even in washing for prayer?" 'Yes, even if you are by a flowing
river!" the Prophet replied.6
By its status as common resource, water belongs to the realm of
matters that are technically referred to in Islamic law as huquq Allah, or
rights of God. 6' These rights are so called, not because they are
eschatological or next worldly in enforcement but because their
enforcement is highly emphasized by God. Compared with huquq al'ibad, or rights of humankind, which are mainly contractual or
tortious, the rights of Allah cannot be remitted, pardoned, relaxed, or
compromised. The judge, plaintiff, or the state has little discretion on
their strict enforcement. The rights of Allah include those that touch
and concern public interests as a whole, with no specific attachment to
any one person.6
The same requirement of enforcement is
demanded, albeit with a modicum of discretion for the judge (or in
appropriate cases the plaintiff) where the rights of Allah and those of
humankind become entwined.
The importance of these rights to water pollution is that waters,
especially those that run on public land such as rivers and bays, cannot
be anything but part of the rights of Allah. If not, then at least a
mixture of both categories of rights. Historically, water has been
accorded a higher priority for management and protection. Inviolable
rights such as those conferred by incidences of proprietorship are
made subservient to water rights. In one case a plaintiff, al-Dahak,
wanted to acquire water by digging a canal. The only way he could
reach the water was by digging through the land of Muhammad Ibn
Muslimah, the defendant. The defendant strongly opposed the idea of

64. Id.at 4.
65. Id.at 2.
66. BAGADER, supra note 53, at 6.

67. ABUL HASSAN 'ALl IBN MUHAMMAD IBN HABIB AL-BAs~i AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM
AL-SULTANIYAH WAL WLAYAT AL-DINYYAH 273 (1978).
68. Id.
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a canal passing through his property. Caliph Umar decided in favor of
the plaintiff, notwithstanding the defendant's strong objection6
Similar concern should be used to prevent the misuse of water,
notwithstanding that it offends individual proprietary rights. The
authorities have a higher responsibility in protecting water as a
resource than they do in enforcing other laws. This responsibility is
discharged once the state takes positive steps to clean polluted waters
or maintain them in their natural condition by regulating polluters'
activities. In any event, the law requires that water be kept free from
pollution so that it may continue to perform its social and religious
functions, as well as serve as habitat for a great number of creatures. A
polluted body of water cannot be used for an, lawful purpose such as
drinking, swimming, washing, and navigation.
The laws for maintaining water quality are not premised on
property law or even on tort law. They are ecocentric, based solely on
the character of water. For instance, landowners where groundwater is
located are liable for polluting it without further inquiry. It is
immaterial whether the polluting activity occurred on private or public
property. Liability is contingent on the simple notion that, strictly
speaking, one cannot "own" water and is, therefore, liable for polluting
public property. One's state of mind is irrelevant to the question of
liability, thereby barring intent-based defenses. Preventing water
pollution on public land is even less complicated under Islamic
jurisprudence. Therefore, unlike the state's insignificant power of
control over pollution on developed private lands, its authority over
water is tremendous. This is because water is not ordinarily susceptible
to private ownership. Since such right is non-existent, the state's
power to effectively regulate water pollution is theoretically without
limit. Indeed the legal requirement for harims, or protective areas for
water bodies, further strengthens the need to prevent water pollution.
IBNANAS, supra note 60, 36 BOOK OFJUDGMENTS § 36.26.33, at 346.
70. In its natural form water serves various purposes some of which are known and
others yet unknown to humankind. "And we send down pure water from the sky,
thereby to bring to life a dead land and slake the thirst of that which We have created cattle and men in multitudes." Qur'an 25:50. Fishing is also part of it. "Lawful to you
is the pursuit of water-game and its use for food - a provision for you, and for those
who travel." Id. 5:96. "It is He Who subjected to you the sea, that you may eat thereof
flesh that is fresh and tender, and that you may extract therefrom ornaments to wear;
and you see the ships therein that plough the waves, that you may seek of the bounty
of God and that you may be grateful." Id. 16:14.
According to Dr. Bakhashab, that water pollution is punishable by God should be
Additionally, water pollution is an
sufficient deterrence against pollution.
infringement against the right of the innocent public to utilize the resource:
Pollution of water such as that caused by the disposal of vast quantities of
waste created by industry and other developments of modern life may also
infringe upon this right [the right of public to use] and is thus also a
transgression of the rights of all, which is a clear contradiction of the will of
the Almighty and, while it is sinful to refuse water to a wayfarer, for which
one deserves to be sorely punished on the day ofjudgment, spoiling water by
polluting it is also punishable by the wrath of God.
Dr. Omar A. Bakhashab, Islamic Law and the Environment: Some Basic Principles, 3 ARAB
L. Q. 287, 293 (1988).

69.
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D. HARIM OR PROTECTIVE ZONE
Harim is a devise that was first developed by the Prophet and
expounded by jurists to protect water from being polluted, among
other things.' The Prophet "recognized that the ownership of canals,
wells and other water sources entailed the ownership of a certain
extent of bordering land or harim on which it was forbidden to dig a
new well .... 72 Harim is mainly associated with watercourses and
rivers, but is also applicable to lands." It is the land that immediately
adjoins all the corners of a well or the bank of a river. 4 It is the buffer
zone surrounding a water body within which human activities, apart
from the lawful use of water, are prohibited. The cardinal rule of
harimsadjoining waters is that they must remain undeveloped.7 5
Literally meaning an area or zone that is protected, harim has been
defined legally in size and distance according to the type of water it
protects. The issue of fixing suitable buffer zones for each water body
is left to experts in the field of hydrology. There is no fixed diameter
or size of zones abutting these waters. The base requirement for the
diameter is such width as will prevent pollution. Furthermore, a harim
on privately owned property surrounding a water source, such as a
well, belongs to the owner of the property and the government cannot
allocate it to a third party.' 6

IV. ISLAMIC REGULATORY REGIME CONSIDERED
River Harims are often referred to as "wetlands."
When
establishing practical regulatory regimes to maintain water quality and
regulate the use of wetlands, contemporary Muslim governments are at
liberty to set limits for a particular wetland depending on experts'
understandings of area's hydrology and its aquatic ecosystem. This is

71. 'UTHMAN IBN FUDI, BAYAN WUJUB AL-HijRA 'ALA 'L-'IBAD 72 (F.H. El Masri ed. &
trans., 1978).
72. CAPONERA, PRINCIPALS OF WATER LAW, supra note 1, at 69.
73. By its broadest connotation, harim is a site associated with a developed area that
must itself remain undeveloped. Every developed area such as a residence, a
farmhouse, a well, or a bay, has its own harim.
74. IBN FUDI, supra note 71, at 73.
75. Id. at 72.
76. Id. at 73. "None of [the harims have] any specific limit. For instance, "[tihe
haim for a well used for irrigation or the like is the area around it which might cause
harm to its water or to one taking water from it." Id. "Those knowledgeable in this
matter should be consulted about it." Id. However, articles 1281-1291 of the Majallah
fix different limits for different harims as follows: the harim of springs is 500 cubits, of
wells it is 40 cubits, and of rivers it is one half of its width. MAJALLAH, supra note 52,
arts. 1281-91.
77. In the U.S., "[t]he term "wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support... a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1998). Private individuals may own wetlands but they must obtain
permits before discharging dredged or fill material into such wetlands that are
adjacent to waters and their tributaries. See id. § 323.3.
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because jurists set different dimensions and sizes for wetlands. The
purpose of fixing limits on wetlands, as stated by Imam Malik, is to
prevent pollution of the water. Different limits will serve different
waters.78 An argument may be made for a conditional lease ('ijarah).
However, regulation by permits effectuate better protection due to a
presumption that permits ('ijazah) are issued after regulators consider
a host of factors, such as social and economic benefits of a given
project to society. Such consideration may not be necessary or
required by a lease. The added fact that wetlands cannot be subjected
to private ownership makes permit-based regulation appealing.
However, criteria for issuing permits must reflect the principles
governing each medium of pollution. A remarkable feature of wetland
permits under Islamic law is that, although the authorities may not
revoke a permit when a permitee fully complies with the conditions,
they may revoke one that was issued in contravention of Islamic rules
on wetlands.
Thus, offshore oil spills must be cleaned and
compensated for by oil companies because, under Islamic law, their
permit or agreement cannot license them to pollute. It is noteworthy
that oil and other mineral resources are owned by the state, according
to the prevailing view of Muslim jurists. 9 Like the Regalia system in
Europe, ownership of land does not include ownership of the
subsurface minerals." The only issue of concern is to put a credible
mechanism in place to respond to emergencies so that irreparable
damage is not done to marine life.
From the foregoing, it is clear that in regulating water pollution,
Islamic law adopts a command-and-control mechanism, by which is
meant a scheme that prohibits certain conduct without reservation and
stipulates a penalty for those who contravene it. It is immaterial that
society benefits immensely from the activity that breeds the pollution.
In comparison with other known systems, this mechanism is possible
under Islamic law because of the few avenues that exist for exclusive
private appropriation of water resources.
Of course, there is nothing under the law restricting one
mechanism to any one medium of pollution. However, given the
current policy on water resources, economic regulatory techniques
cannot be the bedrock for controlling water pollution in Islam, in
contrast with the United States, where economic regulation of land
and all other pollution is far more pervasive. This is consistent with
the theory of private ownership prevalent in the United States.
However, polluters who would have escaped liability have been
78. The size of a harim may be delimited but this may be changed as the need
arises. Sahnun and others actually fixed sizes of harims as follows: the harim of a well
that is being used for irrigation, a house, and a valley in unoccupied land, are twenty
cubits. Ibn Shihab stated that the harim of a spring is five hundred cubits and the
harim of a river is a thousand cubits. IBN FUDI, supra note 71, at 73. A cubit is 0.758
meters. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAw, supra note 1, at 74.
79. WALLED M.H. EL-MALIK, MINERALS INVESTMENT UNDER THE SHARI'A LAw 55
(1993).
80. Id.
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consequently contained in legislation through the concept of strict
liability."' Because it is also important to derive rules from other nonIslamic sources as a shortcut for environmental protection, these
sources need to be reconciled with Islamic legal principles.
Otherwise, if contrary to Shari'ah, these mechanisms will not be
implemented effectively. For example, the strict liability principles
embedded in the United States "Superfund" law or CERCLA, are too
divergent from the Islamic norm to be introduced into the scheme of
Islamic law.83
In Muslim countries, water is polluted mainly through identifiable
industrial activities, oil spills, and agricultural runoff from non-point
sources. The legal response of governments in controlling water
pollution depends on ascertaining facts about pollutants. Such facts,
necessary to determine potential harmful effects, include
identification, concentration, and quantity criteria. Depending on the
cost of enforcement, the susceptibility of a pollutant to detection, and
the characteristic or nature of water use, authorities may chose
between regulating discharges of pollutants to the waters (a
technology-based regulation) and protecting the water's natural
quality (water quality-based regulation). In any event, maintainin
water quality in Islam is a legal decision, rather than a political one.
81. For instance, under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCIA"), as amended by
Superfund Amendments and the Reauthorization Act of 1986, the standard of liability
is without regard to intent, fault, or negligence. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). In other
words, liability is strict. An owner or operator of a regulated conduct is liable unless
his pollution meets the narrow "federally permitted release" as defined under section
101 (10). His liability still stands even where the release was perfectly legal and without
negligence at the time it was carried out. See Bruce Howard, A New Justificationfor
Retroactive Liability in CERCLA: An Appreciation of the Synergy Between Common and
Statutory Law, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 847, 849 (1998).
82. Non-Islamic sources may include statutes such as the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), which the legislature intended to regulate active
disposal of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994). However, RCRA failed to
address the problem of inactive or abandoned waste sites. Irene C. Warshauer & Lynn
Ann Stansel, Analyzing the Relationship Between the Civil, Governmental, and Criminal
Obligations and Liabilitiesfor Hazardous Waste, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 37, 51 (1986). As a
consequence, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 was enacted with the intention "to establish a program of
response to the release of hazardous substances from any type of facility, regardless of
time of disposal." Id.
83. These principles are embedded in CERCLA and have been consistently
reaffirmed by the United States courts. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm.
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8" Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding
that "(1) CERCLA applies retroactively, (2) the government can recover its preenactment response costs under CERCLA, (3) RCRA imposes strict liability... [and]
(6) appellants had the burden of (proof] .... "). Id. at 749.
84. Another set of fundamental rules which is often ignored in discussion of
Muslim water concerns water quality. This is probably because they are elaborated in
connection with ritual ablution (tahara). These recognize that only water in its
original state, or distilled, is pure (tahir); it is polluted (najis) if it has changed in
colour, taste or smell, but may be considered clean (tahir) if it is flowing or in a
sufficiently large body ....
Such rules provide an adequate legal framework for
agricultural purposes also, and traditional irrigation systems ensure that the primary

Issue 2

ISLAMIC WATER LAW

The authorities are obliged to keep water clean not so much for
hygiene but for ritual cleansing and for preserving marine habitats.
Authorities in Muslim countries are under a higher obligation than
contemporary governments to maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of their water. Given the legal status of water, they
need not completely adopt a permit-based scheme in regulating
effluent. 5 Considering the improvement in water quality in the
United States, nothing is wrong with a permit-based system that is
efficiently utilized. Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful that a pervasive
permit scheme can be efficiently operated in Muslim countries without
extensive inspection institutions and a complicated body of laws and
subsidiary legislation. However, this may be unnecessary given the fact
that governments in Muslim countries are not as constitutionally
constrained as the United States Congress in regulating water or water
pollution.
Susceptibility of an environmental element to exclusive private
ownership sometimes restricts general government regulation of the
element. In the United States, Congress needs to balance its concern
for regulating pollutants with the constitutional restriction on
infringement on private property rights.8' The power of Congress to
acquire and dispose of property of all kinds is limited by the
requirement that compensation must be paid for such takings. 8 Thus,
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
unjustified the argument that the public be given free access to a
privately owned and developed waterway without payment of
channel system remains uncontaminated by seepage from water that has already been
used for cultivation ....
Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 89.
85. In the United States, for instance, direct discharges of pollutants from point
sources is possible through a scheme of permitting. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)-(b) (1994).
A permit may be water quality based or, in most cases, technology based. Id. §
1314(a). Accordingly, there are three phases of guidelines governing effluent
limitations that are technology based, depending on whether a pollutant is: (1)
conventional (e.g., oil and grease industry that employs "best practicable control
technology"); (2) non-conventional; (3) or toxic (e.g., iron and heavy metals industries
that employs "best available demonstrated control technology"). Separate effluent
limitations are based not on the available technology but on the water quality. Setting
water quality standards is a separate program whereby a state designates appropriate
uses for its waters, and criteria or ambient pollutant levels that will allow such uses. A
total maximum daily load of particular pollutants necessary to maintain the water
quality standards is then established. Id. § 1313(d).
86. Some of the statutes include the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-500, 72 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); the
Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C., and 46 U.S.C.); and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
87. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
....
.U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3.
88. The takings clause of the United States Constitution states "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
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compensation." Although the case involved proprietorship of a bay
and continued power of the United States to regulate it, the case
demonstrates that the government may not impose regulations that
infinge upon such rights without compensation. In contrast, Islamic
law provides the government with liberty to regulate waters and water
pollution. Muslim governments have wider scope in regulating water
pollution than that of land.9 Consequently, there is no reason for a
complicated scheme regulating the hydrological cycle in its entirely.
V. CONCLUSION
In Islamic countries a government that is uncommitted to
sustained enforcement and monitoring of water quality standards is in
error. Polluted water is not only harmful to humans, but also
endangers all aquatic life that exists in it. Governmental obligations
are not limited to humans but include all life. The scheme of the law
in helping to fulfill this high responsibility is remarkable.
By
excluding water in all its important forms from the dominion of
exclusive ownership, Islamic law disposes of the usual problem of
balancing proprietary rights, which is no less sacrosanct, with
conflicting public interests.
The above understanding of the law on maintaining water quality
needs to be incorporated into current efforts by Muslim governments
to strengthen their environmental legislation and enforcement
procedures. There is no good reason for partial application of Islamic
water law in these communities; unless governments are the biggest
water polluters, in which case they have little incentive to adopt these
principles. As it were, however, these water law principles constitute a
legal requirement binding on Muslim governments.

89. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that the
government may not, without invoking its eminent domain power and paying just
compensation, require owners of a marina that had, as result of improvements,
become a navigable water of the United States, to allow free access to the marina).
90. Islamic law requires minimum effort by a committed government to enforce
water regulation because individuals have little protected rights on the matter.
Recently, based on the revived understanding of its responsibilities to the environment
as prescribed by Islamic law, the Saudi Arabian Government, through its National
Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development, embarked on a plan to
protect the water quality of the Red Sea, among other things. It has designated thirtythree marine reserves in the Red Sea and fourteen in the Arabian Gulf. See Saudi
Wildlife Conservation, WHOLE EARTH: ACCESS TO TooLs, IDEAS, AND PRAC., Winter 1997,
at 43 (citing Information Office of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia). On the other
hand, government is not endowed with similar liberty and must respect private
ownership of land in regulating land pollution. Damage suffered by or through
dangerous objects on a property, without contribution or negligence of the owner,
does not amount to a legal wrong. Thus an independent contractor may not recover
damages from an owner of a mine or asbestos factory should he suffer injury to his
body or health, for the Prophet said injuries inflicted by animals, wells, and mines are
to be overlooked. See 3 AL-BUKHAw, supra note 50, at 318.
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INTRODUCTION
seemingly
despite its single and
policy,
Antidegradation
circumscribed reference in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

("Clean Water Act"),' potentially provides a powerful means of
ensuring the quality of our nation's waters.

Until recently, it has

existed as a little used and often misunderstood provision.

However,

increased attention by the government,3 environmental advocates, and
environmental litigators' signals the vitalization of antidegradation
Like the 1996-1997
policy as an environmental protection tool.
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. §
1313(d) (4)(B) (1994). Certain effluent limitations and water quality standards "may
be revised only if such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation
policy established under this section." Id.
2. The EPA recognized both the potential benefits and the current underuse of
antidegradation policies in its recent Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Advance Notice of Proposed
regarding water quality standards regulation.
Rulemaking, Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36742, 36780 (1998)
"EPA's current thinking is that the
[hereinafter ANPRM, WQS Regulation].
antidegradation policy is significantly underused as a tool to attain and maintain water
quality and plan for and channel important economic and social development that
can impact water quality." Id.; seeJohn Harleston, What is AntidegradationPolicy: Does
Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVrL. L.J. 33 (1996); Alessandro G. Olivieri, Note, New York's
Antidegradation Policy: An Analysis of its Compliance with Federal Standards and its
Vulnerability to Legal Challenges, 17 COLUM. J. ENvT. L. 205 (1992); cf. United States
Environmental Protection Agency Region VIII, Water Management Division, EPA
Region VIII Guidance:AntidegradationImplementation 47 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter Region
VIII Guidance]. A study by the National Wildlife Federation concluded: The "EPA's
[antidegradation] policy has failed." NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WATERS AT RISK:
KEEPING CLEAN WATERS CLEAN at vii (May 1992) [hereinafter NWF STUDY]
(concentrating solely on the highest water classification scheme, Outstanding National
Resource Waters, of antidegradation policy). Furthermore, antidegradation has
received very little scholarly attention, comprising the principal subject of only two law
review articles.
3. Recent statements by the Clinton Administration and the EPA indicate that
antidegradation will develop into a powerful tool to protect the nation's waters. In the
Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting America's Waters, the Clinton
Administration released its designs for the future of water protection, including a call
to strengthen antidegradation applicability to non-point sources of pollution. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and
14, 1998)
Protecting America's Waters, at ch. II (last modified Feb.
<http://www.epa.gov/cleanwater/action/c2c.html> [hereinafter Clean Water Action
Plan] (presenting plan produced by the Department of Agriculture to Vice-President
Al Gore). As discussed infra Part III.C., this policy change would represent a
significant deviation from traditional antidegradation policy by expressly seeking to
apply it to non-point sources. Furthermore, the EPA's Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking concerning water quality standards regulation seeks comments on a
number of measures that would strengthen antidegradation policy. ANPRM, WQS
Regulation, supra note 2, at 36, 779-87.
4. See generally NWF STUDY, supra note 2 (evaluating state implementation of
antidegradation policy).
have increased
decisions addressing antidegradation
5. Administrative
substantially since 1994, and judicial decisions have increased, although at a lesser
pace, since 1996.
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"explosion" of litigation that challenged state implementation of Total
Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") requirements,' litigation in the next
few years may well utilize the protections of antidegradation policy to
improve the rivers, streams, and lakes of this country.
The Clean Water Act seeks to "restore and maintain the chemical,
of the Nation's waters."" Based on the
physical, and biological integrity
"spirit, intent, and goals"9 of the Clean Water Act, antidegradation
policy works within the water quality standards framework of the Act:
use designations establish goals for a waterbody; water quality criteria
define the conditions needed to achieve those goals; and
antidegradation policy provides the decision-making framework to
evaluate decreases to water quality endangering those goals. While
federal Clean Water Act regulations charge the states with
promulgation and implementation authority for antidegradation
policy,'0 the federal government retains strong oversight powers
antidegradation
minimum
of
establishment
the
through
requirements11 and review and approval authority. 2 Under this federal
6. Dianne K. Conway, Note, TMDL Litigation:So Now What?2, 17 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 83,
97 (1997). Conway documents the early unsuccessful attempts to compel state TMDL
statutory and regulatory compliance in the late 1970s; the birth of the "constructive
submission" doctrine in Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); and
recent successful litigation in Idaho and Georgia, followed by the "explosion in TMDL
litigation" in 1996 and 1997. Id. at 93-96.
7. See generally Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994); 40 C.F.R. §
130.7 (1998).
8. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
9. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards
Handbook, at § 4.1 (2nd ed. Aug. 1994) [hereinafter WQS Second Edition].
10. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1998).
11. As set forth in the regulations, the federal government retains strong oversight
powers over state antidegradation implementation. Clean Water Act § 303(d) (4) (B),
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1998). The federal antidegradation
policy states:
(a) The State shall develop and adopt a statewide antidegradation policy and
identify the methods for implementing such policy pursuant to this subpart.
The antidegradation policy and implementation methods shall, at a
minimum, be consistent with the following:
(1) Existing instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary
to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.
(2) Where the quality of the waters exceed levels necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the
water, that quality shall be maintained and protected unless the State
finds, after full satisfaction of the intergovernmental coordination and
public participation provisions of the State's continuing planning
process, that allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommodate
important economic or social development in the area in which the
waters are located. In allowing such degradation or lower water quality,
the State shall assure water quality adequate to protect existing uses fully.
Further, the State shall assure that there shall be achieved the highest
statutory and regulatory requirements for all new and existing point
sources and all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices
for nonpoint source control.
(3) Where high quality waters constitute an outstanding National
resource, such as waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges
and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance, that
water quality shall be maintained and protected.
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direction, states must assign classification tiers to waterbodies, develop
standards of protection within each of these tiers, and ensure that all
regulated activities comply with these protection standards."
The following discussion examines antidegradation policy as set
forth in the Clean Water Act, state statutes, pertinent regulations, case
Part I addresses the historical
law, and agency guidelines.
development of antidegradation policy, providing insight into the
driving forces which ultimately shape its application by the states. Part
II discusses the operation of antidegradation policy, examining the
triggering circumstances, the waterbody classification scheme, and the
Part III
applicable protection standards for each classification.
examines important issues affecting the future of antidegradation
policy as an environmental protection tool through an analysis of state
approaches to the antidegradation policy prescribed by the federal
government.
I.

HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF ANTIDEGRADATION POUCIES

Antidegradation golicy predates the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, having first emerged as a Department of the
Interior policy guideline addressing the water quality standards of the
Water Quality Act of 1965 ('WQA").' 5 "The water quality standards
proposed by a state should provide for... [t]he maintenance and
protection of quality and use or uses of waters now of a high quality or
In his
of a quality suitable for present and potential future uses. ''
1968 press release 7 Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall fortified
antidegradation policy as a component of water protection by
requiring states to include an antidegradation provision in the water
While the 1965 act
quality standards required under the WQA.'
(4) In those cases where potential water quality impairment associated
with a thermal discharge is involved, the antidegradation policy and
implementing method shall be consistent with section 316 of the [Clean
Water Act].
40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
12. 40 C.F.R. § 131.21 (1998).
13. Id. § 131.12.
14. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (1994).
15. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (superseded by the FWPCA). While
these guidelines did not use the term "antidegradation" or "nondegradation," they
articulated the basis for what would later become antidegradation policy.
16. ANPRM, WQS Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,779 (quoting the Department of
Interior policy guidelines).
17. United States Dept. of the Interior, Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration, Compendium of Department of the InteriorStatements on Non-Degradationof
InterstateWaters 1-2 (Aug. 1968) [hereinafter Compendium] (reprinting Secretary Udall's
February 8, 1968 Press Release); cf John Harleston, What is AntidegradationPolicy: Does
Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENvrL. L.J., 33, 39-48 (1996) (providing one of the few articles
extensively addressing antidegradation, but arguing antidegradation policy emerged
with Udall's 1968 press release).
18. Compendium, supra note 17, at 1-2. Secretary Udall articulated the criteria
which would form the basis of antidegradation policy. He provided:
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contained no explicit reference to antidegradation, the Secretary
considered the act's "spirit, intent, and goals," '9 articulated in the
Declaration of Purpose, sufficient justification for providing the
establishment of an antidegradation policy. This antidegradation
policy was included in the EPA's Water Quality Standards Regulation
in 19751 and refined in the 1983 regulations. 2 Congress did not
explicitly recognize antidegradation statutorily until the 1987 Clean
Water Act amendments,
when it required satisfaction of
antidegradation requirements prior to the issuance or revision of water
quality standards, TMDLs, and effluent discharge permits. 4
The early manifestations of antidegradation policy revealed two
competing interests which shaped both the formulation and
implementation of current antidegradation policy: ensuring the future

I have concluded that in order to be consistent with the basic policy and
objective of the Water Quality Act a provision in all State standards
substantially in accordance with the following is required:
Waters whose existing quality is better than the established standards as
of the date on which such standards become effective will be maintained
at their existing high quality. These and other waters of a State will not
be lowered in quality unless and until it has been affirmatively
demonstrated to the State water pollution control agency and the
Department of the Interior that such change is justifiable as a result of
necessary economic or social development and will not interfere with or
become injurious to any assigned uses made of, or presently possible in,
such waters. This will require that any industrial, public or private
project or development which would constitute a new source of
pollution or an increased source of pollution to high quality waters will
be required, as part of the initial project design, to provide the highest
and best degree of waste treatment available under existing technology,
and, since these are also Federal standards, these waste treatment
requirements will be developed cooperatively.
Id.
19. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.1; see Compendium, supra note 17, at 1
(reprinting Secretary Udall's Press Statement).
20. The Declaration of Purpose stated: "The purpose of this Act is to enhance the
quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for the
prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution." Water Quality Act of 1965, §
4, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (amending the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(e) (1975) (requiring states to develop antidegradation
policies and implementation procedures).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1983).
The 1983 revisions to the antidegradation
regulations contained only four textual modifications. However, three of those
changes merely clarified previous articulations. The fourth alteration substantively
changed the protection standard of Outstanding National Resource Waters
("ONRW"), the highest classification, from "[n]o degradation shall be allowed" to
"water quality shall be maintained and protected."
Water Quality Standards
Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983). In commenting on the reasons for
this change, the agency expressed concern that "waters which properly could have
been designated as ONRW were not being so designated because of the flat no
designation provision .... " Id.
23. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
24. These three activities constitute the minimum "triggering activities" expressly
required by the statute for antidegradation review. For a discussion of these triggers,
see infra Part II.B.
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quality of the nation's waters25 and avoiding the "stif [ing of] further
economic development in areas where interstate waters are of high
quality. '26 The policy protected waters from further degradation, but
also allowed some degree of water quality diminishment upon
compliance
with procedural..steps and a showing of economic or social
27
need.
Current state policies reflect this dichotomy: they balance
water quality protections against the maintenance of continued
economic growth, manifesting, in the actual operation of the policies,
state reticence to provide stringent water quality protections due to
fear of limitations on future growth.
II.

OPERATION OFANTIDEGRADATION POICIES

The Clean Water Act 8 and its regulations' control the
implementation and operation of antidegradation policy by
establishing federally mandated minimum requirements that state
antidegradation policies must meet or exceed." The Clean Water Act
requires that revisions to prescribed regulated activities"' comply with
the antidegradation policy. 2 The regulations expand on this mandate
25. In articulating the protection interest, Secretary Udall stated, "it is imperative
that there be no compromise with the Declaration of Policy as now set forth in the
[WQA]." Compendium, supra note 17, at 2. While the Clean Water Act's current
declaration of congressional goals redefines the purpose of the Act to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," the
EPA recognized the continued consistency of an antidegradation policy with the
redefined purposes of the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (1994); see WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.1 ("Antidegradation was
originally based on the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act, especially the clause "...
restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters" [sic] (utilizing current statement of policy to support origination of
antidegradation policies)); Harleston, supra note 17, at 45 (arguing the change in
policy articulation provided greater statutory authority for antidegradation policies).
26. Compendium, supra note 17, at 2. The Secretary noted the "imperative" nature
of considering this conflicting interest. Id.; cf., e.g., id. at 23-26 (providing discussion
between Secretary Udall and Representative Cramer concerning the impact of
antidegradation on industry); id. at 27-35 (providing discussion between Secretary
Udall and Representatives Cramer and McEwen concerning the impact of
antidegradation on industry). Certain states' adoption of a fourth tier classification,
Tier 2.5, provides one example of the continued fear of stifling economic growth. As
noted by the EPA, one of the principle rationales behind the adoption of the fourth
tier was the states' fear that utilization of the most stringent tier would prevent them
from acting on important social and economic development interests. WQS Second
Edition, supra note 9, at 4-2.
27. For an expansion of these procedural steps, and the economic or social need
showings, see infra Part II.B.
28. Clean WaterAct § 303(d) (4) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B) (1994).
29. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.1-131.37 (1998).
30. Id. § 131.12(a).
31. This article addresses these triggering activities, infraPart II.B.
32. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B). The full text of
this provision provides:
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the quality of such
waters equals or exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use for
such waters or otherwise required by applicable water quality standards, any
effluent limitation based on a [TM DL or other waste load allocation
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by laying out the minimum level of antidegradation protections" and
the procedural requirements necessary to implement the policy."4 The
following discussion explores the operation of antidegradation
policies3 through an examination of: (A) the antidegradation water
classification scheme and the protection standard applicable to each
classification tier; (B) the activities triggering antidegradation review;
and (C) the relationship between the federal and state governments in
the promulgation and implementation of antidegradation policies.
A. DETERMINING APPLICABLE WATER DESIGNATION AND APPLICATION
OF THE PROTECTION STANDARD

The foundation of antidegradation policy is the establishment and
implementation of a water classification and protection framework.
States must develop a classification scheme (the tier system)3 6 which
classifies a waterbody according to the quality of its water or other
considerations. Additionally, states must develop protection standards
for each of these classifications. The federal government established a
base level antidegradation framework in the regulations.3 7 However,
states maintain the discretion to apply more rigorous standards. The
following discussion outlines the classification schemes of each tier of
the federal antidegradation policy and the appropriate protection
standard for each tier.
1. Tier 3-Outstanding National Resource Waters
Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters ("ONRW"),
represents the most protective of the antidegradation designations.
The federal antidegradation policy, however, provides little assistance
to the states in defining the parameters of this designation. As stated
in the regulations: "Where high quality waters constitute an
outstanding National resource, such as waters of Nation and State
parks and wildlife refuges and waters of exceptional recreation or
ecological significance, that water quality shall be maintained and
established under this section, or any water quality standard established
under this section, or any other permitting standard may be revised only if
such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy
established under this section.
Id.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
34. See id. § 131.20 (state review and approval); § 131.21 (EPA review and
approval); § 131.22 (EPA promulgation procedures for recalcitrant states).
35. This analysis focuses on the minimum antidegradation policy as set forth by the
federal government in 40 C.F.RI § 131.12. While states may adopt antidegradation
statements more protective than those set forth by the federal government, the states
may not impose less restrictive provisions. Id.; WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at §
4.3.
36. The term "Tier" is the federal articulation of classification levels. Many states
have adopted this term, while others use different terminology. In the interest of
clarity, this article will utilize the federal terminology when referring to state
antidegradation policies.
37. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
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protected."3 EPA Region VIII recommends that the following factors
be utilized in an ONRW inquiry:
(a) location (e.g., on federal lands such as national parks, national
wilderness areas, or national wildlife refuges), (b) previous special
designations (e.g., wild and scenic refuges), (c) existing water quality
(e.g., pristine or naturally-occurring), (d) ecological value (e.g.,
presence of threatened or endangered species during one or more
ife stages), (e) recreational or aesthetic value (e.g., presence of an
outstanding recreational fishery), and (f) other factors that indicate
outstanding ecological or recreational resource value (e.g., rare or
valuable wildlife habitat). Where determined appropriate, the
ONRW designation may be applied to an entire category of waters
(e.g., a wilderness area or areas). 9
Both nationwide EPA and Region VIII guidance recognize that the
quality of water is an important factor in the designation of a water
body as an ONRW. Indeed, the EPA recognized quality-based4
designation as the "thrust" of the federal antidegradation plan. 0
Antidegradation policy also permits ONRW classification for waters
that are not necessarily of high quality, but waters that retain some
"lexceptional ecological significance .... [and] water bodies that are
important, unique, or sensitive ecologically."4 ' For example, Iowa
designated the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers as Tier 3 waterbodies,42
subject to the most stringent protectionsOs despite their failure to
38. Id.§ 131.12(a)(3).
39. Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 9 (footnote omitted); see also David
Moon, Antidegradation Implementation: What are the Issues and Options?, at 3-4 (1996)

(prepared for the Multi-Regional Meeting of the EPA on Water Quality Standards and
Criteria, July 22-24, 1996) (listing factors).
40. As stated by the EPA:
ONRWs are often regarded as highest quality waters of the United States:
This is clearly the thrust of [section] 131.12(a)(3).
However, ONRW
designation also offers special protection for waters of 'exceptional ecological
significance.' These are water bodies that are important, unique, or sensitive
ecologically, but whose water quality, as measured by the traditional
Sarameters... may not be particularly high or whose characteristics cannot
e adequately described by these parameters (such as wetlands).
WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.7; see also Region VIII Guidance, supra note
2, at 9 (model implementation procedure provides that: "Outstanding water quality is
not a prerequisite for ONRW designation.").
41. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at §4.7.
42. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 567-61.2(2)(d) (1997) ('The Mississippi River and
Missouri River do not meet the criteria of 61.2(2) 'c' but nevertheless constitute waters
of exceptional state and national significance. Water quality management decisions
will be made in consideration of the exceptional value of the resource.").
43. See id. r. 567-61.2(2) (g). As provided in the Iowa regulations:

For those waters of the state designated as high quality or high quality
resource waters and the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, any proposed activity
that will adversely impact the existing physical, chemical, or biological
integrity of that water will not be consistent with Iowa's water quality
standards. Mitigation will not be allowed except in highly unusual situations
where no other project alternatives exist. In these cases, full mitigation must
be provide by the applicant and approved by the department.
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achieve standards associated with high quality waters.
Antidegradation policy protects those waters classified as Tier 3
waterbodies by requiring that their "water quality shall be maintained
and protected.",4 EPA interprets this protection standard as an
absolute prohibition on the imposition of new or increased discharges
to ONRWs or upstream waters if the discharges would lower the water
quality in an ONRW.45
The 1983 amendments to the antidegradation regulations changed
the phrase, "[n]o degradation shall be allowed," to "water quality...
shall be maintained and protected.0 7 This change created a limited
exception for temporary or short-term changes in water quality.48 EPA
guidance clarifies the temporal scope of this exception by providing
that it consists of weeks or months rather than years.4 ' Application of
one such state standard occurred in Washington where short term
modifications to water quality standards compliance, including the
state's antidegradation policy, were allowed. The code provision
provides that temporary degradation may occur
when necessary to accommodate essential activities, respond to
emergencies, or to otherwise protect the public interest, even though
such activities may result in a temporary reduction of water quality
conditions below those criteria and classifications established by this
regulation. Such activities must be conditioned, timed, and restricted
(i.e. hours or days rather than weeks or months) in a manner that will
minimize water quality degradation to existing and characteristic
uses. In no case will any degradation of water quality be allowed if
this degradation significantly interferes with or becomes injurious to
characteristic water uses or causes long-term harm to the
environment.
The Washington Pollution Control Hearings Board applied this
regulation to deny a company's requested variance to the state's
The
antidegradation policy and other water quality standards.
company sought to apply copper compounds to a lake as an algae
control measure.' The Board found that "impairment of swimming
44. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3) (1998).
45. WQS Second Edition, supra note 10, at § 4.7.
46. 40 C.F.R. § 35.1550 (1982) (amended by 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1984)).
47. 40 C.F.R § 131.12(a)(1).
48. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983).
49. WQS Second Edition, supra note 10, at § 4.7. The EPA provided further
guidance as to the scope of "temporary or short-term" by recognizing that: "If a
construction activity is involved, for example, temporary is defined as the length of
time necessary to construct the facility and make it operational." Id.
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-110 (1998); see also, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODEANN.
r. 62-4.242(3) (a) (2) (1998) (incorporating the Outstanding Florida Resource Water
temporary degradation provision); id. r. 62-4.242(2) (a) (2)(b). This provision allows
extensions to the thirty day limitations upon a showing of unavoidability and the
development of management practices designed to limit water quality degradation. Id.
51. See Allied Aquatics v. State of Washington, PCHB No. 96-193, 1997 WL 234806, at
*2 (Pollution Control Hearings Board March 4, 1997) (order denying petition for
reconsideration).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 2

and fishing and speculative harm to wildlife"5 did not satisfy the
"necessary" requirement and, furthermore, the potential damage to
the lake contravened the public interest.53
2.

Tier 2-High Quality Waters

The Tier 2 classification, for high quality waters, applies to
waterbodies exhibiting water quality "exceed[ing] levels necessary to
support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in
and on the water."54 According to the EPA, "[i]t is presumed that a
very large majority of state waters qualify for Tier 2 protection."5 Tier
2 designation differs from Tier 3 in three major respects: Tier 2
designation (1) generally consists of waters of lower quality; (2)
provides more guidance on which waters fall within this designation;
and (3) allows a more expansive exception for those activities
demonstrably resulting from economic and social necessity. Unlike
the more indeterminate factorial approach utilized in ONRW
designations, the Tier 2 classification mechanism requires a more
exacting methodology to determine which waterbodies constitute high
quality water. Two means of making this determination exist: a
waterbody-by-waterbody (or designational) approach, whereby the
quality of a waterbody is evaluated as a whole utilizing both qualitative
and quantitative tests;56 and a parameter-by-parameter (or pollutant-bypollutant) approach, which examines individual pollutants for
compliance with established water quality criteria.
The EPA
recommends the use of the parameter approach, believing it comports
more precisely with the Clean Water Act's goal of restoring and
maintaining the integrity of the nation's waters by providing the state
with the discretion to adopt any approach which satisfies "the statutory
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2); see Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 14-15
(Model implementation plan recommends a consideration of four factors: (1) existing
aquatic life uses; (2) existing recreational or aesthetic uses; (3) existing water quality
for all parameters; (4) the overall value of the segment from an ecological and public
use perspective).
55. Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 15.
56. Id. at 70.
57. See id. at 69-70 (providing brief description of the parameter approach); see, e.g.,
ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § R18-11-107(A) (1998). In addition to pure application of either
the parameter or waterbody method, some states utilize hybrid approaches. Under
one such hybrid approach, a designated number of pollutants satisfying water quality
criteria compels the classification of the water segment as a high quality water. See
Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 54 (providing limited survey of different hybrid
approaches adopted by the states as of 1993).
Colorado antidegradation
implementation procedures exemplify this hybrid approach by recognizing a
presumptive Tier 2 designation unless the waterbody satisfies Tier 3 (ONRW) criteria
or Tier 1 criteria. 5 COLO. CODE. REGs. § 1002-31.8(1) (b) (establishing presumption);
id. § 1002-31.8(2)(b)(i)(B). Tier 1 criteria is stated as "[t]he existing quality for at
least three of the following parameters is worse than that specified in [regulations] for
the protection of aquatic life class 1, recreation class 1, and (for nitrate) domestic
water supply uses." Id.
58. WQS Second Edition, supra note 10, at § 4.5.
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and regulatory intent of the antidegradation policy.' ' 9
Like the Tier 3 protection standard, Tier 2 protection requires the
maintenance and protection of water quality,' but provides an
exception. The exception requires a showing of: (1) an important
economic or social need;61 (2) satisfaction of procedural standards
' 62
including "intergovernmental coordination and public participation;
(3) achievement of statutory and regulatory requirements including
"new source performance standards" for point sources and best
management practices for nonpoint source pollutant controls; 63 and
(4) compliance with a maximum degradation requirement established
by the agencZ in charge of antidegradation review and
implementation. The EPA intends this exception
to provide relief only in a few extraordinary circumstances where the
economic and social need for the activity clearly outweighs the
benefit of maintaining water quality above that required for
"fishable/swimmable" water, and both cannot be achieved. The
on the individual proposing such activity
burden of demonstration
6
5
will be very high.

The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Columbus & Franklin County
MetropolitanParkDistrict v. Shank exemplifies the limited nature of this
exception. The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency issued two
59. Id. The EPA recommends the parameter approach because they believe it
eliminates the potential that a large number of waters will be free of antidegradation
protection, which is contrary to the goals of the Clean Water Act. Id. (recognizing the
goal of the Clean Water Act is to "restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation's
waters."). EPA Region VIII, on the other hand, promotes a "modified waterbody-bywaterbody approach," believing the parameter approach could result in Tier 2
application to waters not able to attain fishable/swimmable goal uses. Region VIII
Guidance, supra note 2, at 54.
60. 40C.F.R§131.12(a)(2) (1998).
61. Id. ("allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important
economic or social development in the area in which the waters are located."). EPA
intends this requirement to indicate the general level of social and economic
development necessary to justify the change in water quality. WQS Second Edition,
supra note 9, at § 4.5. The 1983 rule promulgation inserted the word "important" and
deleted the word "significant." 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983) (preamble to
antidegradation policy). This change represented an attempt to increase the necessity
showing required for the Tier 2 need exception. Id. ("Although common usage of
the words may imply otherwise, the correct definitions of the two terms indicate that
the greater degree of environmental protection is afforded by the word 'important."').
(providing for "full satisfaction of the
§ 131.12(a) (2)
62. 40 C.F.R1
intergovernmental coordination and public participation provisions ...").
63. Id.; WQS Second Edition, supra note 10, at § 4.5. This provision serves as a
mechanism to prevent lowering water quality standards and undercutting the Clean
Water Act's point and nonpoint source requirements. Furthermore, by requiring
compliance with the statutory and regulatory controls, "there is less chance that a
lowering of water quality will be sought to accommodate new economic and social
development." Id.
64. 40C.F.R 131.12(a)(2).
65. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.5.
66. Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042
(Ohio 1992).
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"permits to install" wastewater treatment facilities along a Tier 2
waterbody. However, the court enjoined these issuances because the
director failed to satisfy the criteria of part one-the important
economic and social need prong, and part two-the procedural
standards requirement, of the four-part exception. 67 The court
remanded the proceeding for a public hearing.68 The court also
articulated considerations to evaluate in a social or economic need
inquiry, including: (1) an examination of the economic and social
effects on the greater, as opposed to the local, community; (2)
congressional intent to promote centralization of wastewater treatment
plants; (3) present and future local, state, and federal infrastructure
investment; and (4) the objective of the Clean Water Act "that rivers
and streams are not to be conduits for wastewater. ' Even upon
satisfaction of this element, the court further required the director to
ensure "that the most stringent
70 statutory and regulatory controls for
waste treatment be employed.
3.

Tier 1-Existing Uses

Tier 1 protection "provides the absolute floor of water quality in all
waters of the United States 7 ' by requiring the maintenance and
protection of "[e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water
quality necessary to protect the existing uses. '' n The regulations define
"lexisting uses" as "those uses actually attained in the water body on or
after November 28, 1975, whether or not they are included in the
water quality standards.7'3 EPA guidance expands on this definition in
the context of antidegradation policy by recognizing an existing use
67. Id. at 1057-60.
68. Id. at 1057.
69. Id. at 1057-59. Illinois' regulations provide specific guidance on the inquiries
required in making a social or economic need determination:
A demonstration [of antidegradation policy compliance] will address the
following elements pertaining to anticipated important economic and social
development:
A) The extent to which employment will be increased in the area;
B) The extent to which production levels will increase in the area;
C) The extent to which the proposed change will avoid otherwise
anticipated reduction in employment or production levels;
D) The extent to which the activity will be providing economic or social
benefit to the area;
E) The extent to which the activity will be correcting an environmental
or public health problem.

ILL. ADMIN.

CODE tit.

35, § 352.900(b)(1) (1998).

70. Columbus & Franklin, 600 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
71. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.4; see also ANPRN Water Quality
Standards, supra note 2, at 36,781.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1998).
73. Id. § 131.3(e). This should be contrasted with designated uses which are
"those uses specified in water quality standards for each water body or segment
whether or not they are being attained." Id. § 131.3(f). The distinction is important
because the regulations permit a state to reclassify waters and remove a designated use,
which is not an existing use, if the state demonstrates that attainment of the
designated use is not feasible. Id. § 131.10(g).
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upon a demonstration that "water quality is suitable to allow the use to
be attained." 4 By its terms, the regulation allows degradation only to
the point that an existing use would no longer be attainable.
4.

Tier 2.5-Outstanding State Resource Waters

Tier 2.5 (often
Some states institute a fourth classification.
("OSRW'))
Waters
Resource
State
as
Outstanding
referred to
to
afforded
that
than
classifications provide protection less stringent
75
In
its
waters.
ONRWs but more stringent than the high-quality Tier 2
antidegradation guidance literature, the EPA accepts this additional
tier as permissible under Clean Water Act § 510 (state authority
provision), because it represents "a more stringent application of the
Tier 2 provisions of the antidegradation policy ....6 The rationale
behind the development of Tier 2.5, according to the EPA, lies in the
fear that the strict protections afforded to Tier 3 would dissuade states
from designating very high quality waters as ONRWs.77 Thus, with the
adoption of this intermediate tier, states would grant lowered, yet still
high levels of protection that otherwise may not be exercised.
The designation characteristics of an OSRW waterbody mirror those of
ONRWs in Region VIII's Model Implementation Plan."' This appears
consistent with the states that have adopted the Tier 2.5 designation.
For example, Michigan establishes a high water quality designation
when, "for individual pollutants, the quality of the waters is better than
the water quality standards prescribed by these rules."79 Beyond that,
the Department of Environmental Quality may further designate a
waterbody as an OSRW. ° The difference between an ONRW and
OSRW designation appears to lie, not in the characteristics of the
waterbody, but in the state's ultimate goals with respect to that
waterbody.
B.

TRIGGERING ACTIVITIES

The Clean Water Act expressly establishes three activities that
trigger antidegradation analysis: 1) scheduled water quality standards
review; 2) the revision of effluent limitations based upon the TMDL
process; and 3) the revision of other permitting schemes."
74. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.4. This Guidance exemplified the
suitability expansion of existing uses to areas where shellfish propagate and survive,
and are suitable for harvesting despite the absence of such harvesting. Id. The EPA
argues that a contrary interpretation "would be to say that the only time an aquatic
protect use 'exists' is if someone succeeds in catching fish." Id.
75. Id. at § 4.2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Compare Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 9 (ONRW qualification
criteria), with Region VIII Guidance, supra note 2, at 11-12 (OSRW qualification
criteria).
79. MicH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.1098 (1998).
80. See id. r. 323.1098(6).
81. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (1994). Section
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Additionally, section 401 state certification requirements, while not
statutorily recognized as a trigger, allow states to evaluate federal
permits for compliance with, among other things, antidegradation
requirements, thereby indirectly triggering antidegradation review."2
These four triggering activities represent a minimum set of actions
necessitating antidegradation review. However, states maintain the
right to require other activities to trigger this review, such as non-point
source pollution. The following discussion addresses the operation
of these four triggering mechanisms to antidegradation review.
1.

Scheduled Water Quality Standards Review

The Clean Water Act and its regulations establish a system of
federal oversight of state water quality standards. States must submit
new or revised standards, 84or at a minimum submit these standards on
a triennial basis,85 to the EPA for review and approval 6
Antidegradation policy maintains two distinct roles within this regime.
First, it is a water quality standard 7 and therefore EPA must review and
303(d)(4)(B) provides in pertinent part: "[Alny effluent limitation based on a
[TMDLI or other waste load allocation established under this section, or any water
quality standard established under this section, or any other permitting standard may
be revised only if such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation
policy... " Id.; WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.8; see also Harleston, supra
note 17, at 52-65. EPA also recognized that a "demonstration of need for advanced
treatment" or a special study as requested by individuals or agencies would trigger
antidegradation review. WQS Second Edition, supra note 10, at § 4.8.
82. SeeClean WaterAct § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
83. See Region VIII Guidance, supra note 3, at 47 ("EPA Region VIII emphasizes
that states... may apply their antidegradation requirements to any activity that has the
potential to affect existing water quality, and that states.., have authority to define
broadly the universe of activities subject to antidegradation review requirements."); see
also ANPRM, WQS Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,780 (recognizing the four minimum
triggering conditions, and further recognizing the ability of states to require
antidegradation review beyond these activities). The nonpoint source trigger will be
addressed infra Part III.C.
84. Clean Water Act § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994).
("Whenever the State revises or adopts a new standard, such revised or new standard
shall be submitted to the [EPA].").
85. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20 (1998) (requiring states to review their water quality
standards at least every three years and submit the results of the review to the EPA for
approval).
86. State review and submission of water quality standards to the EPA must occur
when states revise those standards, id., or at a minimum on a triennial basis. Clean
Water Act § 303(c) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1); 40 C.F.R. 131.20(a). States must make
the results of the review available to the EPA within thirty days of the final state action
adopting the revised standard, or within thirty days of the completion of the review if
no revisions are necessary. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c). EPA must either: (1) within sixty
days, approve the revisions and notify the state, id. § 131.21(a)(1), or (2) within ninety
days, disapprove the revisions with an accompanying explanation of the reason for
disapproval and specified changes necessary to bring the standards within compliance.
Id. § 131.21(a) (2).
87. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1998) (requiring antidegradation policies to be
included in state water quality standards submissions to the EPA); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf PUD No. 1 v. Washington
Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705-06 (1994) (recognizing antidegradation policies
fall within the state water quality standards mandated by Clean Water Act § 303, 33
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approve new or revised antidegradation policies for compliance with
the federal antidegradation policy. 8 Second, it is also a substantive
requirement which other water quality standards, such as TMDLs and
use designations, must satisfy during their scheduled review and
approval procedures.89 The distinction is important because separate
claims exist under each approach: litigants may argue a state's
antidegradation policy is invalid for non-compliance with federal
minimums or litigants may argue that a component of a state's water
quality standards is invalid for failure to comply with the state's
antidegradation policy.
Two cases illustrate the different claims associated with the distinct
roles of antidegradation policy: Raymond Proffitt Foundation v. United
States EPA° and Miccosukee Tribe v. United States.9' In Raymond Proffitt,
Pennsylvania submitted its antidegradation policy to the EPA under
the triennial review and approval procedures, 2 but the EPA concluded
that it did not comport with federal minimum standards. 9 After
Pennsylvania failed to modify its antidegradation policy and the EPA
failed to promulgate a policy in its stead, an environmental
organization challenged EPA's inaction, arguing that the Clean Water
Act required the agency to establish an antidegradation policy for
Pennsylvania as a recalcitrant state. 4 The court agreed and recognized
Pennsylvania's failure to bring its antidegradation policy to the
minimum level prescribed by federal law as late as 588 days after the
disapproval notification generated a mandatory duty upon the EPA to
establish an acceptable antidegradation policy for the state.95 This

U.S.C. § 1313 (1994)).
88. 40 C.F.R_ § 131.20; id. § 131.6 ("The following elements must be included in
each State's water quality standards submitted to EPA for review: ... An
antidegradation policy consistent with § 131.12."); see ANPRM, WQS Regulation, supra
note 2, at 36,781 ("The antidegradation policy itself is expressly required by 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.20(c)....").
89. See Clean Water Act § 303(d) (4) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B) (water quality
standards must comply with antidegradation policies).
90. Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States EPA, 930 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-99
(E.D. Pa. 1996). This case has important implications for the relationship between the
federal and state governments in the promulgation and implementation of
antidegradation policies, an issue discussed in more detail, infra Part II.C.
91. Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 105 F.3d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1997).
92. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1092.
93. Id. The EPA refused to approve the policy, noting that the Pennsylvania plan
improperly linked existing use protection to the state agency's rulemaking process,
improperly defined Tier 2 waters, and failed to provide stringent enough protections
to Tier 3 waters. Id. at 1092-93. For expansion of these review and approval
procedures, see supranote 86.
94. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1095.
95. Id. at 1105. The court not only recognized the existence of this mandatory
duty, but also ordered EPA to federally promulgate an antidegradation policy for
Pennsylvania. Id. at 1105; see 40 C.F.R. § 131.32 (1998) (EPA's promulgation of water
quality standards for Pennsylvania); see also Water Quality Standards for Pennsylvania,
61 Fed. Reg. 64,816, 64,816-22 (1996) (providing explanation of the interactions
between Pennsylvania and EPA Region III that resulted in the federal promulgation of
antidegradation standards).
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evidences a claim under the first approach to antidegradation policy,
as a water quality standard, challenging the policy itself through the
federal review and approval procedures.
The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Miccosukee Tribe v. United
States96 illustrates a challenge under the second approach to
antidegradation policy: a claim challenging not an antidegradation
policy itself but a state's failure to comply with its own antidegradation
policy in revising other state water quality standards. In 1994, Florida
enacted the Everglades Forever Act ("EFA"),9 an action the plaintiff
Indian Tribe argued effectively altered the state's water quality
standards without complying with the state's antidegradation
provisions." This effective revision, the Tribe argued, triggered the
EPA's duty to review and approve those revised standards for
substantive compliance with the state's antidegradation policy.9 Thus,
the plaintiffs challenged the substantive requirement with which other
state water quality standards must comply.
2.

Load Allocations, Waste Load Allocations, and TMDLs

A second antidegradation review triggering activity is the total
maximum daily load ("TMDL") process utilized by the Clean Water
Act to address the problem of non-complying waters. Non-complying
waters are those waters that do not satisfy established water quality
standards despite conformity with section 301 effluent standards.
Under the TMDL process, states must identify non-complying waters
U '
and establish TMDLs
for certain pollutants necessary to achieve
applicable water quality standards. ' '
Based upon those
determinations, states must establish load allocations ("[A"-the
amount of pollutant input from non-point sources which will still
satisfy water quality standards) .12 and waste load allocations ('WLA"the amount of pollutant input from point sources which will still satisfy
water quality standards)103 and include them in permits so that water
quality standards can be achieved. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act,
any revision to the TMDL, LA, and/or WLA process triggers
96. Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 602.
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.4592-.45926 (West Supp. 1998).
98. Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 601-02.
99. Id.
100. TMDL is "[tihe sum of the individual WLAs for point sources and LAs for
nonpoint sources and natural background." 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (1998).
101. Clean Water Act § 303(d) (1) (A), (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C) (1994);
40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (1998).
102. Load allocation is "[t]he portion of a receiving water's loading capacity that is
attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint sources of pollution or to
natural background sources." 40 C.F.R. § 13 0 .2(g). Loading capacity is "[tihe greatest
amount of loading that a water can receive without violating water quality standards."
Id. § 130.2(0. Loading is "to introduce matter or thermal energy into a receiving
water." Id. § 130.2(e).
103. Wasteload allocation is "[t]he portion of a receiving water's loading capacity
that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of pollution. WLAs
constitute a type of water quality-based effluent limitation." Id. § 130.2(h).
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antidegradation review, requiring compliance with state and federal
antidegradation policy.' 4 No administrative or judicial cases challenge
an aspect of the TMDL process as inconsistent with antidegradation
requirements, presumably due to the scarcity of completed TMDLs.
However, the following discussion of permitting standards provides
insight into the use of the TMDL as a triggering mechanism by
illustrating how permits are subjected to the antidegradation review
process.
3.

NPDES and Other Permits

The final statutorily recognized antidegradation trigger consists of
any other permitting standard."'0 5 This broad language applies
antidegradation review to a wide range of regulatory activities,' 6
including the issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permits established under section 402 of the Clean
Water Act. °7 NPDES permits regulate the "discharge of pollutants"
from a "point source" into "navigable waters"' ' by prescribing
technology-based effluent limitations for discharges. In developing
the numerical criteria comprising the effluent limitations, permitting
authorities must comply with antidegradation policy protection
standards as well as any procedural requirements required under state

104. Clean Water Act § 303(d) (4) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (B).
105. Id.
106. See ANPRM, WQS Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,780 (articulating a very broad
application of antidegradation review: "It is the position of EPA that, at a minimum,
States and authorized Tribes must apply antidegradation requirements to activities
that are 'regulated' . . . (i.e., any activity that requires a permit... )."
107. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Another important permitting
scheme also subject to antidegradation review is § 404 dredge and fill permits. Clean
Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The application of antidegradation policy to deny a
section 404 dredge and fill permit occurred administratively in In re Department of the
Army, DIA No. 97DNR-2, 1997 WL 900837, at *12 (Iowa Dept. of Inspections and
Appeals Aug. 5, 1997) (proposed decision). The Army Corps of Engineers sought
both an NPDES and a section 404 dredge and fill permit for a project which would
deposit material on an island in the Mississippi River. See id. at *1. In an
administrative appeals hearing, Iowa affirmed a previous denial of a section 401
certification for the permits finding the proposed plan violated the state's
antidegradation policy; specifically, the plan improperly degraded a Tier 1 waterbody.
While the Army Corps of Engineers argued that the proposed plan adequately
mitigated any degradation, the hearing body rejected this argument, noting that
"[t]he state's antidegradation policy does not allow mitigation of adverse effects,
except in highly unusual situations .... This case does not present a highly unusual
situation." Id. at *13 (referring to IOWAADMIN. CODE r. 5 67 -6 1.2 (2)(g) (1996)).
108. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The statutory definitions of these
terms and subsequent judicial interpretations represent very broad definitional
constructions which, in turn, produce the very broad applicability of NPDES
permitting requirements. See Clean Water Act § 502(6), (7), (12), (14), 33 U.S.C. §
1362(6), (7), (12), (14). Like antidegradation policy itself, the EPA may grant
authority to states to issue NPDES permits, id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), subject to
the agency's review and approval, id. § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c). As of 1997, EPA
granted permitting authority to forty states. See Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After
Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality StandardEnforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24
ECOLOGYL.Q. 393, 416 n.118 (1997).
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or federal antidegradation policy.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Columbus & Franklin County
Metropolitan Park District v. Shank,' 9 discussed earlier in the context of
Tier 2 protection standards,"' exemplifies the operation of this "other
permitting standard" triggering device. The Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency ("OEPA") issued "[permits] to install""' to two
companies that intended to build sewage treatment plants which
would discharge effluent into a Tier 2 waterbody. 1 2 Upon appeal by
an affected park district, the Ohio Environmental Board of Review
upheld the issuance of the permit, finding that the proposed effluent
discharge would not violate Ohio's antidegradation policy because it
would not interfere with applicable use designations. 3 The Ohio
Supreme Court found the OEPA violated antidegradation policy both
Ohio
the
Procedurally,
and substantively.
procedurally
a
action
and
antidegradation policy requires notice of the intended
public hearing addressing the economic and social costs of the
permitted activity prior to the issuance of an effluent limitation permit
involving a Tier 2 waterbody." 4 Having found the OEPA failed to
engage in the appropriate public participation requirements of the
Ohio antidegradation policy, the court remanded the action for
Furthermore, issuance of the
appropriate hearing procedures.
"permit to install" failed to satisfy the substantive requirements of the
Ohio antidegradation policy because the OEPA improperly considered
degradation of a high quality waterbody permissible, provided that
degradation did not interfere with designated uses."5 Instead, the
court read the Ohio antidegradation policy Tier 2 protections as
preventing any perceptible degradation of water quality regardless of
16
continued compliance with designated use numerical criteria,
109. Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042
(Ohio 1992).

110. See supra notes 66-70.
111. See Columbus &Franklin, 600 N.E.2d at 1049. Pursuant to Ohio law, "permit[s]
to install" are required before the installation of new or modified sewage disposal
systems. OHIOADMIN. CODE§ 3745-31-02 (A) (1) (West 1998); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 6111.01(G) (defining disposal systems). The application for a permit to install must
contain a plan for the disposal system, and approval of the permit constitutes approval
of this plan. OHIOADMIN. CODE § 3745-31-02(A) (1).
112. "Tier 2" utilizes the federal antidegradation articulation of the applicable Ohio
standard of protection at the time of the Columbus & Franklin decision, which
provided: "Waters in which existing water quality is better than the criteria prescribed
in these rules... shall be maintained and protected." Id. § 3745-1-05(B) (1994)
The 1996
(amended 1996) (mirroring the federal antidegradation policy).
amendments to Ohio's antidegradation policy provide a significantly more detailed

approach. See id. § 3745-1-05 (1998). The following discussion of the Columbus &
Franklin decision will reference the Ohio antidegradation policy as it existed at the
time of decision.
113. See Columbus &Franklin, 600 N.E.2d at 1050-51 (reviewing the Board's findings
of fact and law).
114. See id. at 1057-59 (citing Ohio's antidegradation policy, OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.

§ 3745-1-05(C) (3), (6)).
115. See id at 1056.
116. Seeid. at 1056-57.
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finding the OEPA approach "would eviscerate the [antidegradation]
rule... [by allowing] ...a clear degradation of water quality to be
considered nondegradation."' 7 Columbus & Franklin illustrates the
issuance of a permit as triggering antidegradation review. It also
illustrates application of procedural and substantive aspects of the
policy to determine the propriety of that permit.
4.

Section 401 Certification

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act allows states to evaluate
proposed federal permits "which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters"' of the state for compliance with federal and state
water protection requirements." 9 This certification must include,
among other things, "a statement that there is a reasonable assurance
that the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate
applicable water quality standards.' 20 Thus, under this provision,
states may effectively bar the issuance of a federal permit for failure to
comply with the state's antidegradation policy. Furthermore, the
certification may contain conditions "necessary or desirable with
respect to the discharge of the activity" to ensure compliance with state
"effluent limitations and other limitations.''
Section 401 certification should be considered not a direct, but an
indirect antidegradation review trigger for two reasons. First, unlike
the water quality standards review, TMDL, and other permitting
mechanism triggers, certification involves the evaluation of proposed
regulated activity, not the regulatory action itself. Second, states may
Thus, certification
waive section 401 certification through inaction.
activity by
triggering
review
antidegradation
indirectly acts as a fourth
compliance
permits
for
federal
allowing states to evaluate proposed
policy. 2 3
with state water quality standards, including antidegradation
While some dispute existed concerning the extent of a state's
ability to condition permits based upon antidegradation policy, the

117. Id. at 1056.
118. Clean Water Act § 401(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1) (1994).
119. Id. Specifically, section 401 allows states to evaluate whether the proposed
activity will satisfy sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act. Id.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(3) (1998).
121. Id. § 121.2(4); Clean Water Act § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
122. Section 401 certification should not be considered a direct trigger for two
related reasons: first, the other direct triggers-water quality standards review, TMDLs,
and other permitting mechanisms-focus on a regulated activity, as opposed to section
401 certification which is an evaluation of regulated activity; and second, states may
waive section 401 certification through inaction. Clean Water Act § 401(a) (1), 33
U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1).
123. Id. As stated in the Clean Water Act:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ...
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State ...that any such
discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections [301, 302,
303, 306, and 307] of [the Clean Water Act].
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Supreme Court recently set the matter to rest in PUD No. I v.
Washington Department of Ecology, 24 a decision significantly
strengthening antidegradation policy as a means to protect the
nation's waters. In that case, a city utility district sought a federal
license to build a hydroelectric project, thereby giving rise to
Washington's section 401 right to review the license. 12 The state
certified the proposed license but imposed a number of conditions.
These conditions included the maintenance of a minimum stream
flow requirement which, the state argued, was needed to ensure
compliance with Washington's antidegradation policy protections of its
Tier 3 waterbodies.'2 6 Specifically, the failure to maintain minimum
flow requirements would interfere with one of the designated uses of
the Tier 3 waterbody, salmon spawning and migration, by impeding
27
the salmon's ability to travel upstream to their spawning ground.
The applicant district argued that the stream flow requirements
were unrelated to the specific discharges that concededly would arise
from the activity12 and that state section 401 conditioning authority

did not extend beyond conditions placed upon discharges." The
Supreme Court rejected this argument through their interpretation of
section 401(d) which "provides that any certification shall set forth
lany effluent limitations and other limitations... necessary to assure
that any applicant' will comply with various provisions of the Act and
appropriate state law requirements.' 0 The Court found that the text
of 401 (d) refers to compliance by the applicant and not to the
discharge itself. The Court recognized that section 401 certification
conditioning based on state water quality standards may include
minimum flow requirements.5 ' Prior to the PUD No. 1 decision, state
certification procedures provided a powerful means for states to
ensure the protection of their waters through either the denial or
124. PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
125. Id. at 708-09.
126. Id. at 709. Washington's antidegradation policy provides that "[w]ater quality
shall be maintained and protected in waters designated as outstanding resource
waters." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-070(3) (1997).
127. See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 714. The proposed project sought to completely
block the river, divert 75% of the water along a one mile stretch of the river, utilize the
water to generate electricity, and ultimately return that water to the river. See id. at

708-09.
128. These discharges included the release of dredge and fill material during
construction, and the discharge of water following its use to generate electricity. See id.

at 711.
129. Id. The petitioner based this argument on the text of section 401(a) which
allows states to certify that "discharge[s] will comply" with the Clean Water Act

provisions. Clean Water Act § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a); PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 711.
The Supreme Court recognized the potential validity of this argument as applied to
section 401(a), but rejected the argument through an analysis of section 401(b). Id.
(discussing Clean Water Act § 401(a), (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a), (d) (1994)).
130. Id. (quoting Clean Water Act § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)). The Court
recognized that the petitioner's argument maintains validity as to section 401(a), but

fails when considered against section 401(d). Id.
131.

Id. at 713-21; see also Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act

Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996) (providing discussion of PUDNo. 1).
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conditioning of permits. By recognizing the antidegradation policy's
role in this determination, the Supreme Court further strengthened
both section 401 and the antidegradation policy itself as
environmental protection tools.
C. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
Antidegradation policy reflects an integration of duties and
responsibilities on both the federal and state level: the federal
government establishes minimum antidegradation policy criteria,'32 the
states promulgate and implement state antidegradation policies
consistent with the federal criteria,' and the federal government
retains review and approval authority over those state policies. 34 Much
of the litigation surrounding antidegradation policy is centered on this
structure as litigants seek to compel the EPA to enforce the provisions
of the Clean Water Act. The following discussion examines two aspects
of the federal-state relationship: first, federal promulgation of
antidegradation policy for recalcitrant states; and second federal
review of water quality standards' compliance with antidegradation
policy.
1. Federal Review and Promulgation of State Antidegradation
Policies
The EPA retains "clear authority to review and approve or
disapprove and promulgate an antidegradation policy for a State.' 3 5
While this review authority is limited to examining whether the
policies or procedures will sufficiently implement the minimum
elements of the federal policy, the EPA retains authority to disapprove
and "federally promulgate" any portion of a state implementation
procedure "if, in the judgment of the Administrator, the State's
process (or certain provisions thereof) can be implemented ...

as to

circumvent the intent and purpose of the antidegradation policy."' ,6
Authority to compel federal promulgation of a state antidegradation
policy based upon state recalcitrance may reside in three sources: the
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision,' and two provisions of the
federal

Administrative

Procedure

Act

(APA) .'-

The

following

discussion examines differing approaches to the propriety of the
citizen suit provision as a means to compel EPA action, and of the
various APA claims.

132. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).
133. Id.
134. For an outline of the review and approval procedures, see supra note 86.
135. WQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.3.
136. Id. This authority exists through the operation of Clean Water Act § 303(c) (4),
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (4) (1994). SeeWQS Second Edition, supra note 9, at § 4.3.
137. Clean Water Act § 505(a) (2); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2) (1994).
138. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1944)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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Citizen Suit Provision

Section 505(a) (2) of the Clean Water Act3 9 authorizes a citizen to
commence a suit, inter alia, "against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
'
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.' 4
Thus, any attempt to compel the EPA to promulgate a regulation for a
recalcitrant state under the authority of the Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision requires the existence of a non-discretionary duty.
Courts have come to very different conclusions as to the existence,
or lack thereof, of a duty to federally promulgate a state's
antidegradation policy pursuant to section 303(c)(4) of the Clean
Water Act.' 41 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner,141 the court refused to
recognize the existence of an EPA mandatory duty to "promptly"
promulgate an antidegradation policy for Arizona after the state failed
to modify its antidegradation policy to comport with federal minimum
standards. 43 The plaintiffs brought action under the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision to compel EPA promulgation of those changes.4
This action required the court to determine whether section
303(d) (4) imposes a non-discretionary duty on the EPA-an inquiry
focused solely on "whether the agency failed to comply with a datecertain statutory deadline.' ' 45 The court refused to find such a
mandatory duty, reasoning that the statutory mandate to act
itpromptly" did not represent the "clear-cut agency violations
and
defaults" required to invoke the citizen suit provision.
Other jurisdictions, such as the Pennsylvania court in Raymond
Proffitt Foundationv. United States EPA, ' discussed earlier in the context
of scheduled water quality standards review,'4 8 adopt a very different
approach by recognizing that section 303(c) (4) creates a nondiscretionary duty.
Upon Pennsylvania's submission of its
139. Clean Water Act § 505(a) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2).
140. Id.
141. Clean Water Act § 303(c) (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4). This provision states in
pertinent part:
The Administrator shall promptly prepare and publish proposed [and final]
regulations setting forth a revised or new water quality standard for the
navigable waters involved... if a revised or new water quality standard
submitted by [a] State... is determined by the Administrator not to be
consistent with the applicable requirements of this chapter ....
Id.
142. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 888 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Ariz. 1995)
[hereinafter Defenders of Wildlife I].
143. Id. at 1008-09.
144. Id. at 1006.
145. Id. at 1008.
146. Id. at 1008-09 (utilizing method of analysis set forth in Sierra Club v. Thomas,
828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
147. Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States EPA, 930 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
148. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
149. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1097-99 (expressly rejecting Defenders of Wildlife
approach). Another court explained that:
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antidegradation policy pursuant to the triennial review requirements
of the Clean Water Act,' the EPA disapproved certain standards as
inconsistent with the federally mandated minimums."' Pennsylvania
failed to alter its standards as late as 588 days after EPA disapproval
notification, prompting the plaintiff to bring an action to compel EPA
promulgation under the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision. 5 '
Utilizing a traditional statutory interpretation analysis, the court
concluded that the plain meaning of section 303(c) (4) established a
madaor
mandatory
duty, 53 finding the use of the word "shall" particularly
instructive.
While acknowledging the relative vagueness of the term
"promptly," the court found that "one or two years is clearly too long
when matched with the section's stated deadlines and the provisions
for review of a state's standard every three years."'55 Thus, the EPA's
failure to promulgate an antidegradation policy for Pennsylvania
violated its mandatory duty, prompting the court to order
promulgation of the appropriate regulations.154

b.

Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act

In addition to the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, section

Section 303(c) (3) uses mandatory language, stating "the Administrator shall
promulgate such standard pursuant to [Section 303(c)(4)]." The same
mandatory language appears in Section 303(c)(4): "The Administer [of the
EPA] shall promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth
a revised or new water quality standard "if a state fails to adopt regulations
within the specified period. There is no case law suggesting Section 303(c)
leaves the Administrator any discretion to deviate from this apparently
mandatory course.
Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Russell, 946 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1991); see
Idaho Conservation League v. Browner, 968 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (W.D. Wash. 1997)
("By the plain language of the statute, and under the cited authorities, the EPA's duty
under § 1313(c) (4) (A) is mandatory.").
150. See supra note 86 (providing overview of review and approval requirements of
40 C.F.R § 130).
151. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1092. Specifically, EPA contended that the
Pennsylvania plan improperly linked existing use protection to the state agency's
rulemaking process, improperly defined Tier 2 waters, and failed to provide stringent
enough protections to Tier 3 waters. Id. at 1092-93.
152. Id. at 1092-1100.
153. Id. at 1096-98.
154. Id. at 1097 (citing numerous cases that recognized the word "shall" as indicative
of a mandatory duty including United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989)
("Congress could not have chosen stronger words [than 'shall'] to express its intent
that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied ....
").
155. Id. at 1100. In examining the scope of the term "promptly," the court noted
that a statutory analysis should "construe that statute in such a fashion that every work
has some operative effect." Id. Thus, the court found that "Congress expected the
Administrator to begin preparing and publishing the regulations without undue
delay." Id.
156. Id. at 1105; see 40 C.F.R. § 131.32 (1998) (EPA's promulgation of water quality
standards for Pennsylvania); see also Water Quality Standards for Pennsylvania, 61 Fed.
Reg. 64,816, 64,816-22 (1996) (providing explanation of the interactions between
Pennsylvania and Region III of the EPA that resulted in the federal promulgation of
antidegradation standards).
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706(1) of the APA'5 7 may provide a mechanism by which to seek an
order compelling EPA to promulgate an antidegradation policy for a
recalcitrant state. Section 706(1) provides that a reviewing court shall
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed. ' 5 8 An inquiry into a claim based upon this APA provision
must examine whether an agency violated a statutory mandate by
failing to act. 59 While courts use a number of approaches, the most
exacting of these tests examines four factors:
(1) the length of time that has elapsed since the agency came under a
duty to act; (2) the reasonableness of the delay in the context of the
statute that authorizes the agency's action; (3) the consequences of
the agency's delay; and (4) the agency's need to balance priorities in
the face of limited resources.

In addition to the Clean Water Act citizen suit claims, both
Raymond Proffitt and Defenders of Wildlife'6' addressed EPA's failure to
promulgate antidegradation policies in the context of APA section
706(1).
In Raymond Proffitt, application of the first two factors
prompted the court to recognize that a 588-day delay was
unreasonable in light of the context of the statute which contained
sixty and ninety-day deadlines'62 and triennial review procedures.'63
The third factor, consequences of the delay, supported a finding of
violation of section 706(1) because the regulations provided that state
antidegradation policies remain in effect, despite EPA disapproval,
until the agency promulgates a new policy.6 4 Court decisions
addressing this factor indicate that a strong argument for the existence
of negative consequences needs factual support for assertions of actual
degradation as a result of the delay.'65
157. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994).
158. Id.
159. Oregon Natural Resource Council v. Turner, 863 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 n.7 (D.
Or. 1994) (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (D.
Ariz. 1995) [hereinafter Defenders of Wildlife II] (citing a number of tests, all of
which involve an assessment of the reasonableness of the delay in the context of the
statute which authorizes the agency's action).
160. Defenders of Wildlife II, 909 F. Supp. at 1345-46 (citing In re Int'l Chem. Workers
Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at
1102; Oregon NaturalResource Council,863 F. Supp. at 1283; Hells Canyon Preservation
Council v. Richmond, 841 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
161. After dismissing the plaintiffs Clean Water Act citizens suit claim in Defenders of
Wildlife I, the court granted plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint alleging a
violation of section 706(1) of the APA. Defenders of Wildlife I, 888 F. Supp. 1003 (D.
Ariz. 1995). The subsequent decision in Defenders of Wildlife II, 909 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Ariz. 1995), addresses the APA claim.

162. Clean Water Act § 303(c) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (3) (1994).
163. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1102.
164. As stated in the regulations: "A State water quality standard remains in effect,
even though disapproved by EPA, until the State revises it or EPA promulgates a rule
that supersedes the State water quality standard." 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) (1998).
165. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1103 (citing specific example of the issuance of
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An inquiry into the fourth factor," the need to balance priorities,
recognizes a degree of deference to agency prioritization, allowing an
agency, without specific timetables, "broad discretion... to set its own
agenda, establish its own priorities, and distribute its resources on tasks
it deems most pressing. ''r 7 In Defenders of Wildlife II, the EPA argued
this discretion rendered their delay in policy promulgation reasonable,
given its "limited resources, the greater environmental significance of
its other projects, and the lack of immediate risk or harm to human
health or aquatic environment in Arizona."'

The Defenders of Wildlife

II decision, however, illustrates some constraints on the applicability of
this deference to section 303(c) actions. First, while section 303(c)
does not establish a rigid timetable, the temporal limitation of
"promptly" differs from statutes that are silent on timeframe and those
statutes that invoke more discretionary language such as "from time to
time. '"'O Second, an agency's discretion to construe "promptly" must
exist within the context of the statutory provision in question. Since
section 303(c) establishes short time periods for EPA review of water
quality standards, the deference argument loses force. As noted by the
court in Defenders of Wildlife II, according an agency great deference in
priority balancing in this area would nullify the statute's short time
frames and undermine the triennial review procedure.70 Having
found the factorial test favored the plaintiffs, the courts in Defenders of
Wildlife H and Raymond Proffitt Foundationgranted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs and ordered the federal promulgation of proposed
water quality standards for the states pursuant to section 303(c)."
c.

Section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act

Section 706(2) also provides a potential avenue through which a
party can compel the EPA to promulgate an antidegradationpolicy for
a state in light of a state's failure to respond to EPA denials. Section
a permit); Defenders of Wildlife II, 909 F. Supp. at 1350 (citing poor Water Quality
Assessment as indicative of Arizona's inability to adequately protect the state's waters
and evidencing a negative consequence of the delay).
166. The defendants in Raymond Proffitt failed to include evidence supporting their
position with respect to the fourth factor in the administrative record, prompting the
court to disregard this factor. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1103. As such,

discussion of this fourth factor will examine the arguments presented in Defenders of
Wildlife H.
167. Defenders of Wildlife 11,909 F. Supp. at 1350 (citing Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879,
896 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168. Defenders of Wildlife II, 909 F. Supp. at 1350.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court further noted that if "the statutory timelines are unrealistic, or
counterproductive to public policies for state and federal cooperation, the EPA must
look to Congress for relief." Id.
171. Id. at 1351; Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1103-05; see generally 40 C.F.R.
131.32 (1998) (EPA's promulgation of water quality standards for Pennsylvania); 61
Fed. Reg. 64,816, 64,816-22 (1996) (providing explanation of the interactions
between Pennsylvania and EPA that resulted in the federal promulgation of
antidegradation standards).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994) delineates actions for which specific claims may be
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706(2) (A) provides that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be...
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.' 73 While courts grant substantial deference to an
agency's interpretation of its regulations, 74 failure to comply with those
regulations constitutes an action (or more properly, a decision not to
75
act) which is arbitrary, capricious and "not in accordance with law.'
To satisfy the standards set forth under section 706(2) (A) of the APA
in the face of agency inaction, a plaintiff need only show that the
regulations required agency action and the agency did not perform
those actions."6 In addressing the section 706(2)(A) claim, the
Raymond Proffitt court found that EPA's inaction violated explicit
agency regulations, stating that "[i]f the State does not adopt the
changes specified by the Regional Administrator within 90 days... the
Administrator
shall promptly propose and promulgate such
77
standard.'

D. Federal Review of State Water Quality Standards' Compliance with
Antidegradation
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act and associated regulations, states
must submit new or revised water quality standards to the EPA for
substantive review and approval-a review that must include an inquiry
into compliance with federal and state antidegradation policy.78 The
recent decision in Miccosukee Tribe v. United States' significantly

brought against a government agency: § 706(2) (A) ("arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"); § 706(2) (B) ("contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity"); § 706(2)(C) (in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right" or "without
observance of procedure required by law"). While each of these provisions represent
separate causes of action, the arbitrary and capricious standard generally controls the
outcome of claims arising under section 706(2) and, therefore, will be emphasized in
the following discussion.

173. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
174.

See Martin v. OSHA, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991); Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp.

at 1104.
175. Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1104 (citing Frisby v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 755 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
176. See Raymond Proffitt, 930 F. Supp. at 1104. In the context of claims asserting that
the EPA failed to promulgate an antidegradation policy for a recalcitrant state, the
timing element will be of particular importance. Thus, claims under sections 706(1)
and 706(2) (A) would seem to be roughly equivalent. But as the Raymond Proffitt
decision indicates, other considerations, beyond the timing element, enter into the
section 706(2) (A) determination. See id. (noting both the temporal failure to comply
with the regulations and the failure of Pennsylvania to initiate proceedings to address
the EPA concerns).
177. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R § 131.22(a) (1996)).
178. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (1994) (water
quality standards must comply with antidegradation policies); 40 C.F.R §§ 131.20-.21
(setting forth the review and approval procedures); see also supra note 86.
179. Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997). For a
discussion of Miccosukee Tribe in the context of the water quality standards review
triggering activity, see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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increases EPA's review and approval duties by, in effect, expanding the
definition of state "submission" to include the failure to submit.
As discussed previously, Florida established the Everglades Forever
Act ("EFA"), 180 but, having decided that the EFA did not alter state
water quality standards, the state did not submit the EFA to the EPA
for approval.8 The EPA accepted Florida's "no revision" assessment
and did not require the state to submit the water quality standards, nor
did the agency review the act for compliance with antidegradation
policy.' 82 The plaintiff argued the EFA altered water quality standards
and that the EPA improperly refused to review the act for compliance
with antidegradation policy. r83 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, utilizing a
variation of the "constructive submission" approach adopted by the
Seventh Circuit in Scott v. City of Hammond.18' The court found that the
Clean Water Act imposed a mandatory duty on the EPA to review state
water quality standards even in the absence of state submission, if an
alteration of state water quality standards actually occurred.185 The
existence of this possibility of a change in water quality standards
necessitated a factual inquiry by the EPA, or by the trial court, into
whether a change actually occurred. ' m
While the Eleventh Circuit can be commended for their expansive
approach to antidegradation review, it is unlikely that other
jurisdictions will follow their lead for two reasons. First, the theoretical
underpinnings of the Miccosukee Tribe decision are suspect. Scott
applied the constructive submission doctrine to the states bordering
Lake Michigan, who, contrary to statutory mandates,'87 failed to submit

180. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.4592-45926 (West Supp. 1994).
181. Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 601; see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 601.
183. Id.
184. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984). Scott applied the
constructive submission doctrine to the TMDL context. Scott, 471 F.2d at 994.
185. Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 602-03 ("Florida's failure to submit any new or
revised standards cannot circumvent the purposes of the CWA." (citing Scott, 741 F.2d
at 998)). The D.C. Circuit refused to address the "constructive submission" issue in
National WildlifeFed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1131 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997). However,
the situation in National Wildlife Fed'n differed in that the plaintiffs challenged
Michigan's rejection of a petition to designate Lake Superior as an ONRW. Id. at
1127-28. The plaintiffs claimed this refusal, and the resulting submission refusal,
constituted a constructive submission and therefore invoked EPA's mandatory review
duties. Id. at 1128. The court recognized that EPA was not under a mandatory duty to
review unchanged water quality standards and, therefore, dismissed the citizen suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1131.
186. The court ruled that since the jurisdiction question was intertwined with the
merits of the claim, the defendant's motion to dismiss should have been treated as a
"factual attack rather than a facial attack... for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 603.
187. The Clean Water Act requires a state to "identify those waters within its
boundaries for which the effluent limitations.., are not stringent enough to
implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters," Clean Water Act §
303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A) (1994), and provide the EPA with a list of
those TMDLs.
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any list of TMDLs to the EPA, and had no TMDLs in place.'88 The
court reasoned that this absence of state action could indicate a
decision that Lake Michigan did not necessitate the implementation of
the TMDL process-essentially a submission of a list containing no
TMDL applicable waters-thereby triggering EPA's non-discretionary
duty to review the propriety of the "empty" list. Unlike the Scott
situation involving complete state inaction, Florida had water quality
standards in place, but determined that an action did not revise those
standards. Florida even invited EPA input on its decision if the agency
disagreed with their "no revision" determination, " further
distinguishing the situation from Scott.
A second reason future courts are unlikely to import the
constructive submission doctrine to antidegradation policy review
involves the practical implications of such a move. The TMDL process
involves a relatively formalized structure: the EPA promulgates a list of
pollutants to be utilized in TMDL determinations. The states establish
TMDLs for waterbodies unable to satisfy water quality criteria for those
pollutants and then submit a list of those TMDLs to the EPA for review
and approval.'" Unlike this formalized TMDL structure, potential
alterations to water quality standards may occur through a wide range
of activity not specifically addressed by the Clean Water Act or its
regulations. Applying the constructive submission doctrine to water
quality standard revision/no revision review would potentially open
the EPA to non-discretionary review of a plethora of state actions with
no means of filtering legitimate and illegitimate claims of constructive
submission. Given the difficulties in applying constructive submission
to this area, and the distinguishable circumstances between Scott and
Miccosukee Tribe, it is unlikely other courts will adopt the expansive
approach of the Eleventh Circuit.
I. THE FUTURE OF ANTIDEGRADATION
The future of antidegradation policy as an environmental
protection tool depends in large part on the resolution of some key
issues arising in both state antidegradation policies and federal moves
to alter the existing standards. The following discussion examines de
minimis degradation, classification designations, and the application of
antidegradation review to non-point sources.
A. DE MINIMIS DEGRADATION: THE DEGREE OF SIGNIFICANCE NEEDED
FOR ANTIDEGRADATION REVIEW

One issue common to an analysis of antidegradation protection
standards involves the issue of de minimis degradation (or

188. Scott, 741 F.2d at 997.
189. See Miccosukee Tribe, 105 F.3d at 601.
190. This presentation of TMDLs represents a very abbreviated version of the
workings of the process. For a more precise treatment, see Conway, supra note 6;
discussion supraPart IIA.2.
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significance) Y9 While a strict reading of the federal antidegradation
policy requires antidegradation review for any decrease in water
quality, 92 Region VIII expressly supports the use of a significance
determination as a "valuable means of focusing state resources
appropriately. ,193 A number of states have promulgated regulations
that define the point at which the lowering of water quality invokes the

protections of antidegradation review. 94

These regulations define

degradation in varying ways, from any lowering of the water quality to

complex analyses directed at whether a discharge or change in water
quality represents a significant change requiring antidegradation
review.
The Supreme Court recognized the propriety of a significance
determination in Arkansas v. Oklahoma.'9 The dispute arose after EPA
issued a permit to an Arkansas sewage treatment plant, prompting
downstream Oklahoma to challenge the permit as violative of its water
quality standards. The standards allowed "no degradation" of the
upper Illinois River.Y The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's
determination that no detectable violation occurred, noting that since
the Illinois River was already degraded, any effluent would contribute
to the river's deterioration even if it did not noticeably affect the water
quality.9
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and
sanctioned the use of de minimis determinations, finding the "no
degradation" language of Oklahoma's antidegradation policy did not
necessarily prohibit any new discharge. Instead, "no degradation"

191. Some states limit this inquiry to Tier 2 waterbodies. See, e.g., 5 COLO. CODE
REGS. § 1002-31(3) (c) (1997) (Colorado's antidegradation implementation policySignificance Determination provision).
192. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1998) ("that quality shall be maintained and
protected unless" the state follows the public participation and need inquiry
requirements); 48 Fed. Reg. 51, 400, 51,403 (1983) (preamble stating that Tier 2
provisions allow "some limited water quality degradation after extensive public
involvement.").
193. Region VIII Guidance, supra note 3, at 55. At the same time the Region VIII
Guidance stated that the significance test "should screen out only those activities that
would result in truly insignificant water quality effects." Id. To that end, Region VIII's
model implementation policy utilized a low significance threshold which would
require antidegradation review for most activities. Id.
194. The allowance of an insignificance determination to avoid Tier 2 protections
appears to contravene the purpose and language of the policy; however, as evidenced
by the Region VIII guidance statement, many states recognize a de minimis level of
degradation which does not implicate Tier 2 protections. The EPA's approval of these
implementation policies, with the significance provisions, indicates EPA's acceptance
of this approach. See id. at 72-75 (discussing certain state "significance" approaches);
see also Harleston, supra note 2, at 43-45, 57-59 (recognizing de minimis degradation as
an "unresolved issue").
195. See Region VIII Guidance, supra note 3, at 72-75 (discussing various approaches
adopting certain state "significance" determinations); see, e.g., 5 COLO. CODE REGS. §
1002-31(3)(c) (Colorado's antidegradation implementation policy-Significance
Determination provision).
196. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
197. Id. at 91.
198. Id.
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would apply to discharges demonstrably producing adverse effects.'2
States explicitly addressing the significance determination °
appear to agree with the "measurable" standard as a minimum
requirement for significance2 1' but vary on the maximum amount of
water quality deterioration that can still be classified as de minimis (or
insignificant) degradation, such that antidegradation review is not
required. For example, Ohio's antidegradation policy originally
provided for a very high degree of degradation before requiring
antidegradation review: "the director may allocate to existing sources
eighty percent of the pollutant assimilative capacity as determined by
appropriate total maximum daily load procedures without further
antidegradation review. 20 2 In Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus,203 the
court rejected this "significance provision," finding that "the
unambiguous meaning of the.., federal rules is that any deterioration
of high quality violates the policy. ,0 4 The eighty percent of assimilative
capacity significance standard promulgated by Ohio, and rejected by
the court, represents an extreme example of the use of an initial
significance to limit antidegradation review.
While the "detectable or measurable" standard makes practical
sense to describe the amount of degradation needed to invoke
antidegradation review, de minimis provisions moving beyond this
standard contradict the purpose of antidegradation policy, and
therefore should be drafted and construed strictly. Congress created
antidegradation policy to force entities to engage in a balancing
between the need to protect water quality and the need to facilitate
economic and social growth. The sole effect of these provisions is to
remove discharges from the antidegradation review process and
thereby eliminate the balancing determination. Furthermore, neither
the Clean Water Act nor the regulations provide express support for
allowances for de minimis degradation also requiring strict construction

199. Id. at 110-12 (requiring "actually detectable or measurable" change).
200. Considerable variation exists among the states in defining significance.
Compare MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.715, .716 (1995) (providing detailed lists of the
categories of activities that cause nonsignificant water quality changes), with Wis.
ADMIN. CODE § 207.05 (1998) (providing detailed scientific procedures and tests for
determining whether a discharge is deemed significant), with 5 COLO. CODE REGS. §
1002-31.8(3) (c) (using both a parameter-by-parameter and waterbody approach to the
significance determination).
201. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 9B1.5(d)(6)(iii) (1998) (protecting Tier 3
waters from "any measurable changes (including calculable or predicted changes) to
the existing water quality.").
202. OHIOADMIN. CODE§ 6111.12(A)(3) (1997).
203. Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1997).
204. Id. at 611 (quoting Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600
N.E.2d at 1061-62). In Columbus & Franklin, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the
Ohio EPA's interpretation of degradation for purposes of invoking antidegradation
review, as not including "deterioration to a point short of interference with the
designated use." Columbus & Franklin, 600 N.E.2d at 1054. The court indicated a
stringent limitation on the significance/de minimis issue by noting that Ohio's
antidegradation implementation policies clearly intended to prevent "perceptible
change in water quality." Id. at 1055.
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of de minimis provisions and construal of their terms.
B. Classification Designations
Effective classification designations represent a fundamental
component of antidegradation policy implementation. Water not
placed in the appropriate tier does not receive the appropriate
protections. States, however, subject only to the very broad mandates
of the federal antidegradation policy's direction, maintain a great
deal of discretion over the timing of classification designations and the
criteria utilized to make the classification determinations.
The
discretionary nature of classifications, in those states without objective
tier classification schemes, makes a challenge to those classifications
very difficult. Therefore, despite the importance of this aspect of
antidegradation policy in protecting the nation's waters, successful
challenges to tier classifications occur infrequently.
One example of this difficulty arose in In re Petition of Town of
Sherburne,2 ° when the State Water Resources Board reclassified a river
segment from a Tier 2 waterbody to Tier 1 upon petition by the
town.0 7 In affirming the Board's decision, the Supreme Court of
Vermont analyzed the Board's action under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review commonly used to assess the propriety
of agency decisions.0 Under this deferential standard, a court deems
an agency's decision reasonable if "the decision makes sense to a
reasonable person, even if the reviewing court might have weighted
the factors differently. '2 °9 The court, however, improperly applied the
economic and social necessity evaluation to the reclassification
context, as opposed to individual
degradation allowance
determinations,' thereby allowing substantially more degradation
than would be permitted under strict application of the
antidegradation policy decision-making framework. Furthermore, the
court improperly evaluated the existing uses by focusing on the
current attainment of recreational uses as opposed to the "uses actually

205. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
206. In reTown of Sherburne, 581 A.2d 274 (Vt. 1990).
207. Id. at 276-77.
208. Id. at 278-79.
209. Id. at 279. The court further elaborated on the scope of the arbitrary and
capricious standard by recognizing that:
We will not disturb the Board's findings of fact if there is substantial evidence
in the record to support them. The Board held a de novo hearing in this
matter.
It took testimony from numerous witnesses, assessed their
credentials, weighed their opinions, and, based upon all the evidence before
it, found the facts that support itsjudgment. We are an appellate court, not a
fact-finding agency; we must defer to the Board when its findings are
supported--even if the record contains contradictory evidence-and when
its conclusions are rationally derived from its findings and based on a correct
interpretation of the law.
Id. at 280 (quoting In reSouthview Assocs., 569 A.2d 501, 504 (Vt. 1989)).
210. Sherburne, 581 A.2d at 281-82.
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attained in the water body on or after November 28, 1975 '011 mandated
by the regulations.
Current antidegradation policy fails to address classification
problems in three respects.2 " First, beyond the "necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife" language for Tier 2
classification, 3 the federal policy does not adequately clarify for the
states the criteria that states must follow in establishing waterbody
classifications. With respect to ONRW classification, the EPA has
stated that "there is no requirement that any water body be so
designated or any specificity as to how that is to be done."214 Given the
tension between water quality protection and economic development
that has shaped antidegradation policy from the beginning, 5 it is not
surprising that a National Wildlife Federation study found only
minimal use of the ONRW designation.
Second, the federal
antidegradation policy does not require states to systematically classify
all the waterbodies in the state, allowing, instead, piecework tier
assignation at the time activities trigger individual waterbody
antidegradation review.26 This potentially clouds the decision-making
process by allowing interests other than those associated with the goals
for the waterbody to enter the classification determination. Third, the
EPA review provisions do not include the authority to review state
antidegradation designations of waters beyond the broad language of
the federal antidegradation policy's Tier 2 classification language. 7
Especially with respect to ONRWs, this raises concerns as to whether
the highest quality waterbodies are receiving adequate protections as
states attempt to avoid Tier 3 designations in favor of the more lenient
and flexible protections afforded to Tiers 2 and 2.5.
C. Non-Point Source Regulation
The most important issue facing the future effectiveness of
antidegradation policy as an environmental protection tool, and the
211. 40 C.F.R § 131.3(e) (1998); see 40 C.F.R § 131.12 (1998) ("In allowing such
degradation or lower water quality, the State shall assure water quality adequate to
protect existing uses fully ....
").
212. The EPA presumably recognizes some deficiencies in this aspect of
antidegradation policy in their advanced notice of proposed rulemaking by requesting
comment on whether classification guidance should be increased. See ANPRN WQS
Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,785 (Tier 2); id. at 36,787 (Tier 3).
213. 40 C.F.R § 131.12(a)(2).
214. ANPRN WQS Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,786.
215. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing the competing interests which led to the
initial formulation of antidegradation policy in 1967).
216. See NWF STUDY, supra note 2, at 13-17 & tbl. 3-2 (providing survey of state
designation authority, including the use of an inventory process).
217. See Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994) (providing authority
to review new or revised water quality standards, but not referencing classification
designation); 40 C.F.R. § 131.20-.22 (1998); NWF STUDY, supra note 2, at 4 ("EPA has
narrowly interpreted its authority to protect [ONRWs]. The EPA Office of General
Counsel has interpreted EPA's regulations to deny EPA any role in overseeing state's
designation of [ONRWs] or in requiring the development of equivalent state
programs."(emphasis omitted)).
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future of water protection attempts in general, is the treatment of nonpoint source pollutant regulation. "Nonpoint source," while not
defined in the Clean Water Act, refers to the addition of pollutants,
such as agricultural and construction run-off, to a waterbody by means
2 18
other than "a discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance..
Nonpoint source pollution is the most significant source of water
pollution today. 219 However, the Clean Water Act and its regulations
do not impose any regulatory scheme for the control of this pollution
source. Instead, the federal government delegates authority to the
states to address the problem, requiring only state satisfaction of
procedural mechanisms such as the state assessment report.2°
The federal antidegradation policy requires states to implement
policies that "achieve[] the highest statutory and regulatory
requirements for all new and existing point sources and all costeffective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint
source control. '2 2'

Thus, any non-point activity regulated by a state

triggers antidegradation review and must conform to that state's
policy. 22

Application of this trigger has yet to occur, however, due to

the lack of regulatory requirements addressing nonpoint sources
within the states. While nonpoint source control is difficult since
"output sources cannot be pinpointed for measurement,"' ' effective
water quality protection requires both the federal and state
governments to address the control of nonpoint source pollution in a
more comprehensive manner, adopting enforceable standards which,
in turn, will strengthen antidegradation policy as a water quality
protection mechanism.
CONCLUSION

Antidegradation policies have seldom been used as an aspect of
the Clean Water Act, despite the statutory/regulatory breadth of its
coverage (applying to both effluent limits and water quality standards).
Yet, this statutory and regulatory breadth, combined with the
mandatory nature of many of the duties prescribed by antidegradation
policies, provide a powerful tool to protect the waters of this nation.
By establishing a decision-making framework to evaluate the
advisability of activities which may lead to further degradation of our
waterbodies, antidegradation policy forces decision-makers to choose
our nation's water values-whether we value increased economic
218. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1998) (defining "point source").
219. See David Zaring, Agriculture,Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The
Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future,20 HARV.ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 515 (1996).

220. SeeClean WaterAct § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994).
221. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1998).
222.

See ANPRN WQS Regulation, supra note 2, at 36,780 (listing "any activity subject

to State or Tribal nonpoint source control requirements or regulations" as an
antidegradation review trigger).
223. Clare F. Saperstein, State Solutions to Nonpoint Source Pollution: Implementation and
Enforcement of the 1990 Coastal Zone Amendments Reauthorization Act Section 6217, 75 B.U.

L. REv. 889, 890 (1995).
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development, protection of water quality, or a compromise between
the two. The importance of antidegradation policy lies in that choice
and the decision must be a considered one. Demonstration of need to
allow further degradation must be complete and persuasive. Like the
relatively recent growth of TMDL claims, actions brought under
antidegradation policies potentially represent the next wave of
environmental litigation in the water protection area. However, that
potential depends upon the judicial, legislative, and executive
decisions of today.

ARTICLE UPDATE
UPDATE TO
COLORADO WATER LAW. AN IHSTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS,JR.

To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors will periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is an
update to Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, Appendix - Colorado
Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law, selected by The
Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., and published in the Water Law
Review, Volume 1, Issue 1.

Chatfield East Well Company, Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners
Ass'n
"Waters of the natural stream, including tributary ground water,
belong to the public and are subject to use under Colorado's
constitutional prior appropriation doctrine and implementing
statutes. Rights of use thereto become perfected property rights upon
application to beneficial use. In contrast, the right to use water in
designated ground water basins, nontributary water outside of
designated ground water basins, or any Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, or
Laramie-Fox Hills ground water outside of a designated ground water
basin, is governed by the provisions of the Groundwater Management
Act. Ground water located in designated basins is subject to a
modified system of prior appropriation administered by the ground
water commission. Use of nontributary ground water and Denver
Basin aquifer water outside of designated ground water basins is
Regardless of
subject to the provisions of section 37-90-137(4).
whether water rights are obtained in accordance with prior
appropriation law, or pursuant to the Ground Water Management Act,
no person "owns" Colorado's public water resource as a result of land
ownership."
Chatfield East Well Co., Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners Assoc., 956 P.2d 1260,

1268 (Colo. 1998) (citations omitted).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

"In Bayou Land Co. v. Talley we reiterated that a right to use
nontributary ground water outside of a designated basin is purely a
function of statute and landowners do not have an absolute right to
ownership of water underneath their land. Rather, landowners have
an inchoate right to extract and use the nontributary water in
accordance with section 37-90-137(4). We held that
'[t]he right does not vest until the landowner or an individual with
the landowner's consent constructs a well in accordance with a well
permit from the state engineer and/or applies for and receives water
court adjudication. Until vesting occurs, the right to extract
nontributary ground water is subject to legislative modification or
termination.'
Id. (citations omitted).
"By means of Senate Bill 5, the General Assembly subjected Denver
Basin ground water, whether nontributary or not nontributary, to the
separate water use system of section 37-90-137(4) and required the
state engineer to promulgate rules for use of this water under section
37-90-137 (9) (b)."
Id. at 1270 (citations omitted).

City of Grand Junction v. City & County of Denver
"[W] e disagree with Grand Junction's claim that the Water Court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it examined and construed the
provisions of the Blue River Decree. We hold that the Water Court
possessed the authority to review the Blue River Decree in order to
ascertain whether Denver's application would interfere with the terms
or objectives of the decree. In doing so, we also reaffirm the
principle.., that a court of coordinate jurisdiction does not possess
the authority to enter a decree that modifies or interferes with the
objectives or terms of another court's decree."
City of GrandJunction v. City & County of Denver, 960 P.2d 675, 682-83 (Colo. 1998).

"Therefore, in the context of the priorities described in the decree,
Denver can fill Dillon Reservoir only once. In other words, all
priorities to Blue River water awarded in the Blue River Decree are
senior to Denver's rights, if any, to fill Dillon Reservoir more than
once. In the instant case, Denver ultimately sought a refill right with a
priority date of 1987, a date junior to all priorities described in the
Blue River Decree. Hence, Denver's new claim is entirely consistent
with those terms of the Blue River Decree that relate specifically to
refilling Dillon Reservoir."
Id. at 683 (footnotes omitted).
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"Furthermore, Denver's claim to a refill right at Dillon Reservoir
was not even among the subjects addressed by the Blue River Decree.
The refill right was not, and could not have been, before the Federal
Court in 1955 because Denver's first appropriation date for the refill of
the reservoir was 1965. As the Water court explained, the Federal
court in the Blue River Decree addressed only those relative priorities
at issue at the time of adjudication. The Federal Court enjoined the
parties from asserting in the future any priorities different from those
described in the Blue River Decree. Accordingly, the Federal Court
has thwarted subsequent efforts by Denver to modify, intentionally or
otherwise, the United States' senior rights to Blue River water."
Id. at 684.

"The Federal Court's continuing jurisdiction is limited to the
purpose of effectuating the objectives of the Blue River Decree ....
Denver's refill right does not interfere with the objectives of the Blue
River Decree because Denver's refill right is subject to all of the
provisions of the Blue River Decree .... Consequently, Denver's
application for a refill right with respect to Dillon Reservoir did not
implicate the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction to implement the
Blue River Decree. We hold, therefore, that the Water Court
possessed subject matterjurisdiction over Denver's application."
Id. at 685.

City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co.
"The conditional decree contemplated that Lafayette would not
obtain an absolute decree if it no longer had a lawful right to divert
water through the Anderson Ditch. Lafayette did not meet this test
because at the time of the trial and the entry of the proposed absolute
decree, Lafayette had no legal right to exchange water using the
Anderson Ditch for application to beneficial use.
Lafayette argues that the water court improperly injected an
additional requirement for the perfection of a conditional water right
by requiring the applicant to possess facilities to transport the water
when it ruled that 'absent a permanent means of transport[ing] water,
there can be no absolute water right.' We agree with Lafayette that the
water court's ruling is inaccurate, since Colorado law contemplates
that legal arrangements for a means of diversion may be perpetual or
for a term of years. Consistent with the terms of the stipulation
between these parties, we have concluded that the water court was
correct in declining to enter an absolute decree following trial,
because Lafayette then had no legal right to use the point of diversion
identified in the decree.
In conclusion, we hold that Lafayette demonstrated reasonable
diligence in developing the rights set forth in the 1987 decree, and
that the water court properly continued Lafayette's conditional rights
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to exchanges to the Anderson Ditch for another diligence period."
City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co., 962 P.2d 955, 963 (Colo. 1998) (citations
omitted).

Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation District
"Irrigation districts were created 'to provide means.., for bringing
into cultivation the arid lands of the state and making them highly
productive by the process of irrigation.' To accomplish this objective,
the legislature authorized irrigation districts to levy and collect special
assessments at the expense of those landowners whose lands were
serviced by irrigation waters. However, legal authority to levy and
obtain collection of special assessments does not transform an
essentially private entity into a governmental entity for Amendment 1
purposes. We have repeatedly said that irrigation district special
assessments are not general taxes characteristic of government. While
general taxes exact revenue from the public at large for general
governmental purposes, an irrigation district's special assessment
benefits specific landowners whose land the district supplies with
water. These special assessments are designated to pay the expenses,
including servicing debt, incurred in irrigating the land.
The
assessments are levied in proportion to land ownership and are paid
only by the landowners who receive the benefits. In summary, a 1921
Act irrigation district serves the interests of landowners within the
district and not the general public. As such, it cannot be said that an
increase of an irrigation district's special assessment increases the
burden of the taxpaying public which Amendment 1 sought to
regulate."
Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., 972 P.2d 1037, 103940 (Colo. 1998)
(citations and footnotes omitted).

"[W]e conclude that the private character of a 1921 Act irrigation
district differs in essential respects from that of a public governmental
entity exercising taxing authority contemplated by Amendment 1. An
irrigation district exists to serve the interests of landowners not the
general public. Rather than being a local governmental agency, a
1921 Act irrigation district is a public corporation endowed by the state
with the powers necessary to perform its predominantly private
objective. Accordingly, we hold that an irrigation district is not a local
government within the meaning of Amendment l's taxing and
spending election requirements."
Id. at 1041.
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DECONSTRUCTING A WATER PROJECT'
ALISON MAYNARD"*
INTRODUCTION

The Animas-La Plata water project ("ALP" or "Animas-La Plata") has
been on the Bureau of Reclamation's drawing board for Southwestern
Colorado for over fifty years. If constructed as originally planned (in two
phases) it will be enormous. Phase 1 involves construction of a large
reservoir known as "Ridges Basin." The Bureau will divert 25% of the
flow of the Animas River and pump it uphill 500 feet, at a cost of
approximately $710 million, to fill this reservoir. This phase will require
years of earthmoving to construct pumping stations, as well as miles of
tunnels

and pipelines.

It

will also cause

severe

and irreparable

environmental damage to the Animas River, one of the last free-flowing
rivers in the West. Phase 2 involves pumping water out of Ridges Basin
upward, once again, to the west over Red Mesa. Some of this water will
be dumped in the La Plata River to increase flows for downstream

irrigation, and some will be pumped another 400 feet higher and several
more miles west to irrigate what is known as the "Dry Side."

Because of opposition to the project, backers have proposed
smaller versions since the early 1990s. One, "ALP-Lite," would have
+ This article has been adapted from a memorandum Ms. Maynard wrote for the
Citizens Progressive Alliance in January 1999. That memorandum, in part, constituted
a legal analysis of issues identified earlier by Mr. Richard Hamilton in a monograph
dated September 30, 1997. Mr. Phillip Doe, a retired former official of the Bureau of
Reclamation and board member of CPA, supplied additional factual background for
the present article. Ms. Maynard wishes to express her appreciation for his assistance.
" Ms. Maynard practices primarily water and land use law from her offices in
Capitol Hill, Denver, representing citizens' groups and environmental organizations.
She is a 1976 graduate of Cornell University (where she majored in physics), a 1986
graduate of the University of Denver College of Law, a former geophysicist, and a
former Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado, in the water unit. Ms.
Maynard was the trial attorney in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water
Conservation Board, 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995), pro bono; performed the legal services
which resulted in the formation, by election in 1997, of the Center of Colorado Water
Conservancy District in Park County; and brought a series of suits against the Park
County Commissioners in 1995-98 on behalf of various citizens' groups, which were
instrumental in the recall of all three commissioners in February 1998. Ms. Maynard
served for four years on the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
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been only 6% smaller than the original ALP. Project proponents and
the Department of Interior are allegedly working out the details of its
successor, "ALP-Ultralite," in secret. "ALP-Ultralite" will, at the least,
still require construction of Ridges Basin Reservoir. In all likelihood,
this project will mirror its predecessors in size.
Originally, Animas-La Plata was proposed strictly as an irrigation
project, without any reference to Ute Indian reserved water rights.
Indeed, several federal water projects already exist in the area, which not
only meet the Utes' water needs but have capacities greatly exceeding
those needs. The Bureau of Indian Affairs built a network of ditches in
the last century to irrigate the lands allotted to tribal members, and those
ditches divert substantial amounts of water, with priority number 1, from
the Pine River. In the early 1940's, the federal government built the Pine
River Project, consisting of Vallecito Reservoir-with one-sixth of its
water supply dedicated to the needs of the Southern Utes-and the
Florida Project, a small portion of which serves Indian water needs.
The water from the Pine River ditches and Vallecito Reservoir is
more than adequate to serve the residential needs of the Southern Ute
Indians-approximately 1,300 people-as well as to irrigate 14,000 acres
of land. A portion of the irrigation water goes unused by the Indians,
however, because of the area's marginal crop yield. In fact, Vallecito
Reservoir has recently been the subject of bills transferring it to private
ownership, and converting its use from irrigation to municipal and
industrial. Such legislation would enable the new owner, the Pine River
Irrigation District, to avoid federal restrictions on such conversions.
For the Ute Mountain Utes, in the 1980s the federal government
constructed the Dolores Project, one fourth of which, or 24,700 acre-feet,
is for the exclusive use of that tribe. This amount of water would satisfy
the residential water requirements of 123,500 people. However, the Ute
Mountain Ute tribe consists of only a little over 2,000 people. Finally,
Navajo Reservoir, a mainstream reservoir on the San Juan River with
1,500,000 acre-feet of storage capacity, sits adjacent to the Southern Ute
Reservation and upstream of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. It is
highly likely3 this reservoir also could be used to satisfy any water needs of
both tribes.
The three completed federal water projects on the Pine, Florida, San
Juan, and Dolores Rivers cost about $1.1 billion in 1999 dollars, almost
all of which will be paid by taxpayers, not project beneficiaries. The Utes
do not use much of the water from these existing projects, nor are they
able to make use of the quantities available. Thus, there is no need for
yet another reservoir project in Southwestern Colorado to meet Indian
needs for irrigation or domestic use, certainly not one that would cost
1. See Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Interior,
No. 99-WM-808 (D. Colo., filed Apr. 23, 1999).
For more information, see
<http://angelfire.com/al/alpcentral/>.
2. Possibly a very large portion; we have been unable to get reliable information.
3. Such an eventuality would have to be negotiated with the Navajo Nation, however,
since it claims all the water of the SanJuan River.
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taxpayers another $710 million, and possibly three times that if the
history of overruns which have afflicted similar federal water projects is
repeated.
As mentioned, when originally proposed, the purpose of Animas-La
Plata was to serve Western irrigators. The Utes were not major
participants. Only within the past twelve to fifteen years or so has the
project become "clothed in the Indian blanket'; and, at the same time,
its purpose changed from irrigation to municipal and industrial use.
This "Indian blanket" has had great practical usefulness to the promoters
of Animas-La Plata, who, based on lessons they learned from the Dolores
Project, now advance Indian interests tojustify construction of ALP. The
proponents argue that the Utes have a large (unquantified) reserved
water right with an 1868 priority-the date of their treaty with the United
States government establishing their reservation. Due to the threat this
"senior reserved water right" putatively poses to established patterns of
water use among non-Indians in Southwestern Colorado, interested
parties, including the tribes, the State of Colorado, the United States
Departments of Interior and Justice, and numerous local governmental
entities, entered into a "settlement" of the Utes' claims in water court in
1986.! The settlement confesses the existence of an 1868 reserved water
right, but subordinates it to the 1966 adjudication date of Animas-La
Plata. In return for the subordination, 29,900 acre-feet of project water is
dedicated to the Southern Utes, and 26,000 acre-feet to the Ute
Mountain Utes, almost all of which is for municipal and industrial use
specifically, which the Utes may sell for use off their reservations. The
settlement was subsequently authorized by an Act of Congress 6in 1988,5
court.
and decreed on stipulated motion by the Division 7 water
The "Indian blanket" in which ALP is clothed has also had great
political usefulness to its promoters, since no one can dispute that the
history of the United States' treatment of the Utes in the last century,
possibly even more than its treatment of other Indian tribes, was one of
dishonor and disgrace-a greedy theft of resources accomplished under
color of law. Yet one can dispute that justice requires reparation be
made to the Utes for these wrongs in the form of this particular water
project.
Although an agreement has been struck by interested parties in
order to smooth the road for Animas-La Plata-and there are now both a
stipulated water court decree and an Act of Congress enshrining that
agreement-the point of this article is to show that no consideration
supported the agreement. The law is clear that the Southern Utes do
not have a reserved water right with an 1868 priority, and common sense
4. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, December 10,
1986.
5. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585,
102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
6. In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America
(Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes), Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1991) (No. W1603-76F).
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dictates that a costly water project not be built to satisfy a nonexistent
claim.
THE UTES Do NOT HAVE AN 1868 RESERVED WATER RIGHT
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the Ute
Reservation, created in 1868, was extinguished by the Act of Congress of
June 15, 1880.' The Court interpreted that Act (which was supported by
the Agreement of 1880 between the Utes and the United States
government) to extinguish all "right, title, [and] interest" of the
Southern Ute Tribe in the Ute reservation.' Consequently, the Winters
right9 impliedly reserved at the time the reservation was created was also
extinguished.
The Supreme Court detailed the history of this forfeiture in its
opinion. It begins with the creation of the reservation in 1868, when the
Confederated Bands of Utes, composed of the Uncompahgre Utes, the
White River Utes, and the Southern Utes, exchanged their aboriginal
lands in New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado for a reservation of
approximately 15.7 million acres lying wholly within Colorado. The
reservation was subsequently almost severed in 1874 by the "Brunot
Cession" of 3.7 million acres of the east-central portion after valuable
mineral deposits were discovered there. 0
In 1879, members of the White River Ute band of Utes murdered
Indian Agent Meeker and others at the White River Station in Western
Colorado." Public outcry over this incident led to the June 15, 1880 Act
of Congress, terminating tribal ownership in the reservation lands.' The
Act caused the cession to the United States of all acreage not already
allotted to individual Indians, "except as hereinafter provided for their
settlement."' 3
The Supreme Court interpreted that language in
examining whether the Act of 1880 actually extinguished the reservation.
The Act "provided for the settlement" of the White River Utes in Utah
and the Uncompahgre Utes along the Grand River, unless insufficient
agricultural land was found there, in which case they would also go to
Utah (which they soon did)."4 As to the Southern Utes, the Act provided
that they were to
remove to and settle upon the unoccupied agricultural lands on the
La Plata River, in Colorado; and if there should not be a sufficiency of
such lands on the La Plata River and in its vicinity in Colorado, then
7. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
8. Id. at 160.
9. In Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court held that water rights, in
sufficient quantity to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, are impliedly reserved for
the benefit of the Indians at the time a reservation is created. Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
10. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
11. Id.at 162.
12. Id. at 162-63.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Id.
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upon such other unoccupied agricultural lands as may be found on
the La Plata river or in its vicinity in New Mexico.' 5
The Southern Utes thus continued to occupy the area of their former
reservation known as Royce Area 617.
The United States Court of Claims, from which the appeal to the
Supreme Court was taken, held that the United States, in acquiescing in
the continued occupancy of Royce Area 617 by the Southern Utes, had
waived its rights created in the 1880 Act "whatever [those rights] were."' 6
The Supreme Court reversed this holding, finding no such waiver, and
expressly concluded that, despite the language, "except as hereinafter
provided for their settlement," the entire reservation was extinguished in
1880.17

Although the Act of 1880 terminated tribal ownership, 8 Indians
could still own such former reservation land as might be allotted in
severalty to individual Indians. All of the land not allotted to individual
Indians-the remaining portion of the former reservation-was released
and conveyed to the United States, to be held as public lands subject to
disposal for the Utes' financial benefit. 9
The question whether the Tribe's 1868 reserved water rights survived
the extinguishment of the reservation itself must be answered in the
negative. Winters v. United States held that, since the purpose of Indian
reservations was to convert the Indians from a "nomadic and uncivilized
people," to a settled, agricultural people, ° the government must have
intended to reserve water adequate for the irrigation of reservation lands
when the reservation was created. Since Winters, a reserved water right
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation (including now
not only Indian reservations, but other federal reservations such as
reservations for forests, national parks, and the like) has been deemed
vested with a priority as of the date of the reservation itself.2' Although
an Indian reserved water right must be considered to have sprung into
existence on the Ute Reservation as of 1868 pursuant to Winters,
therefore, it was extinguished by the Act of 1880. A water fight is an
interest in real property. The Winters right was unquestionably included
in "all the right, title, interest, estate, claims, and demands of whatsoever
nature in and to the land and property"2 2 of the Southern Ute Tribe in
their reservation, ceded in its entirety to the United States. 'Where the
grantor conveys all of his interest without qualification, his entire right is
15. Id. at 159 (quoting Act ofJune 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199, 200 (1880)).
16. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346, 356 (1970)
(Skeltonj., dissenting), rev'd, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
17. United States v. Southern Ue Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 163-64, 174.
18. Id. at 162-63.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
21. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
22. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159 (quoting Act of

June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199, 200 (1880)).
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transferred, since the word 'interest' is regarded as the broadest term
applicable to claims in and on real property, and a like rule is applicable
to a conveyance of 'all right, title, and interest.' 23 Moreover, because a
reserved water right is measured exclusively by the "practicably irrigable
acreage" of the reservation, not by the "number of Indians, '' 4 as soon as
there was no longer any acreage to irrigate there was no longer a
reserved water right.
Two lower courts have expressly agreed with the conclusion that,
upon cession of an Indian reservation to the government and opening of
that land to homesteading, the Winters right is extinguished. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached this result in United States v. Anderson,25
in determining, among other issues, whether the Spokane Indian
Reservation, which was ceded to the government, opened to
homesteading, then subsequently reacquired by the Tribe, carried a
reserved water right with an original date-of-the-reservation priority. 6
The Ninth Circuit held it did not.2 The Tribe had a reserved water right,
but its priority was the date of the Tribe's reacquisition of their lands.8
The court found this conclusion was required by the Supreme Court's
determination, based on the Desert Lands Act, that a homesteader
acquires no federal water right incident to the transfer of public lands
into private ownership.29 The Ninth Circuit stated:
Application of this rule to the case before us would terminate the
availability of Winters rights on those reservation lands which have
been declared public domain, opened to homesteading, and
subsequently conveyed into private ownership.
This result is

23. 26 CJ.S. Deeds, §104(c) (1956) (footnotes omitted).
24. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600, 601.
25. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 1361. This is a different question from whether a reserved water right
attached to lands allotted to Indians while those lands were still part of the reservation;
and, if so, whether that water right can be transferred to non-Indians and still retain its
original priority date. The answer to both parts of this question is yes, since an allottee has
a reserved right which is derivative of the tribe's. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527,
532 (1939) (Indian allottees are entitled to "use some portion of tribal waters essential for
cultivation" of their reservation); Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362; State of Wyoming v. Owl
Creek Irrigation Dist., 753 P.2d 76, 114 (Wyo. 1988). If the lands left reservation status,
however, allotments made after that time did not carry a reserved water right. Water
could be appropriated for such lands only pursuant to state law. Owl Creek, 753 P.2d at
114. Accord Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285 (1990) (the right to an individual share in
tribal water is not the same thing as an entitlement to a reserved water right for the
individual allotment); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326
(E.D. Wash. 1978), affJd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (at the time a tribal member acquires an
allotment, he takes a proportionate share of the tribe's reserved rights). The principles
governing the reserved rights of allotments to members of the Southern Ute tribe made
prior to June 15, 1880, is believed unimportant for purposes of this article, since the
Southern Ute Tribe does not base its claim to an 1868 priority on tribal reacquisition of
such allotments.
27. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361.
28. Id. at 1363.
29. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 15556, 158 (1935).
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supported by the fact that Winters rights were only intended to assist
in accomplishing the needs of the reservation; where the land has
been removed from the Tribe's possession and conveyed to a
homesteader, the purposes for which Winters rights were implied are
eliminated. Therefore, a homesteader is not entitled to rely on the
Winters doctrine. The appropriation doctrine will serve as the source
of his water rights.
Where the homesteader has no perfected water rights or has lost
rights which were perfected, there are no rights to be regained by the
Indians on reacquisition of the property. This principle protects the
intervening rights, if any, that may have been acquired in good faith
by third party water users during
the homesteading process and prior
30
to reacquisition by the Tribe.
The Wyoming
Supreme Court followed this rule in 1995 in In re Big Horn
311
River, stating:
When the Tribes ceded their land to the United States for sale, the
reserved water right disappeared because the purpose for which it was
recognized no longer pertained. That purpose no longer existed for
lands acquired by others after they had been ceded to the United
States for disposition. The effect is that the reserved water rights were
eliminated as to those tracts.32
One of the appellants in the Big Horn River case argued that while
Congress had the power to terminate Indian rights, 33 it had not done so

since its intent was not express; yet, the Wyoming court found a
termination. In the Southern Ute case, not even that argument can be
made since Congress did express its intent to terminate Indian rights in
the Act of June 15, 1880. It was a harsh consequence for the Utes, but
extinguishment of the reservation and termination of Indian rights are
what the Supreme Court held Congress intended to accomplish.34 The
Court was influenced by a line of court cases brought by the Utes in the
20th century, resulting in consent judgments that the Tribe had
admitted constituted full compensation for their property interests which

30. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363 (citation omitted).
31. In re Big Horn River, 899 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1995).
32. Id. at 854.
33. See United States v. State of Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13
(1968).
34. It is Congress' unequivocal language in the 1880 Act which similarly distinguishes
the Southern Ute case from the situation presented in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether a reserved water right for fishing
purposes survived when the Klamath Tribe was terminated pursuant to the Klamath
Termination Act of 1954. Id. at 1428. The Court found that it did, because there is a
substantive exception in the Klamath Termination Act which states that nothing in that
Act shall be deemed to abrogate any water rights reserved to the Tribe, or fishing rights.
Id. at 1412. No similar water rights "saving clause" was inserted in the Act of June 15,
1880. The Southern Utes' reserved water rights, thus, did not survive.
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had been improperly disposed of by the government. In 1938 the
federal government also restored the Tribe's as-yet-undisposed-of lands
from their original reservation.
THE SOUTHERN UTES ARE DUE No REPARATIONS

In 1950, the Confederated Bands of Utes and the United States
government entered into a settlement of six cases the Utes had pending
in the United States Court of Claims." The Utes claimed compensation
for property interests which had been taken from them in violation of
section 3 of the 1880 Act, which provided that the ceded lands were to be
disposed of for cash only, with the proceeds applied to the Utes' financial
benefit. 6 The decisions in these Court of Claims cases and the history
behind them-including two earlier Court of Claims decisions-are
pertinent to understanding the Supreme Court decision of 1971. 7
In 1909, Congress passed ajurisdictional act permitting the Court of
Claims to hear the Utes' claims that the United States had failed to carry
out the terms of the 1880 Agreement."' Pursuant to that jurisdictional
act, the Utes brought suit against the United States to recover the
proceeds of cash sales for lands formerly part of the reservation, which
had been sold as public lands without the proceeds' being credited to
the Utes; and as compensation for other lands from the former
reservation, which the government had set aside for its own use. In 1910,
the Utes received a judgment of $3,516,231.05, representing
compensation for more than 4.5 million acres. 9 In 1911, they received
an award of attorney fees in an amount equal to 6% of the judgment, or
$210,973.86. 40 More than seven million acres were still left subject to the
1880 agreement."
After the 1910 judgment, the government disposed of additional
large tracts of land still held by the United States under the terms of
section 3 of the 1880 Act through entry and sale, or appropriation for its
own use, without the required crediting to the Utes.42 The disposition of
these lands between 1910 and 1938 thus became the subject of another
suit for compensation by the Utes,3 permitted to be brought under a

35. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 433 (1950)
(consolidating Case Nos. 45585, 46640, 47564, and 47566). Two other cases, Nos. 47565
and 47567, were referred to in the General Accounting Office Report Re: Petition of the
ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians. These cases are unreported.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159.
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 781, 788-89 (1909) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
320 (1994).
39. Ute Indians v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 225 (1911), supplementing 45 Ct. Cl. 440
(1910); see also Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 413, 422
(1943).
40. UteIndians,46 Ct. Cl. at 227.
41. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. at 422.
42. Id. at 418.
43. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 433, 436
(1950).
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second jurisdictional act promulgated for that purpose." The parties
stipulated to $6,037,567.72 plus interest for that taking.45
At that time, thousands of acres still remained undisposed of by the
government. In 1934 the Secretary of Interior, pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 46 believed he was authorized to
restore these "remaining surplus lands" to tribal ownership. He issued
two orders dated July 17 and November 13, 1937, purporting to restore
30,000 acres adjoining "the present reservation" (now known as the Ute
Mountain Ute reservation), and approximately 8,500 acres within and
lying north of Township 35 N, respectively.4" However, as detailed in
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States,49 the restoration of many
of these lands, already included in grazing districts under the Taylor
Grazing Act, "created much alarm and uneasiness among the citizens of
western Colorado."' Thus, the "Adams Amendment" was offered to the
pending bill which became the Act ofJune 28, 1938. As finally passed,
with the Adams Amendment, the 1938 Act provided that there was to be
no restoration of any lands north of and including Township 35 N, and
provided that all prior orders purporting to restore such lands were
"rescinded and annulled."" The lands including and north of township
35 were in Royce Area 616. On September 14, 1938, the Secretary of
Interior then restored the remaining lands in Royce Area 617 to tribal
ownership, an area consisting of approximately 200,000 acres, described
as:
Townships 32, 33, and 34 North, Ranges 1-1s to 13 West, inclusive, of
the N.M.P.M., in Colorado, being that area lying between the north
boundary of the old Southern Ute Reservation and the south
boundary of the State of Colorado and extending west from the 107th
Meridian to the east boundary of the present Southern Ute
Reservation [now known as the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation] .

As mentioned, the 1938 Act provided that the Utes could sue the
United States for compensation for any "claims arising.., by reason of
any lands taken from them, without compensation ....
, Thus, even
44.

Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 776, 52 Stat. 1209 (1938) (codified as amended at 16

U.S.C. § 81(d) (1994).
45. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. at 436.
46. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (1994)).
47. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. at 419.
48.

Id. at 423.

49. Id. at 413.
50.

Id. at 419.

51.

Id. at 423-24.

52. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 413, 424 (1943). The
Act did, however, either ratify the Secretary's order, or legislatively transfer, the 30,000
acres, which was not within the prohibited area. Id.
53. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians,423 F.2d at 370.
54. Southern Ute Reservation, Colorado, Order of Restoration, 3 Fed. Reg. 1425

(1938).
55. Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 776, 52 Stat. 1209 (1938) (codified as amended at 16
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though 200,000 acres had now been restored to them in fee, the
Confederated Bands of Utes brought suit in the Court of Claims. Case
No. 45585 sought compensation for the taking of the undisposed-of land
lying within and north of T. 35 N which were the subject of the Adams
Amendment, so prohibited by law from being restored to the Southern
Utes.56 Case No. 46640 sought compensation for the lands disposed of
between 1885 and 1938. 57 Case No. 47564 sought compensation for
64,560 acres of land withdrawn in 1916 for naval oil reserves in Colorado,
for which the stipulated compensation totaled $623,686.18. 5s Case No.
47566 sought compensation (for unstated reasons) for 3,199,258 acres of
the same lands dealt with by the 1911 case, which had been set aside for
forest reserves. The compensation stipulated to was $803,826.48. 9 The
stipulations that settled these four cases, as well as two others which are
not reported,- are referred to as the "1950 consent judgments." The
total compensation awarded, not including attorney fees, was around $31
million (according to the Supreme Court). 6' The value of this judgment
in 1998 dollars is approximately $857 million.62
The 1971 Supreme Court decision in Southern Ute Tribe was
commenced in the Indian Claims Commission by the Southern Ute
Tribe alone the very year after the 1950 consentjudgments were entered,
in 1951.63 The Utes argued that the United States had violated its
fiduciary duty to the Tribe by disposing of 220,000 acres of land ceded to
it by the federal government as "free homesteads,"' although obligated
by the Acts of 1880 and 1895 to sell the acreage for the Tribe's benefit."'
The Tribe also sought an accounting for the proceeds from the sale of
82,000 acres, which, it alleged, were required, under the same Acts, to be
held for the Tribe's benefit.5 The government's defense was resjudicata:
because of the Tribe's entry into the 1950 consent judgments between
the United States and the Confederated Bands of Utes (which included
the Southern Utes), it was barred from bringing the 1951 claims. 66
The Supreme Court held in favor of the government, stating that the
Southern Utes had already been fully compensated for their loss. 67 In an
8-1 decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Court quoted from the
U.S.C. § 81(d) (1994).
56. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. at 434. Two other
cases, Nos. 47565 and 47567, were referred to in the GAO Report, but no separate report
of these cases was found. See GeneralAccounting Office Report Re: Petition of the Confederated
Bands of Ute Indians.
57. ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. at 437.
58. Id. at 439.
59. Id. at 440-41.
60. See supra, note 35.
61. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 402 U.S. at 159, n.2.
62. Computed by Professor Charles Howe of the University of Colorado
Department of Economics, assuming a rate of 3% interest compounded annually.
63. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
64. Id. at 159-60.
65. Id. at 160.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 174.
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stipulation in ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians,which stated:
[T]hejudgment to be entered in this case is resjudicata,not only as to
the land described in Schedule 1, but, whether included therein or not,
also as to any land formerly owned or claimed by the plaintiffs in
western Colorado, ceded to defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880,
and by the defendant during the aforesaid periods of time sold for
cash, disposed of as free homesteads and set aside for public purposes
[between 1910 and 1938].68
The Supreme Court examined whether the Utes had either withheld
any lands from the 1880 cession, or acquired any land or interests in land
subsequent to the Act of June 15, 1880 which were subsequently ceded,
particularly given that they had continued to occupy Royce Area 617.69
The Utes maintained that there were such interests or rights for which
they had not been compensated by virtue of the 1950 consent decreesapproximately 230,000 acres of land in Royce Area 617.70 The Supreme
Court again disagreed, holding that no interest or right survived the
1880 cession, the subsequent improper disposition of which still
remained to be compensated. 7' The Court held that the 1950 consent
judgments were res judicata as to compensation to the Utes for the
taking of all property from the 1868 reservation which was "ceded to the
defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880," and that there were no other
cessions.72

The views expressed by Judge Skelton, the lone dissenting voice in
the Court of Claims in Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, appear to
In expressing his
have strongly influenced the Supreme Court.
disagreement with the result reached by his court, Judge Skelton stated:
I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority nor with the result
they reach. In my opinion, the Indians in this case, along with other
Southern Ute tribes, were paid $31,938,473.43 in 1950 for the
identical land involved here, together with other lands. This was the
largest judgment ever awarded by this court since it was established in
1855. The attorneys who represented the Indians in the recovery of
this tremendous judgment received an attorney fee of $2,800,000. See
ConfederatedBand of Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 609 (1951).
As will be seen in the following pages, the same Indians and the same
attorneys are before the court again in this case asking that they be
paid again (twice) for the same land, and the opinion of the majority
is going to allow them to get this double payment. This results, in my

68. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 161; Confederated
Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. C1. at 437 (some emphasis in original, some
added; citation omitted).
69. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 163-64.
70. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d at 346 (the case
from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was taken).
71. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 164.
72. Id. at 174.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

opinion, in a shocking giveaway of millions otdollars of public money
of the United States, and I cannot agree to it."
Judge Skelton then discussed the difficulty of assessing the particular
lands that were the subject of the consentjudgments:
The stipulation [which served as the basis for the 1950 consent
judgments] went on to describe a "Schedule 1," which contained the
legal descriptions of approximately 1,523,236.95 acres of land
embraced by the stipulation, saying: "So far as the parties with
diligence have been able to determine these descriptions represent
all the land so disposed of and set aside." This Schedule 1 contains
338 pages of single-spaced, typewritten legal descriptions of land. A
land expert would find it difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of
this Schedule 1. Even if he were to analyze it, months of his time
would be required in the process. When confronted with the
schedule of lands pursuant to settling case no. 46640, the government
only ran a spot check of the schedule, and concluded that while there
were errors, it was impractical to continue the examination.
Evidencing an obvious lack of reliance on the correctness and
completeness of Schedule 1, the stipulation signed by both parties
went on to state:
However, the judgment to be entered in this case is res judicata,
not only as to the land described in Schedule 1, but, whether
included therein or not, also as to any land formerly owned or
claimed by the plaintiffs in western Colorado, ceded to defendant by
the Act of June 15, 1880 by the defendant during the aforesaid
periods of time sold for cash, disposed of as free homesteads and
set aside for public purposes ....
One searches in vain for a more clear, a more precise 4 a more final
disposal and release of claims, than the one just quoted.
Judge Skelton then analyzed whether the land from Royce Area 617
in Southwestern Colorado was included in the comprehensive language
of the 1950 settlement, and concluded that it was. 75 The Supreme Court
adopted his analysis and conclusion, reversing the Court of Claims] 6
The United States Supreme Court holding is all the more important
in light of its recent decision in the coalbed methane gas (CBM) case.
In that case, the Southern Utes went back to court again to claim
ownership of CBM by virtue of their "ownership of the coal estate"
underlying approximately 200,000 acres of patented land in Royce Area
617.78 The CBM case is important here only for its tie to the reserved
73.

United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians,423 F.2d at 363.

74. Id. at 364 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 372.
United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 159.
77. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, No. 98-830, 1999 U.S. Lexis
4002 (1999), revg, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251
(10th Cir. 1998), affgen banc 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997), rev'g 874 F. Supp. 1142
(D. Colo. 1995), modifying 863 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Colo. 1994).
78. Amoco, 874F. Supp. at 1147.
76.
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water right question. In the CBM case, the district court held that the
Tribe's title to the coal estate derives from the 1909 and 1910 Coal Lands
Acts,79 by which the United States government reserved to itself the coal
in lands subject to homesteading. The United States then putatively
restored the coal estate to the Tribe by means of the 1938 restoration
order. The United States could reserve the coal estate to itself in 19091910 because the land was in the public domain, however, which can
only have been the case if the reservation had been extinguished.
District CourtJudge Babcock noted that:
The Supreme Court has left no doubt as to the meaning and effect of
the 1880 Act. "The central feature of the Act of 1880 was the
termination of tribal ownership in the reservation lands, and the

limitation of Indian ownership to such lands as might be allotted in
severalty to individual Indians. '
Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit left this part of the
district court's order intact. Indeed, all parties adopted that conclusion
and, on appeal, agreed that tide to the coal estate derived from the 1909
and 1910 Coal Lands Acts and 1938 restoration order. 2 The only issue
appealed was whether CBM was included in the word "coal."" The
Tribe's position that an 1868 reserved water right exists (requiring
continuous existence of the reservation) is, thus, wholly inconsistent with
the way it claims title to the coal and coalbed methane gas (which
requires the reservation to have been extinguished).
THE "PINE RIvER DECREE" DOES NOT CONSTITUTEJUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF AN 1868 RESERVED WATER RIGHT

The proponents of Animas-La Plata have, in the past, argued that the
so-called "Pine River decree" constitutes judicial confirmation of the
existence of an 1868 reserved water right. For several reasons, that
conclusion is incorrect.
The Pine River decree arose from an action ("Case No. 7736")
brought in 1930 by the United States, on behalf of the Southern Utes, for
an injunction and to quiet title in the United States to ditches diverting
from the Pine River.14 The United States constructed the ditches in 1884
for irrigation of Southern Ute lands.85 The defendants in this case were
numerous non-Indian successors to Indian allottees who had been taking

79. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 81

(1994); Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, §§ 1, 3, 36 Stat. 583-84 (current version at 30
U.S.C. §§ 83, 85 (1994).
80. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1151-52.

81.

Id. at 1148 (emphasis in original) (quoting Southern Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. at 163).

82. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band ofIndians, 151 F.3d at 1256, n.2.
83. Id. at 1256.
84. United States of America v. Morrison Consol. Ditch Co., No. 7736 (D. Colo.
Oct. 25, 1930) [hereinafter Pine River Decree].
85. Stipulation, United States of America v. Morrison Consol. Ditch Co., No. 7736, at 2
(D. Colo.July 14, 1930). The Stipulation recites these efforts as having begun in 1870.
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water from the government's ditches to irrigate their allotments. 6 The
amount of water to which title was purportedly quieted was sufficient to
irrigate existing allotments, as well as lands held by the United States in
trust for future allotments; "purportedly" because, at the time of the
action, there had been no judicial confirmation of an appropriation (i.e.,
a decreed water fight) which would support such title.
The suit was settled by stipulation of the parties to entry of a decree
granting the United States the right, as against the defendants, to 213 cfs
of water for irrigation and domestic uses, 212 cfs of which was diverted
through the ditches on the Pine River, and 1 cfs of which was diverted
from Dry Creek, a tributary of the Pine, all with a priority ofJuly 25, 1868
(the date of Senate ratification of the 1868 treaty with the Utes)." The
decree establishes that the water is to be used for the irrigation of "16,966
acres of irrigable lands of the former Southern Ute Reservation lying
under said ditches, and for domestic purposes... ,,8These water rights
are "for the irrigation and domestic needs of the United States Indian
Agency and the lands heretofore allotted within the Southern Ute
Reservation susceptible of irrigation with water from Pine River.""9 Of
this amount, the United States was entitled to divert no more than 31.3
cfs for use on 2,505 acres of irrigable lands "on Indian allotments
purchased by persons not wards of the United States" (the defendants)
until such time as the defendants' priorities as among themselves could
be determined."0 Although the Pine River decree purports to assign a
priority to the United States' ditches, Case No. 7736 was not a water rights
adjudication, since it was not held to decide relative priorities among all
water diverters on the same stream."1 Instead, it was an injunction and
quiet title action-an in personam suit brought to determine only
whether the named defendants in the case had any right, vis-a-vis the
government, to divert from the government's ditches. 2
Case No. 7736 must, thus, be distinguished from a true federal water
rights adjudication, such as that described in Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States.93 In that case, the adjudication suit
attempted by the United States in federal court is described as one for a
declaration of the United States' rights vis-a-vis some 1,000 water users "in
certain rivers and their tributaries" in Water Division 7. "' [B]y reason of
the interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights. Accordingly all water users

86. Pine River Decree, at 5, 1 3.
87. Id. at 5-6,113,6.
88. Id. at 5, 1 3 (emphasis added to show the parties knew, in 1930, that the
reservation was extinguished).
89. Id. at 3, 11.
90. Id. at 5-6,
4-5.
91. Id. at 5, 15.
92. Id. at5, 11,15.
93. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
94. Id. at 805.
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on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any
court proceedings."'
In Case No. 7736, the court did not join all the water users on the
stream.
Instead, only those interested in taking water from the
government's ditches were present, and they all had an interest in
obtaining the earliest priority date possible (1868) for those ditches.
Such would not be the case in a true water rights adjudication, where the
parties would be competing with one another for the senior priority.
The 1868 priority date appears never to have been litigated. Even
though the State of Colorado, in the early 1930s, held its own general
adjudication of water rights within District 31,6 which includes the Pine
River, apparently (correctly) not recognizing the quiet title action in
federal court as an adjudication of water rights, the issue of the
government ditches' priorities relative to other water rights was still not
litigated. In District No. 31, the government's ditch rights were decreed
absolute only as to that amount of water that had been put to actual
beneficial use as of October 25, 1930." The rest of the water asserted in
the decree as divertible through the various ditches was not actually
being used, so was decreed conditional. 8
The District No. 31 decree reveals that the Ute ditches all shared the
number one priority (called "P-I"), with an appropriation date ofJuly 25,
1868 (the date of Senate ratification of the treaty with the Utes).9
However, the wording shows that the state court, in making this finding,
believed itself bound by the decree of the federal court in Case No.
7736' ° For example, in connection with the Buckskin Ditch ("Ditch No.
Ute-l"), the state court stated:
[T] he original construction of said ditch was commenced on the 1st
day of April, 1884; but that, under and by that certain decree entered
on October 25, 1930, by the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, in case numbered 7736 in said Court, entitled
the United States of America vs. the Morrison Consolidated Ditch
Company et all l the date of priority is therein fixed and decreed as of
July 25, 1868. 1

Even if the decree in District No. 31 is given effect by water users in
Colorado's Water Division 7, as it apparently has been, there are at least
three reasons why it has no precedential effect binding or determining

95. Id. at 811 (emphasis added) (quoting S.REP. No. 755, at 4-5 (1951)).
96. In the Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities of Water Rights for Irrigation in
District No. 31 (Pine River and its Tributaries), Decree of Adjudication, at 5 (Dist. Ct.,
Colo. 1934) (No. 1248) [hereinafter District No. 31].

97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 18. The division engineer's tabulation shows October 25, 1930 as the date of
adjudication, andjuly 25, 1868 as the date of appropriation.
99. Id. at 17.
100. The evidence relied on by the court may still exist in the case file in the La Plata
County district court, but does not exist in the State Engineer's Office in Denver, so was
not reviewed for this paper.
101. District No. 31, No. 1248 at 17 (emphasis added).
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any future claims for "reserved water rights with an 1868 priority" from
the Pine River, or any other river. First, the Pine River decree, upon
which the decree in DistrictNo. 31 depends, was not litigated, so does not
represent judicial confirmation of any fact therein. Its terms were
drafted by the parties themselves to settle the case, and are self-serving.
Second, the fact that it was an in personam injunction/quiet title action
meant the decree, by its nature, binds only the parties to the case. A
water rights adjudication, in contrast, is in rem and binding on the whole
world." Third, the Pine River decree itself contains a clear disclaimer.
The decree is carefully worded in order to avoid any implication that the
United States could ever again claim an 1868 priority for its diversions
from the Pine River, stating that the 213 cfs:
defines, limits, and settles forever all of the rights of the [United
States] to divert water from Pine River and its tributaries, under its
claim of priority of July 25, 1868, and also limits such rights to the
amount of water herein decreed to its several ditches above named,
respectively, for use upon the maximum acreage of lands herein
designated. Any ditches hereafter constructed or acquired, or water
diverted from The Pine River and its tributaries for the purpose of
irrigating other Indian lands than those irrigated or which may be
irrigated from the above-mentioned ditches, shall be entitled to and take

priority only as of the date of appropriation
03 and application of such water to a
beneficial use on such other Indian lands.1

Therefore, the "Pine River decree" by no means establishes any
precedent for other reserved water rights with an 1868 priority date on
any river.
CONCLUSION
Because, as a matter of law, the Southern Utes do not have a reserved
water right with an 1868 priority and have been fully compensated for
the loss of their property interests, there was no consideration for the
Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement of December 10,
1986,'0° upon which the stipulated water court decree for Animas-La
Plata, as well as the Act of Congress authorizing ALP's funding, are
based. A charitable view of this shortcoming is that the agreement was
based on mutual mistake. A less charitable view is that the agreement
was based on fraud, since the 1971 United States Supreme Court
decision was certainly known to the United States and the Southern Ute
Tribe, who were parties both in that case and to the 1986 Agreement. It
was, in fact, only one year after the Supreme Court decision was
rendered in 1971 that the United States filed its application on behalf of
102. If parties are summoned in a quiet title action by means of publication, such an
action will also be considered "in rem" and binding on the whole world, but still only as to
the title question. The mere fact that notice was published does not convert a quiet title

action into a water rights adjudication.
103. Morrison, No. 7736 at 10-11, 1 14 (emphasis added).

104. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, December 10,
1986.
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the Tribe to quantify "1868 reserved water rights" in federal court.
The main objectionable feature of the 1986 Settlement Agreement,
in this writer's view, is that it reserves an enormous amount of water for
municipal and industrial uses-almost eight times the amount it reserves
for irrigation. Yet the measure and limit of a reserved water right is only
the "practicably irrigable acreage" of the reservation, in accordance with

the stated purposes of the law or executive order which created the
reservation. . In the case of the Southern Utes, as in the Fort Belknap
reservation considered in Winters, the purpose of the original reservation
was to provide the means for agriculture. 6 The Utes' treaty contains no
language, in contrast, expressing that Congress' purpose was to provide a
means for the Ute Indians to engage in real estate development, or to
sell their water off the reservation for such a purpose. Yet it is precisely
this practice which the seemingly innocuous terms "municipal and
industrial use" authorize, and for which the 1986 Agreement provides.
Thus, far more has been realized from the 1986 "settlement" of
reserved water rights than likely ever could have been achieved through
litigation. The final outcome makes clear that the beneficiaries of the
Animas-La Plata project must be somebody other than the handful of
tribal citizens in the area, who are already more than adequately served
with water. When the "Indian blanket" is stripped away, we see those
beneficiaries for who they really are: real estate developers.

105. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 546.
106. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Tabeguache, Muache,
Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah Bands of Ute Indians, Mar. 2,
1868, 15 Stat. 619. The treaty's purposes were to:
insure the civilization of the bands entering into this treaty [by education of]
such of them as are or may be engaged in either pastoral, agricultural or other
peaceful pursuit of civilized life on said reservation ....
[F]or the purpose of inducing said Indians to adopt habits of civilized life
and become self-sustaining, the sum of forty-five thousand dollars, for the
first year, shall be expended ... in providing each lodge or head of a family
in said confederated bands with one gentle American cow.., and five head
of sheep ....
The treaty also provided for allotments of 160 acres of land for a head of household, and
80 acres for a person over 18, as they should elect, "for purposes of cultivation." Id. at
620-22 (emphasis added).

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF-A RESPONSE TO THE
OPPONENTS OF THE COLORADO UTE INDIAN
WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1988
SCOTT B. McELROY"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In objecting to the taking of land belonging to the Tuscora Indian
Nation for a power plant, Justice Black said: "Great Nations, like great
men, should keep their word."'
That message is lost on Alison
Maynard and the parties she represents who seek to deny the Ute
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Tribes ("Ute Tribes" or
"Tribes") the principal benefit promised to them in the Colorado Ute
Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988,-a reliable supply of
water from the Animas River stored in an off-stream reservoir adjacent
to the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Reservations.
Sadly, the script that Ms. Maynard follows in attacking the tribal water
rights is one that could have been written in the 1880s. She seems to
miss the tragic irony of the situation-the events on which she relies
for her mistaken legal conclusion that the Ute Tribes do not have a

* This paper responds to arguments advanced by Ms. Alison Maynard during the
course of hearings conducted by the Department of the Interior regarding the scope
of the environmental compliance required to proceed with its proposal for settling the
claims of the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes to use water from the
Animas and La Plata Rivers in southwest Colorado. The author appreciates the
assistance provided by Brett Lee Shelton and M. Catherine Condon, attorneys with
Greene, Meyer & McElroy, P.C., in the preparation of this paper.
* Scott McElroy is an attorney with the law firm of Greene, Meyer & McElroy,
+
P.C. of Boulder, Colorado. He received hisJ.D. from the University of Toledo College
of Law in 1974. His practice is limited to the representation of Indian tribes and their
members, concentrating on the litigation and negotiation of natural resource
disputes. Mr. McElroy presently serves as special counsel for water rights to the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Pueblo of Nambe, the Colorado
River Indian Tribes, and the Walker River Paiute Tribe. Prior to his entry into private
practice, Mr. McElroy practiced with the United States Department ofJustice and the
Department of the Interior, as well as the Native American Rights Fund. While at the
Department ofJustice, Mr. McElroy tried Arizona v. California I. While with the Native
American Rights Fund, he represented the Southern Ute Indian Tribe during the
negotiation of the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Agreement dated
December 10, 1986. He has represented the Southern Ute Indian Tribe in water
matters since that time.
1. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J, dissenting).
2. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585,
102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
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senior water right occurred in one of the most shameful times in the
history of the United States. Despite the unequivocal promises of
earlier treaties and federal statutes, tribes and individual Indians lost
nearly 90 million acres of Indian land during the period of allotment
in the 1880s.'
Over a century later, the consequences of those earlier betrayals
continue to haunt tribes and their neighbors, and raise the important
policy question whether the underlying terms of a modern-day "treaty"
among the Ute Tribes, the United States, the State of Colorado, and
the affected water users should be reexamined long after Congress
debated and approved the settlement of the tribal water rights through
the construction of the Animas-La Plata Project ("ALP"). Even if there
were cause to reopen the already resolved issue of the tribal
entitlement to water, the long history of broken promises to the Indian
tribes of this country provides ample justification for the United States,
as a matter of good public policy, to keep its word to the Ute Tribes to
provide them with a long term water supply rather than belatedly
questioning the nature and extent of the Tribes' rights.
In any event, Ms. Maynard's arguments that the Ute Tribes are not
entitled to an 1868 priority date for their reserved water rights are flat
wrong. Whether by design or default, she badly misreads the existing
case law governing nearly identical situations on other reservations
where land was opened to non-Indian settlement but was not patented
by homesteaders and was later restored to tribal trust status. On the
Southern Ute Indian Reservation, the vast majority of the land now in
trust status never left federal ownership and, thus, never lost the water
rights reserved for the benefit of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe in
1868 when the original Ute Reservation was established. Under the
principles established in In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System ("Big Horn") , and United States v.
Anderson,5 the priority date for tribal water rights appurtenant to land
which was subject to, but not claimed for non-Indian homesteading, is
the date the reservation was originally established.6 In the case of the
Southern Utes, the result is a priority date of 1868.'
The Ute Tribes' cases against the federal government for money
damages to compensate for the misdeeds of the United States do not
support a different conclusion.8 Because the Ute Tribes never lost
their 1868 water rights, they never sought compensation for the loss of
such rights and those water rights were never an issue in any of the
3.

FEux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 138 (Rennard Stickland et

al., eds., 1982).
4. In re General Adjudication of Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 492
U.S. 406 (1989).
5. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
6. Id. at 1361.
7. See BigHorn, 753 P.2d at 112.
8. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159
(1971).
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cases. Quoting language out of context from the various claims cases
cannot change the fact that the suits by the Ute Tribes against the
United States were for money damages for loss of title to lands, and
have no bearing on the priority date for tribal water rights for lands
that the United States continues to hold in trust for the benefit of the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe.
At the end of the day, the arguments advanced against the Ute
Tribes' senior water rights are part of a transparent political agenda
aimed at stopping the construction of a storage facility on the Animas
River. Now that it is clear that the Tribes will be the principal
beneficiaries of such a project; that the environmental consequences
of going forward with the substantially reduced project are virtually
negligible; and that the project cannot be stopped under the federal
environmental laws, the opponents of the project feel compelled to
attack the validity of the tribal claims in a desperate effort to
undermine the justification for the project.
Understanding the misguided nature of the attack on the Ute
Tribes' rights requires an appreciation of (1) the nature of tribal water
rights under federal law; (2) the history of the Southern Ute Indian
Reservation; (3) the admirable effort of the Ute Tribes, local water
users, and the State of Colorado to settle the tribal claims and avoid
the costly and bitter litigation that has plagued other states dealing
with tribal claims to scarce natural resources; (4) the obstacles placed
in the way of that settlement by opponents of the Animas-La Plata
Project; and (5) the United States' tortured and ambiguous efforts to
meet its trust responsibilities to the Ute Tribes while buffeted by a
variety of political forces both for and against the construction of water
projects.
H. THE NATURE OF TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL
LAW
The Ute Tribes, like most tribes in the Western United States, once
held domain over vast areas of land on which they hunted and
gathered wild plants in order to survive. With the onslaught of
Western settlement, the Utes were forced to reside on an ever
shrinking reservation and to abide by a federally imposed policy to
convert tribal members from their traditional ways to a new lifestyle
based on agriculture. The Supreme Court has established that the
creation of Indian reservations, whether by treaty, executive order, or
statute, results in the reservation under federal law of that quantity of
water needed to carry out the purposes of the reservation."
9. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 696 n.36 (1979) ("Except for some desegregation cases .... the
district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a
decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.") (citing Puget Sound Gillnetters'
Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978)).
10. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600 (1963) [hereinafter Arizona v.
California1]; United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir.
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In the seminal case of Winters v. United States,1" the United States
brought suit on behalf of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Indians of
the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation to halt upstream diversions of the
Milk River by non-Indians.
The Supreme Court found that the
language of the Act of May 1, 1888,"s which created the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation, was decisive." That Act ratified the Gros Ventre
and Assiniboine cession of "a very much larger tract which the Indians
had the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits
and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people."
In exchange for
their cession, the tribes agreed to remain within the confines of the
Fort Belknap Reservation and to give up their hunting and gathering
lifestyle "and to become a pastoral and civilized people.' 6 The treaty
did not mention water rights. The Court held that the Indians did not
cede their rights to water for use on the Reservation under the 1888
Act:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of
all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving
herds of stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization.
Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their
occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or

adequate? And, even regarding the allegation of the answer as true,
that there are springs and streams on the reservation flowing about

2,900 inches of water, the inquiries are pertinent. If it were possible
to believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that the Indians
were awed by the power of the government or deceived by its
negotiators. Neither viey is possible. The government is asserting
the rights of the Indians.
In Arizona v. Cal fornia I, the Supreme Court followed its holding in
Winters, finding that the United States impliedly reserved water rights
for the five Indian reservations along the lower Colorado River.
Most of the land in these reservations is and always has been arid. If
the water necessary to sustain life is to be had, it must come from the
Colorado River or its tributaries. It can be said without overstatement

that when the Indians were put on these reservations they were not

considered to be located in the most desirable area of the Nation. It
is impossible to believe that when Congress created the great
Colorado River Indian Reservation and when the Executive
Department of this Nation created the other reservations they were
unaware that most of the lands were of the desert kind-hot,

scorching sands-and that water from the river would be essential to

1939).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Id. at 565.
Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
Winters, 207 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
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the life of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and the
crops they raised.
The water so reserved "was intended to satisfy the future as well as
the present needs of the Indian Reservations ..

."'9

In other words,

0
the United States reserved water "to make the reservation livable.4
The Court agreed "with the Master's conclusion as to the quantity of
water intended to be reserved,"noting that the Master had "found that
the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs
of the Indian Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved
2 1
to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations.
As a result, the Supreme Court recognized reserved water rights for
the benefit of the tribes of nearly 1 million acre feet per year out of the
approximately 7.5 million acre feet of water per year set aside for the
states of California, Arizona, and Nevada from the Colorado River.2
Winters and Arizona v. Californiaform the foundation for a potent
federal law doctrine that entitles tribes to use substantial quantities of
water to the detriment of surrounding non-Indian communities. The
recognition of tribal water rights is likely to have a devastating effect
on non-Indian water users who may have depended for generations on
streams that are now subject to the senior rights of neighboring Indian
tribes. In virtually every state in the West, the United States, tribes,
states, and local water users are engaged in protracted litigation over
the precise scope of the tribal claims, as well as the validity of
competing claims to water under state law." In numerous instances,
the affected parties have sought to avoid the bitterness and turmoil
associated with such lawsuits by settling the controversy, frequently
through the use of developed water supplies that allow existing nonIndian water uses to continue while meeting tribal needs from "new"
water supplies from federal or state water projects.24

III. THE COLORADO UTE INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1988
The issue of the reserved water rights on the Southern Ute Indian
Reservation first arose in the context of the Pine River. In 1930, the
United States brought suit against a variety of water users to establish
water rights for Indian lands in the Pine River valley.25 The final
18. Arizona v. California1, 373 U.S. at 598-99.
19. Id. at 600.
20. Id. at 599 (cited with approval in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566
n.15 (1981)).
21. Id. at 600.
22. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (decree).
23. See generally Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States-There Must be a Better Way, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 597
(1995).
24. See generally EUZABETH CHECCHIO & BONNIE G. COLBY, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE (June 1993).
25. United States v. Morrison Consol. Ditch Co., No. 7736 at 1 3 (D. Colo. Feb. 14,
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decree recognized the United States' "first and exclusive right, with a
priority date [of] July 25, 1868" to divert water for use on "sixteen
thousand nine hundred and sixty-six (16,966) acres of irrigable lands
of the former Southern Ute Indian Reservation. 26 Apart from the
Pine River, the United States failed to assert and protect tribal rights in
the other streams crossing the two Ute Reservations. As a result, the
local non-Indian farmers, ranchers, and communities developed
economies that were highly dependent on water from streams in which
the Ute Tribes had significant but unquantified rights to water.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California,the
issue of tribal water rights on the Reservation took on new significance.
The initial skirmish was over the forum to resolve the nature and
extent of the tribal rights. 2 7 The United States, supported by the Ute

Tribes, wanted tribal rights adjudicated in federal court; the State and
the local water users wanted the issues decided in state court. In
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Supreme
Court interpreted the McCarran Amendment7 to require the federal
court to defer to the comprehensive Colorado state court water
adjudications intended to determine all the water rights in the eleven
streams in which the Ute Tribes claimed water rights under federal
law.
After the Supreme Court decided in Colorado River that the matter
should be heard in state court, the parties began preparing for the
lawsuit to ascertain the tribal rights. In 1985, the Ute Tribes, the
United States, the State of Colorado, and the major water users in the
area began the negotiations that resulted in the Colorado Ute Indian
Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement ("1986 Agreement") .3 That
agreement provided for a comprehensive settlement of the Ute Tribes'
claims to all of the affected streams in southwest Colorado, and sought
to resolve all anticipated issues between the parties." The settlement
of the tribal claims had essentially four parts: (1) provision of
developed water supplies to the Tribes through the use of the AnimasLa Plata and Dolores Federal Reclamation Projects; (2) recognition of
the Tribes' legal entitlement to defined water rights in the other
streams on their reservations; (3) state and federal endowment of
tribal development funds; 23and (4) detailed provisions for the
administration of tribal rights.

The 1988 Settlement Act endorsed the 1986 Agreement, ratified
the use of ALP and the Dolores Projects as contemplated by the 1986
Agreement, authorized the federal contribution to the development
1931).
26. Id.
27. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
28. Id.
29. McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
30. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement (Dec. 10, 1986)
[hereinafter 1986 Agreement].
31. Id.
32. Id. at 31-34.
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funds, and confirmed the administrative provisions to which the
parties agreed.3 3 The settlement became "final" upon entry of consent
decrees in state court on December 31, 1991.34 The only part of the
1986 Agreement and the 1988 Settlement Act that has not been
implemented is the construction of ALP. The Tribes may revive their
claims on the Animas and La Plata Rivers in the event that the facilities
required to deliver water in accordance with the terms of the 1986
Agreement are not completed by the year 2000."5 Under the 1986
Agreement, the Tribes must choose by the year 2005 to litigate their
reserved rights or to accept whatever water is available from ALp.S6
When Congress passed the 1988 legislation, it was clearly
understood that the core of the tribal settlement was the Animas-La
Plata Project-a federally authorized water project that would serve
Indian and non-Indian needs in the area by storing water from the
Animas River and transferring the developed supply into the La Plata
basin to supplement the water supplies for currently irrigated lands, to
provide for the irrigation of new lands, and to allow for the
development of tribal natural resources, as well as provide water for
municipal uses in New Mexico and Colorado. Congress also thought
that ALP had passed environmental muster and that environmental
compliance for the project was complete. In the words of then
Representative Campbell, "[a]ll environmental laws, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act have been
complied with."' 8
IV. THE COMPROMISES BY THE PARTIES TO THE
SETrLEMENT IN THEIR EFFORTS TO CONSTRUCT THE ALP
ALP has proven to be the most controversial part of the settlement.
Despite the clear understanding at the time of the settlement that ALP
should be built, widespread opposition to the project has continued.
The supporters of the tribal settlement have found themselves in a
difficult position. Many of the criticisms directed at the project were
simply rehashed concerns that had been debated and supposedly
resolved during the course of the original negotiations and the debate
over the 1988 Act.3 On the other hand, some of the concerns seemed
33. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585,
102 Stat. 2973 (1988).
34. E.g., In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of
America (Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Tribes) for Claims to the McElmo Creek in Water Division No. 7 (Dist. Ct., Water Div.
No. 2, Colo. 1991) (No. W-1603-76G consent decree) [hereinafter 1991 Consent
Decree].
35. 1986 Agreement, supra note 30, at 31-33.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., CONG. REC. H9346 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of George
Miller) ("We are buying a Bureau of Reclamation project.").
38. Id.
39. For example, the original settlement considered the issues of the costs of the
project in comparison to the benefits. See Letter from Wayne Marchant, Acting
Assistant Secretary, Department of Interior Morris K Udall, Chairman, Committee on
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to raise legitimate environmental issues that warranted further
consideration and study to ensure that any adverse effects of
proceeding with the project could be adequately mitigated.4 0 At the
same time, delay was the worst enemy of the settlement, given the everincreasing cost of the project and the increasingly hostile attitude in
Congress toward the federal financing of Western water projects in the
difficult budget climate of the 1990s. The Indian and non-Indian
parties to the settlement have shown an amazing willingness to
compromise, so long as it is possible to maintain the core concept of
the settlement to provide the Ute Tribes with a reliable water supply
without taking water from their non-Indian neighbors. In contrast, the
project opponents, as exemplified by Ms. Maynard's arguments, have
been willing to go to any length to kill the project without regard to
the benefits of the settlement to the Ute Tribes, and no matter how
insignificant the environmental consequences of the now greatly
reduced project.
A. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DEBACLE
The application of the Endangered Species Act,4' to ALP has
proven to be extremely painful and has resulted in reducing the
project to one third of its original capacity. In 1979, the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") concluded under § 7 of the Endangered
Species Act,42 that it was not necessary to preserve the population of
Colorado River squawfish (now the "Pike minnow") in order to recover
the species due to the existing populations in the Green and Upper
Colorado River basins.
Simultaneous with the reinitiation of
consultation on ALP in 1991, the FWS changed its position with regard
to the San Juan River, concluding that the population was necessary
for the recovery of the species. As a result, a draft opinion was issued
that found that construction of the pro ect was likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the species.4
Therefore, the Bureau of
Reclamation refused to move forward with construction.
Project
supporters, including the Ute Tribes, spent the next two years
negotiating a "reasonable and prudent alternative" ("RPA") that would
allow construction to proceed. The RPA had numerous components
Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives (October 1, 1987) reprinted in
H.R REP No. 100-932, at 17 (1988).
40. As described in Part IV.A, the most significant of these concerns was the
potential impact of ALP on the endangered fish in the San Juan River. In addition,
concerns have been raised about the effect on water quality of irrigating new lands in
the La Plata Basin. See Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement
Animas-La Plata Project, 404(b) (1) Evaluation, § 10 (April 26, 1996).
41. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
42. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
43. U.S. Fish &Wildlife Service, Draft Opinion (May 7, 1990).
44.

See Final Biological Opinion for the Animas-La Plata Project, Colorado and

New Mexico (Dept. of Interior Oct. 25, 1991).
45. Memorandum from U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to Bureau of Reclamation 29
(Oct. 25, 1991) (citing Memorandum from Bureau of Reclamation to U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (Mar. 4, 1991)).
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but the most significant were: (1) the project depletion was limited to
57,100 acre feet per year; (2) Ridges Basin Reservoir would be
constructed first and the water supply would be devoted to municipal
and industrial uses; (3) a seven year study of the endangered fish
would be conducted to determine the factors limiting the endangered
fish; (4) a recovery program for the endangered fish would be initiated
on the San Juan River; (5) Navajo Dam and Reservoir would be
operated to mimic the natural hydrograph for the benefit of the
endangered fish; and (6) at the end of the seven year study, a decision
would46 be made as to whether the remainder of the project could be
built.
Following the determination of the RPA, the Bureau of
Reclamation decided unilaterally in 1992 that a supplemental
environmental impact statement ("SEIS") would have to be prepared.
The final version of that document was completed in the spring of
1996, but the Environmental Protection Agency suggested that it was
not adequate. Reclamation has granted EPA continued extensions to
comment on the document, a step that is required before a record of
decision can be issued by the Commissioner of Reclamation. 4 8
B. THE ROMER/SCHOETTLER PROCESS AND SENATE BILL
1771
In 1996, it became obvious that ALP and, hence, the 1988
Settlement Act was in trouble.
The cost of the project had
skyrocketed, in part because of inflation, but more significantly
because of the added environmental costs and Reclamation's
recalculation of costs and benefits. 49 As a result of that recalculation, it
was clear that the cost of the municipal water from the project, for
which the recipients must pay the capital costs as well as the operation
and maintenance costs, would increase greatly. It appeared the cost of
providing municipal and industrial water to the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe might triple.
Moreover, the project opponents in the
environmental community were successful in enlisting fiscal
conservatives in Congress to oppose the funding request for the
project in the House of Representatives in 1996."o At the same time,
Governor Romer indicated that he could not support the project as
originally authorized.5
In addition, the environmental problems
associated with the impact of irrigation on water quality seemed to
46. Final Biological Opinion, supra note 44.
47. Sharyn Wizda, Animas-La Plata ProjectDelayed Until Late August, GRANDJUNcTION
DAILYSENTINEL, May 4, 1996.
48. Mark Lewis, Utes Sue Government Over Project Delays, FARMINGTON DAILY TIMES,
June 23, 1996.
49. Colorado State Representatives, Animas-La Plata Discussions Meeting Notes:
Opening Remarks and Presentations 2 (Oct. 9, 1996).
50. Dan Morgan, Water ProjectFundingDrained in House Bill, WASHINGTON POST,
July 26, 1996.
51. Bob Silbernagel, Enough is Enough, GRAND JUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, June 23,
1996.
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block further progress. Finally, the opponents seized on the fact that
the depletion limits in the RPA would not allow Phase I of the project
to be completed and, therefore, that the settlement was not assured.
With the encouragement of Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt, the Romer/Schoettler process was initiated in the fall of 1996
to examine whether the project supporters and the project opponents
could agree on a solution to resolve the controversy over ALP. 2 The
project supporters viewed the process as an opportunity to clarify that
storage was required to resolve the tribal claims, and to show their
good faith in addressing the issues that had arisen and were impeding
the construction of the project and, therefore, the completion of the
tribal settlement. The process was not successful in reaching a
common ground between project supporters and opponents. It was
effective in demonstrating that a storage project could be developed
that had no meaningful environmental problems and that there are no
realistic alternatives to such an approach.
Project opponents put forward an alternative under which the
Tribes would purchase water rights and lands from existing water right
holders under state law, i.e., the other parties to the consent decrees
on the other streams affected by the Settlement Agreement." In
addition, the opponents suggested that it might be possible to increase
the storage capacity of existing reservoirs in order to provide the
Tribes with water.
Both Tribal Councils (the Tribes' elected
leadership) rejected that approach because of the uncertainty of the
water supply that it would produce and the management nightmares
that would be created if the Tribes were to obtain significant land and
water rights that were not to be held in trust by the United States.55
The project supporters advanced the concept of a reduced project
that was negotiated in the fall of 1996 and the spring of 1997, among
the different groups who stood to benefit from the project.16 The
reduction in the project was intended to address the cost and
environmental issues that had arisen over the project configuration to
settle the tribal rights under the 1988 Settlement Act. 57 The down-

sized project contemplated a depletion level of 57,100 acre feet per
year in accordance with the prior ESA consultations.58 In order to
reduce cost and avoid the water quality problems that had troubled
EPA, it included no irrigation facilities. However, it included a

52. Colorado State Representatives, supra note 49, 1-2.
53. Animas River Citizens Coalition Conceptual Alternative, Romer/Schoettler
Discussions (Aug. 4,1997).
54. Id.
55. Letter to Gail S. Schoettler, Lt. Gov. Colorado, from Marvin E. Cook, Vice
Chairman Southern Ute Indian Tribe (Oct. 9, 1997).
56. See, e.g., Letter from David W. Robbins, Attorney, Hill & Robbins, P.C. to Gail
Schoettler, Lt. Gov. Colorado (July 8, 1997).

57.

SANJUAN WATER

COMMISSION, SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE REVISED

ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECT 2 (July 8, 1999).

58. Agreement in Concept, Attachment to letter from David W. Robbins, Attorney,
Hill & Robbins, P.C. to Gail Schoettler, Lt. Gov. Colorado (July 8,1997).
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reservoir with a capacity in excess of that required to provide the
57,100 acre feet of depletion. 9 In addition, the proposal called for
Congress to find that the existing environmental compliance was
adequate to construct the project features required for settlement of
the tribal rights, although additional work might be required when the
water was actually used by the Tribes or others. 6° This proposal was
dubbed "ALP lite" by the press.1 The proposal reduced the water
supply for the Tribes, all of which would be municipal and industrial
water. In return, the proposal called for a complete waiver of the
tribal construction costs associated with the Project.
After a false start in which the State of Colorado seemed to leave
the choice of which proposal to accept up to the Department of the
Interior, Governor Romer strongly endorsed the project supporters'
proposal for a reduced project in the fall of 1997.64 Senator Campbell
and Congressman Mclnnis introduced legislation in Congress
consistent with the proposal that summer.6 *- The Administration
ultimately opposed the legislation and it did not move forward in
Congress.6
The Administration was troubled by the size of the
reservoir and the environmental compliance language.6 ' There was
also strong opposition in Congress centered on the notion that the
oversized reservoir was just a ploy to allow a much larger project with
irrigation in the future.6 The Administration, in turn, was criticized
for not having a proposal of its own to put forward and for showing no
leadership on the issue.6 9 Nevertheless, the legislation died in
Congress.
C. THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL
On August 11, 1998, Secretary Babbitt announced the
Administration's proposal, frequently called "ALP ultra-lite," to address
the problems with going forward with a settlement as included in the
1988 Settlement Act. The Administration's proposal was premised on
59. Id.

60. Letter from Dan Israel, Attorney for the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, to Dana
Minerva, Environmental Protection Agency 1 (September 26, 1997).
61. See Bill Roberts, Build A-LP Lite, THE DURANGO HERALD, Nov. 23, 1997.
62. Agreement in Concept, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. Ellen Miller, Romer, Schoettler Endorse Scaled-Down Animas-La Plata,DENVER POST,
Nov. 19, 1997.
65. S. 1771, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3478, 105th Cong. (1997).
66. Hearingson S. 1771 Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 1998 Before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (June

24, 1998) (statement of Eluid Martinez, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation
Department of Interior).
67. Id. at 4, 7.
68. 144 CONG. REC. H4931 (June 22, 1998) (statement of George Miller).
69. Letter from Clement Frost, Chairman, Southern Ute Indian Tribe, and Judy
Knight Frank, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe to William J. Clinton,
President, United States of America (July 8, 1998).
70. Administration Proposal for Final Implementation of the Colorado Ute
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building a storage facility to provide the 57,100 acre feet of annual
depletion previously approved by the FWS. Its chief features were: (1)
over 19,000 acre feet of depletion for each Tribe; (2) a waiver of tribal
construction costs; (3) a tribal water acquisition fund of $40 million to
acquire additional water rights; (4) a reservoir with a storage capacity
of 90,000 acre feet; (5) full environmental compliance, including an
alternatives analysis, to be undertaken before construction; (6) no
benefits at all for irrigation; and (7) deauthorization of those project
features not required for the tribal settlement. 7' The result is a project
that would provide nearly two-thirds of its water to the Ute Tribes and
completely eliminate any benefits for irrigation. Moreover, the
proposal made it crystal clear that all federal environmental laws would
have to be satisfied before construction is started.72
Although criticized in the press, it is obvious that the
Administration proposal was fair to the Tribes, while devastating to the
other parties to the 1986 Settlement Agreement. Like the Tribes,
those parties relied upon the benefits of the project as part of the deal
which they negotiated.
Since the announcement of the
Administration's position, the attorneys for the project supporters have
sought to find a middle ground between ALP lite and ultra lite that
might be acceptable to the Administration and the parties to the
settlement. Such a compromise appears feasible at this time.
In
addition, the Department of the Interior has moved forward with
environmental compliance for the Administration proposal.74 The
Administration has been particularly adamant that it will
75 not
compromise that process, even to advance the tribal settlement.
Incredibly, the project opponents are aggressively hostile to the
Administration proposal and appear unwilling to accept any storage
facility, no matter how small, or who receives the benefits, or how
minimal the impact. Over the years, project opponents have focused
their opposition on the financial benefits that would accrue to the
non-Indian irrigators, and the perceived environmental harm
associated with the irrigation of additional lands in the La Plata basin.
In addition, perhaps more understandably, they have sharply criticized
any effort by the project supporters to short cut compliance with the
federal environmental standards.
The Administration proposal
essentially adopts the opponents' position on these points and there is
not the slightest indication that the Department of the Interior is
Settlement Act (Aug. 11, 1998).
71. Id. at 1, 4.
72. Administration Proposal for Final Implementation of the Colorado Ute
Settlement Act, supra note 70.
73. Tom Sluis, A-LPDistrictAllows Changes, DURANGO HERALD,June 8, 1999.
74.

Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement to the 1996 Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement for the
Animas-La Plata Project and Announcement of Public Scoping Meetings, 64 Fed. Reg.
1 (1999).
75. Administration Proposal for Final Implementation
Settlement Act, supra note 70, at 5 [hereinafter IRA].
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willing to move away from these core points. Instead of declaring
victory or turning their efforts to ensuring that the Administration
does not lose its resolve on the points that are important to them, the
project opponents have unleashed an attack on the Tribes who are
now the primary beneficiary of the reduced ALP. As described below,
that attack is wrong as well as misguided and belated.
V. THE SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE IS ENTITLED TO AN
1868 PRIORITY DATE FOR ITS RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
The principal flaw in Ms. Maynard's attempt to besmirch the
Southern Utes' water rights is her failure to understand the full history
of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation and, in particular, that over
200,000 acres of unsettled land were restored to trust status as a result
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.76 Under the precedent
established in Big Horn and United States v. Anderson, the lands in
question are entitled to an 1868 priority date for the water rights
reserved under federal law because those lands never left federal
ownership and the Tribe never received any compensation for their
divestiture. As a result, the Tribe retains the water right reserved at the
time the Reservation was created.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN
RESERVATION
To understand the present day Southern Ute Indian Reservation, it
is necessary to understand the history of the Southern Ute Tribe and
the treatment under federal law of the lands that now constitute the
Southern Ute Indian Reservation. Ms. Maynard focuses on the Act of
June 15, 1880,17 but the effect of that Act cannot be ascertained in a
vacuum. Rather, it is necessary to examine what happened to the
lands subject to that legislation, and in particular, the treatment under
subsequent federal enactments of that portion of the lands that were
never patented to non-Indians. It is those lands that are at stake here.
Examination of the complete history demonstrates that the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe retains water rights for the lands which it never lost,
and those lands restored to tribal trust status under the IRA.
1.

1868 to 1879

The Confederated Bands of Utes, which included the bands that
today comprise the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes,
signed a comprehensive treaty with the United States in 1868.7' The
Treaty of 1868 purported to guarantee to the Utes approximately the
western third of what is today the State of Colorado-nearly 15 million

76. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
77. Act ofJune 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199 (1880).
78. Treaty with the Ute Indians, 15 Stat. 619 (1868).
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acres of land. 79 The land was "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians.... ."'o
The discovery of valuable minerals in the San Juan Mountains led
to widespread trespass on the lands set apart under the 1868 Treaty."
As a result, the United States concluded another agreement with the
Utes in 1873 that carved 3.7 million acres out of the middle of the
Reservation.82 The Brunot Cession almost completely separated the
remaining northern and southern sections of the original 1868
reservation. The southern section was occupied by the Southern Utes,
which consisted of the bands that became the modern day Southern
Ute Tribe and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes. The land occupied by
the Southern Utes consisted of a narrow strip, 15 miles wide, that ran
from 20 miles east of the Utah border to the eastern boundary of the
Reservation near Pagosa Springs-about 110 miles. 3 In 1879, a bitter
dispute between the Northern Utes and federal agents in Meeker,
Colorado led to an insurrection in which twelve non-Indians were
killed.84 Outrage over the so-called "Meeker Massacre" spread from
coast to coast, and intense political pressure was applied to remove the
Utes from Colorado. 85
2.

1880 and 1882 Treaties

In 1880, the Northern Ute bands were relocated to Utah under an
Agreement dated March 6, 1880, ratified by the Act of June 15, 1880,
("1880 Act").m The Southern Ute bands were to "remove to and settle
upon the unoccupied agricultural lands on the La Plata River, in
Colorado... .."7 The Utes agreed to open the remainder of the 1868
Reservation to non-Indian settlement." This reservation treatment was
consistent with the federal Indian policy of the era." Reservation lands
79. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 162
(1971).
80. 15 Stat. at 619, art. II.
81. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 162.
82. Agreement of Sept. 13, 1873, ratified by Act of Apr. 29, 1874, ch. 136, 18 Stat.
36 (commonly referred to as the "Brunot Cession"). See also United States v. Southern
Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
83. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 162.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Act ofJune 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199 (1880).
87. Id. at 200.
88. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. CI. 413, 421
(1943).
89. The Department of the Interior has characterized the 1880 cession agreement
as "set[ting] forth a plan of allotment and disposal of surplus lands which became
stereotyped in later allotment acts." Restoration to Tribal Ownership-Ute Lands, 1
Dept. of Interior, Op. Solicitor 832, 835 (1938) [hereinafter Kirgis Memo]. The federal
allotment policy was principally implemented by the General Allotment Act of 1887
(also known as the Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1983)). It sought to assimilate tribal
members into the mainstream of society by converting Native Americans into farmers
and eliminating tribal governments and other aspects of tribal sovereignty. The
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which were not allotted to individual Indians were opened to nonIndian settlement. Large amounts of "surplus" reservation land
thereby became available for sale or entry to homesteaders. By the
time the allotment policy was repudiated in 1934 by the IRA, about 90
million acres of tribal land had passed from Indian ownership
nationwide. 90
Under the 1880 Act, the "surplus" lands of the Southern Ute
Reservation were "deemed to be public lands of the United States."9'
The 1880 Act did not immediately divest the Indians of all rights to the
land, however. Rather, the United States was obliged to dispose of the
surplus land by "cash entry only" for the benefit of the Ute bands
which were entitled to the proceeds from the sale of such lands.9
By 1882, the other bands of Utes had been removed from their
aboriginal territory, but the Southern Utes remained in the southern
strip, essentially the current Reservation.93 The Act of July 28, 1882,
("1882 Act")94 declared that former Ute lands north of the Reservation
were public lands to be disposed of for the benefit of the Utes in
accordance with the 1880 Act, and directed the Secretary of the
Interior to "at the earliest practicable day, ascertain and establish the
line between" the two areas.
3.

1888 Act and Agreement

Subsequently, the Southern Utes sent a delegation to Congress to
discuss the possibility of removal to another reservation.
In 1888,
Congress enacted further legislation intended to effectuate removal of
the Utes. The Act of May 1, 1888, ("1888 Act") 7 authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to appoint a commission "with authority to
negotiate with the band of Ute Indians of southern Colorado for such
modification of their treaty and other rights, and such exchange of
their reservation, as may be deemed desirable by said Indians and the
Secretary .... 9"
The Commission formed under the 1888 Act succeeded in
negotiating an agreement, under which the Southern Utes would have
removed to a reservation in San Juan County, Utah.9 The agreement
was not ratified by Congress, however. When the agreement was
resubmitted to Congress in 1894, the House Committee rejected it and
allotments were inalienable and nontaxable for 25 years. COHEN, supra note 3, at 619
(citing § 5, 24 Stat. at 389 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348) (1983)).
90. COHEN, supra note 3, at 138.
91. § 3, 21 Stat. at 203.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 168
(1971).
94. Act ofJuly 28, 1882, ch. 357, 22 Stat. 178 (1882).
95. § 2, 22 Stat. at 178.
96. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 169.
97. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 113 (1888).
98. Act of February 20, 1895, ch. 113, § 4, 28 Stat. 677, 678 (1895).
99. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 170.
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instead recommended enactment of a bill that became the Act of
February 20, 1895. '00

4.

1895 Act and Allotment

In the 1895 legislation, Congress annulled the 1888 Act, ratified
the 1880 Act, and directed the Secretary of the Interior to proceed
with issuing allotments from reservation area to the Southern Utes as
required under the 1880 Act.' O' Some of the Utes did not wish to
receive allotments, however, and the 1895 Act set aside the western
portion of the Reservation for those band members.
Today, the Ute
Mountain Ute Indian Tribe occupies the western portion of the
Reservation, which was not allotted. Those members of the Southern
Ute bands favoring allotment were permitted to select tracts from
lands on the eastern portion of the Reservation.
On April 13, 1899 President William McKinley announced the
completion of the Southern Ute allotment process and the opening of
the Southern Ute Indian Reservation to homesteading. 03 Non-Indian
homesteading continued until passage of the IRA. By 1934, more than
one-half of the surface area of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation
was occupied by non-Indian homesteaders. However, the federal
government had yet to distribute thousands of additional "surplus"
acres which had never been settled by non-Indians.
5.

Indian Reorganization Act and Interior Actions Restoring Lands
to Trust Status

In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act brought an end to the era
of allotment. Under the IRA, the Secretary of the Interior was
"authorized to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands
of any Indian reservation heretofore opened, or authorized to be
opened, to sale, or any other form of disposal ....,,04 Initially, the
Secretary of Interior withdrew from further sale or entry all of the
remaining Ute lands ceded under the 1880 Agreement. 0 Then, by
two orders issued in 1937, the Secretary attempted to restore all °6of the
surplus lands in the southern portion of the former reservation.'
By 1938, over 3.5 million acres of the 7 million acres affected by
100. § 4, 28 Stat. at 677; see United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402
U.S. at 171 (quoting 191 Ct. CI. at 16, 423 F.2d at 354).
101. § 4,28 Stat. at 677; see United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402
U.S. at 171.
102. § 3, 28 Stat. at 677.
103. Presidential Proclamation No. 2, 31 Stat. 1947 (1899).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 463; see also 25 U.S.C. § 465 ("Title to any lands or rights acquired
pursuant to section[] ...463... of this title shall be taken in the name of the United
States in trust for the Indian tribe ... for which the land is acquired ....
").
105. Restoration of Lands Formerly Indian to Tribal Ownership, 54 Interior Dec.
559, 563 (1934).
106. Order of Restoration-Southern Ute Indian Reservation, Colorado, 2 Fed. Reg.
1,348 (1937); Confederated Bands of the Ute Tribe of Indians, Colorado-Order of
Restoration, 2 Fed. Reg. 2,563 (1937).
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the 1880 Act had been sold or taken by the United States for its own
purposes.' 7 The Department of the Interior concluded that all of the
remaining undisposed lands-nearly 4 million acres-were eligible for
restoration under the IRA.' °8 The Solicitor's Office examined the
status of the Ute lands ceded in 1880, and concluded that the 1880 Act
did not divest the Utes of all rights to the land." 9 Rather, the "United
States [became] a trustee for the disposal of the land ceded ....
[T] he result is that the Indians retain an equitable interest in the land
until they have received the consideration barg ained for, and the
United States becomes a 'trustee in possession."' 0 These lands were
"not public lands in the full sense of the term as they [were] to
be
disposed of only in limited ways and upon certain conditions.""' The
Acting Solicitor concluded that the "[s]urplus lands are also properly
designated as Indian lands in view of the interest of the Indians in the
proceeds of any disposal of the lands."2' In short, until the United
States patented the surplus land to homesteaders and compensated
the Utes, the Indians retained an interest in the land. As a result, the
Solicitor concluded that the surplus lands were eligible to be restored
to trust status under the terms of the IRA."1
Interior's attempts to restore the land to trust status raised local4
concern about the effect of restoration on local grazing districts."
That concern resulted in Senator Adams of Colorado writing an
amendment to Section 6 of pending jurisdictional legislation that
became the Act of June 28, 1938, ("1938 Act")." 5 The amendment
precluded the Secretary of the Interior from restoring any lands north
of township 35 to the Utes; that is, lands north of the present
Reservation were precluded from restoration."6 By Order dated
September 14, 1938, the "surplus" lands within the Southern Ute
Indian Reservation were restored to ownership of the United States in
trust for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe." 7 The boundaries of the
restored lands, encompassing approximately 200,000 acres, were as
follows:
Townships 32, 33, and 34 North, Ranges 1 to 13 West, inclusive, of
the N.M.P.M., in Colorado, being that area lying between the north
107. Kirgis memo, supra note 89, at 832, 833, 837-38.
108. Southern Utes -Tribal Lands, 1 Dept. of Interior, Op. Solicitor 849, 850 (1938)
[hereinafter 1938 Solicitor Opinion].
109. Id.
110. Kirgis memo, supra note 89, at 836-37; 1938 Solicitor Opinion, supra note 108, at
850.
111. Kirgis memo, supra note 89, at 837 (citation omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 413, 423-24
(1943).
115. Act ofJune 28, 1938, ch. 776, 52 Stat. 1209, 1210 (1938) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 461-79 (1994)).
116. See ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians, 100 Ct. Cl. at 424.
117. Southern Ute Indian Reservation, Colorado, 3 Fed. Reg. 1,425 (1938).
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boundary of the old Southern Ute Reservation and the south
boundary of the State of Colorado and extending west from the 107th
Meridian to the east boundary of the present Southern Ute
Reservation." 8

6.

The Modern Day Status of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation

The result of this complicated history is straightforward. On the
present day Reservation there are three categories of land, with the
restored land constituting the vast majority. The other lands are lands
that never left trust status; that is to say, they were allotted to individual
tribal members and remained in trust status either through
inheritance or purchase by the Tribe. A small amount of land has
been reacquired from non-Indians and returned to trust status. The
status of the Reservation has been confirmed and its boundaries
recognized by Congress."9
B.

THE TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN 1868
PRIORITY DATE

Contrary to Ms. Maynard's assertions, the Tribe retains a reserved
water right with a priority date of 1868. The existing case law clearly
establishes that a retained tribal interest in the land at issue is all that is
required to maintain the reserved right for the benefit of the Tribe
and its members. As is plain from the history recited above, the
United States continued as trustee for the Tribe with regard to those
lands that were opened to non-Indian settlement but never patented
to non-Indians or taken by the United States for its own use and
subsequently were restored to trust status under the Indian
Reorganization Act. Because the Tribe never lost its interest in those
lands, it retains a reserved water right under federal law with an 1868
priority date. And, of course, there is no contention that the allotted
lands lost their senior priority date. Thus, only for reacquired land-a
very small part of the Reservation-is there any question of the
appropriate date for the tribal rights.
In any event, the key issue in determining the nature and extent of
the tribal water rights is not the status of the Reservation or whether it
was "extinguished" in 1880. Indeed, none of the cases cited by Ms.
Maynard even remotely suggests that the nature and extent of tribal
water rights is related to the continuing jurisdictional status of the land
as part of a reservation. Reservation status, as opposed to trust status,
is usually significant as to jurisdictional matters which are far different
than the property right questions associated with water rights.
Certainly, the establishment of a reservation is a critical event relative
to the creation of reserved water rights, but once created those rights

118.
119.

668).

Id.
Act of May 21, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-290, 98 Stat 201(codified at 25 U.S.C. §
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are property rights unaffected by the continuing jurisdictional status of
the lands.
1. The Big Horn and Anderson Cases Establish that the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe is entitled to an 1868 Priority Date for the Restored
Lands.
The priority date for water rights appurtenant to tribal land which
was subject to, but not claimed for, either homesteading or allotment
and returned to trust status was addressed in Big Horn'" and United
States v. Anderson.' In Big Horn, "ceded" lands were originally part of
the Wind River Reservation, but through subsequent acts and treaties
were relinquished by the Tribes on the Reservation to the United
States for cash payment.' 2 The remaining reservation lands came to
be known as the "diminished reservation."
Some of the lands within
the diminished reservation had passed into non-Indian ownership by a
variety of means."4 In 1934, the United States reserved the ceded
lands which had not been disposed of to non-Indian settlers from
further non-Indian settlement. 2 In 1940, the Secretary began a series
of programs designed to reacquire, on behalf of the Tribes, both
ceded lands and diminished lands that had passed out of Indian
ownership. 2 6 In deciding the priority date for the water rights
appurtenant to these lands, the Big Horn court held that "[b] ecause all
the reacquired lands on the ceded portion of the reservation are
reservation lands, the same as the lands on the diminished portion, the
same reserved water rights apply. Thus, reacquired lands on2 both
portions of the reservation are entitled to an 1868 priority date.'"
Similarly, in Anderson, there was no challenge to the district court's
holding that "lands reacquired by the tribe and returned to trust
status, includ[ing] ... lands opened to homesteading which were
never claimed," should be "awarded a priority date as of the [original]
,0128
reservation ....
In short, the only two cases that address the question of the nature
and extent of tribal water rights associated with tribal lands opened to
120. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 492
U.S. 406 (1989).
121. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
122. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. BigHorn, 753 P.2d at 114.
128. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1984). Water rights
appurtenant to lands that had actually been homesteaded prior to reacquisition by the
tribe had a priority date as determined under state law. If water rights associated with
land that had been homesteaded and later reacquired by the tribe had not been
perfected or had been lost, the priority date was the date of reacquisition. Water
rights associated with land that was allotted and later sold to non-Indians, if not lost to
non-use, carried a priority date of the creation of the original reservation. Id.
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non-Indian homesteading but never settled, and thereafter restored to
trust status, hold that such lands have reserved water rights with a
priority date as of the date the reservation was established. The
reasoning of those cases controls here. Because the restored lands on
the Southern Ute Indian Reservation were never patented and no
compensation was paid to the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Tribe
never lost its interest in the restored lands. Hence, those lands
retained the reserved water rights created at the time the Reservation
was originally established in 1868.
2.

The Claims Cases Do Not Stand for a Different Proposition.

The fact that the Southern Ute Indian Tribe was compensated for
lands to which it actually lost title does not alter the conclusion that
the Tribe retains an 1868 water right for lands which were not
patented and eventually restored to trust status. Nor do any of the
cases which address the question of the amount of compensation to
which the Tribe was entitled on account of the federal government's
misdeeds change the holdings of Big Horn and Anderson. Even a
cursory reading of those cases reveals that they only dealt with lands to
which the Tribe had actually lost title and not with the lands restored
to trust status in 1938.
In 1909, Congress granted the Court of Claims special jurisdiction
to hear the Utes' claims for certain lands taken under the 1880 Act.'2
Compensation was awarded for approximately 4.5 million acres
actually taken under the cash entry provisions of the 1880 Act and for
land taken by the United States for public reservations such as national
forests, parks, and monuments.1 30 Over 7 million acres of the 1868
reservation that were eligible forl disposal under the 1880 Act
1
remained undisposed at that time.

In 1938, Congress again granted special jurisdiction for the Court
of Claims to hear the Utes' claims for lost land (authorizing the Claims
Court to "hear, determine, and render final judgment on all legal and
equitable claims of whatsoever nature which the Ute Indians ...may
have against the United States, including.., claims arising... by
reason of any lands taken from them, without compensation.") . In
1941, a confederation of several Ute bands, including the Southern
Utes, brought suit under this Act for compensation for lands sold since
1911 by the United States under the 1880 Act, and for lands taken
north of the present Reservation.'

The Court of Claims issued the first decision in the suit in 1943.14

129. Act of March 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 781, 788-89 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 320 (1994)).
130. See Ute Indians v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 440 (1910), supplemented by 46 Ct. CI.
225 (1911).
131. Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 100 Ct. CI. 413, 422
(1943).

132. Id. at 414-15.
133. See id. at 422-23.
134. Id. at 413.
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As an interlocutory matter, it held that the Utes were entitled under
the 1938 Act to compensation for all lands in Colorado north of and
including township 35, held by the United States for disposal under
the 1880 Act.'
The Court of Claims also confirmed the notion that
the Utes retained an interest in the surplus lands.16 The court held
that even by ceding to the United States in 1880 all territory in
Colorado then reserved for their use, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe
did not relinquish all interest in such lands which the United States
did not dispose. 37 Rather,
such lands, "while they remained unsold,
38
belonged to the Indians.'

Finally, in 1950, the parties reached an agreement regarding the
value of the lands taken from the northern parcel and from within the
Reservation. The Court of Claims entered a judgment giving effect to
the stipulation agreement between the Utes and the United States.3 "
The parties stipulated as follows:
[A] judgment... shall be entered in this cause as full settlement and
payment for the complete extinguishment of plaintiffs' right, title,
interest, estate, claims and demands of whatsoever nature in and to
the land and property in western Colorado ceded by plaintiffs to
defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 199), which (a) the
United States sold for cash Fbetween 1910 and 19381. (b) disposed ot
as free homesteads rbetween 1885 and 19381. and (c) set aside for
public purposes [between 1910 and 19381 .... There is filed
erewith and made a part of this stipulation Schedule 1, which
contains the legal descriptions of approximately 1,523,236.95 acres,
of which 1,361,993.22 acres were disposed of by defendant as free
homesteads and the remaining 161,243.73 acres of which were set
aside by the defendant for public purposes. So far as the parties with
diligence have been able to determine these descriptions represent
all the land so disposed of and set aside. However, the judgment to
be entered in this case is res judicata, not only as to the land
described in Schedule 1, but, whether included therein or not, also as
to any land formerly owned or claimed by the plaintiffs in western
Colorado, ceded to defendant by the Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat.
199), and by the defendant during the aforesaid periods of time sold
for cash, isposed of as free homesteads and set aside for public

purposes.
In 1951, the Southern Ute Tribe brought a claim before the Indian
4
Claims Commission, pursuant to the Indian Claims Commission Act,1 '
asserting that the United States had violated its fiduciary duty to the
Tribe by disposing of 220,000 acres of land as free homesteads and by
failing to account for the proceeds of an additional 82,000 acres,
135.
Ct. CI.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 432-33. See also Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 112
123 (1948).
Id.
at 429-30.
ConfederatedBands of Ute Indians, 100 Ct. Cl. at 432.
Id. at 428.
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 433 (1950).
Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70a.
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although the 1880 Act had explicitly stated that lands were to be
opened to "cash entry only" and the United States was to hold the
proceeds from the lands for the benefit of the Tribe.142 The Tribe had
argued that the lands in question were not listed on Schedule 1
attached to the 1950 consent decree, and they were ceded in 1895
rather than 1880.143 Therefore, the Tribe contended that the 1950
consentjudgment should not preclude the claim based on the lands in
question.'44 The United States defended on the basis that the 1950
consent judgment foreclosed any claim to 45the land in question, and
therefore the suit was barred by resjudicata.'
The Indian Claims Commission twice rejected the United States'
defense. 1 4 6 The Court of Claims affirmed. 4 7 Both courts based their
decisions on the ground that the claim concerning the lands in the
action was not compromised by the 1950 consent judgment because48
the lands were not among the lands ceded by the 1880 Act.
However, the Supreme Court reversed, allowing the federal
government's res judicata defense. 49 The Court first examined the
language of the 1950 consent judgment, and concluded that the plain
meaning indicated that the present claim was barred. 5 0 Next, the
Court considered the history of the relations between the Southern
Utes and the United States from the 1880 Act to the 1895 Act,
including the 1882 and 1888 Acts.'
The Court52 concluded that the
lands in question were ceded under the 1880 Act.
In short, the various claims cases all dealt with misdeeds by the
United States for lands to which the Tribe's title had been divested
either by actual sale of the land, appropriation of the land for the
federal government's own purposes, or the 1938 Act's taking of the
retained tribal interest in the lands north of the current reservation.
The underscored language in the 1950 stipulation makes it crystal
clear that the compensation paid to the Tribe was for lands in which
the Tribe had lost its interest. Those are not the lands at issue here
and no principled reading of the cases could conclude otherwise. The
Supreme Court case on which Ms. Maynard places such great weight
142. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians v. United States, 17 Ind. C1. Comm. 28
(1966); see also United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159,

159-60 (1971).
143.

United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346, 347 (Ct.

C1. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 159 (1971).
144. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians v.United States, 17 Ind. C1. Comm.28

(1966).
145. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe orBand of Indians,402 U.S. at 159-60.
146. See Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians v. United States, 7 Ind. CI, Comm.
28; Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians v.United States, 21 Ind. CI. Comm.268
(1969).
147.

United States v. Southern Ute Tribe orBand of Indians,423 F.2d at 346.

148. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,402 U.S. at 161.
149. Id.at 174.
150. Id. at 164.
151.

Id. at 164-71.

152. Id. at 174.

266

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

holds only that any the loss of tribal title occurred by virtue of the 1880
Act and not the 1895 Act. That has no bearing on the question of the
nature and extent of tribal water rights for lands which were not lost.
VI. CONCLUSION
When viewed in context, the arguments that the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe is not entitled to a reserved water right with an 1868
priority date do not withstand scrutiny. Instead, those contentions are
revealed as a desperate and erroneous effort by those opposed to the
development of additional water supplies in southwest Colorado to
stop the United States from implementing its promises to the Ute
Tribes to provide them with a long term water supply from the Animas
River. Only if the tribal water rights do not exist can the greatly
reduced project proposed by the Administration be halted. The law
should not be distorted in the fashion advocated by Ms. Maynard for
such blatantly political purposes.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT PREVENTS
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON PREVIOUSLY
LITIGATED CHANGE OF USE DECREES
R. WOODRUFF CURRAN AND PAULJ. ZILIS:
I.

INTRODUCTION

As Colorado's population has grown during the past century, the
need for more water in municipalities has caused many water suppliers
to purchase irrigation water rights with early priority dates and change
the use of those rights to municipal uses. Most watersheds are
overappropriated for much of the year, and municipalities must be
aggressive in both obtaining and protecting their water rights. In
FarmersHigh Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,' a case recently
decided by the Colorado Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), several
water suppliers brought an action in water court to protect their water
rights from injury due to alleged overuse of a senior, upstream water
user under change of use decrees entered during the 1960s. The
FarmersHighlinedecision narrows the range of issues that can be raised
regarding previously litigated change of use decrees, particularly those
based upon assertions that decrees which do not include volumetric
limitations must be governed by implied limitations.
11. BACKGROUND

A basic tenet of Colorado water law, commonly referred to as the
"no injury" rule, is that the vested rights of other appropriators cannot
be injured when a water right is changed. The terms and conditions
included in change of use decrees to prevent such injury have evolved
over the years as engineering practices and technologies have
improved. In change of use cases litigated before the 1970s, applicants
were typically required to protect junior water rights by abandoning
some of their water rights to the stream, thereby limiting the use of the
changed water rights to their historic consumptive use. Decrees

* R. Woddruff Curran graduated from the University of Colorado School of Law
in 1995 and is an associate with the law firm of Vranesh and Raisch, LLP. PaulJ. Zilis
graduated from the University of Colorado School of Law in 1982 and is a partner with
Vranesh and Raisch, LLP. The law firm represents governmental, industrial, and
individual clients in matters concerning natural resources, water rights,
environmental, real estate, and administrative law.
1. No. 97SA343, 1999 WL 167671 at *1 (Colo. Mar. 29, 1999) (to be reported at
975 P.2d 189).
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approving changes of water rights typically included flow limitations,
use limitations, and abandonment requirements.
Improved engineering and technology have afforded the water
courts more precision in applying the "no injury" rule. Change
decrees now typically include detailed volumetric limits scientifically
based on the historic consumptive use. Furthermore, volumetric limits
have been implied into some older decrees for change of use in order
to prevent enlarged uses of the changed water rights. However,
change in use decrees awarded without the accuracy of these improved
determinations may be exposed to litigation where juniors assert
expanded use.
I.

FARMERS IIGHLINE CANAL

& RESERVOIR Co. . CTY OF GOLDEN

In Farmers Highline, Farmers High Line Canal and Reservoir
Company, Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company, and the cities of
Westminster, Thornton, and Arvada ("the Plaintiffs") filed a complaint
in water court against the City of Golden ("Golden") alleging that
Golden was using more water than its decrees permitted. The decrees
in question were court-approved consent decrees entered in two
change of use cases during the early 1960s.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The case raised two issues: (1) under what circumstances are
implied limitations applicable to previously litigated decrees not
containing volumetric limits; and (2) does claim or issue preclusion
protect such a change of use decree from the addition of implied
volumetric limitations years after a decree has been entered.
B.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The decrees at issue in this case were based on a senior water right
known as Clear Creek Priority 12 ("Priority 12"), originally decreed in
a general adjudication in October 1884 with an appropriation date of
May 1861. In 1957, Golden approached two owners of Priority 12
water and offered to buy a portion of their water rights.3 The owners
applied to the water court to change the decreed uses of their portion
of the Priority 12 water right from irrigation to municipal use. In the
water court, Golden's water engineer, W.W. Wheeler, testified that
Golden could receive 2.86 cubic feet per second ("cfs") without
injuring junior water rights.4 The water court denied the application
ruling Golden had failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
showing that juniors would not suffer injury.5 The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the trial court was required to assist in the

2. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1226 (Colo. 1988).
3. FarmersHighline,1999WL 167671, at *2.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id.
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development of a decree which would protect junior water rights
holders.6
The parties to that case ultimately developed a consent decree that
the water court approved in 1961.' While the decree contained no
express volumetric limitations, it included terms and conditions
intended to protect junior water rights. The decree required Golden
to dry up the lands previously irrigated with the transferred water and
limited Golden's actual use of 2.86 cfs of Priority 12 water by two
requirements: (1) 0.84 cfs of the transferred water had to be
abandoned to the stream; and (2) the diversions had to be limited to
the irrigation months of May to October. 8
Golden's other decree at issue in this case, a consent decree
approved in 1964, contained the same terms as the 1961 decree and
covered Golden's purchase of 1.8 cfs of additional Priority 12 water
rights from another party. The same water engineer prepared an
engineering study that formed the basis for these terms.9
While no volumetric limits were developed during the 1960s
litigation or negotiations, Golden did quantify its use of Priority 12
water while opposing another water application in 1993.°
Consolidated Mutual ("Con Mutual"), another owner of Priority 12
water rights, applied in 1992 to change the use of 2.5855 cfs of Priority
12 water from agricultural to municipal use. Golden opposed Con
Mutual's application arguing that Con Mutual's change of use would
injure Golden's portion of the Priority 12 water right unless the
resulting decree included a volumetric limitation. In determining
what that limit should be, Golden's water engineer provided testimony
regarding the historic consumptive use of Priority 12 water by both
Golden and Con Mutual based on the 1960s testimony and
documentation of W.W. Wheeler. The water court adopted the
calculations and volumetric limits asserted by Golden in Con Mutual's
decree in that case."
C. THE CURRENT CASE
The Plaintiffs in this action alleged that Golden was acting outside
the authority of its change of use decrees by exceeding the volumetric
limits that should be implied, by changing the timing of its diversions,
and by changing the extent of its lawn irrigation. The Plaintiffs'
primary argument was that volumetric limits are implied as a matter of
law in all decrees. The Plaintiffs also asserted that Golden had
quantified a limit during the 1993 Con Mutual litigation and should
6. Mannon v. Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co., 360 P.2d 417, 423
(1961) (stating "[t]he trial court.., is required to do more than passively hear the
evidence; it has an active role in the administration of valuable and vital rights ... .
7. Fa&mersHighline,1999 WL 167671, at *3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
11. Id. at "4-5.
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therefore be either judicially estopped or prevented by claim
preclusion from arguing that volumetric limits are not applicable to its
decrees."
Additionally, the Plaintiffs asserted two factually based claims: (1)
that Golden had enlarged its use by altering the use patterns of its
Priority 12 water from a supplemental supply during summer months
to a year-round, base supply; and (2) that Golden had increased the
percentage of Priority 12 water being used to irrigate lawns, thereby
undermining the analysis relied upon in the issuance of the 1960s
decrees.
The Plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Orr v.
Arapahoe Water & Sanitation District," required incorporating
volumetric limits into Golden's 1960s decrees. 4 Golden defended its
decrees on the basis that claim and issue preclusion prevented relitigation of the 1960s decrees. 5 Although the water court initially
denied Golden's motion for summary judgment on this issue, it ruled
after a trial that the Plaintiffs could not attack the terms of the
previous decrees. The water court distinguished Orr on the grounds
that its holding applies only to decrees arising from
6 cases in which the
issue of historic consumptive use was not litigated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the water court's ruling.
In
highlighting the role that claim and issue preclusion often play in
water rights litigation, the Supreme Court resolved some of the tension
between the preclusive effect of final decrees and the need to allow
claims of injury to be litigated based upon subsequent enlarged uses of
water.
The Supreme Court held that the request to add volumetric
limitations to Golden's 1960s change of use decrees was properly
dismissed by the water court as an issue previously litigated and
determined. The Supreme Court held that the water court properly
limited the Orr decision to change of use proceedings in which no
quantification of historic use was litigated. During the proceedings
that led to the entry of decrees for Golden's change of water rights,
expert analysis formed the basis for the decrees. The decrees also
included flow limitations and season of use limitations. Finally, the
amount of water abandoned to the stream was based on the expert
witness' analysis of historic return flows. In a case where historic use
has been litigated, the determination of historic use is final, and
subsequent litigation of the issue is precluded.
The Plaintiffs also argued that issue preclusion and judicial
estoppel prevented Golden from denying the existence of volumetric
limitations on the two disputed decrees. Issue preclusion was asserted
12. Id. at *5.
13. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & SanitationDist., 753 P.2d at 1217 (Colo. 1988).
14. See id. at 1226.
15. Farmers High Line, 1999 WL 167671, at *6.
16. Id. at *7.
17. Id. at*12.
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on the basis of testimony given by Golden's expert witness during the
1993 Con Mutual litigation. Since testimony in that action appeared
to limit Golden's claim under the 1960s decrees to specific volumetric
amounts, the Plaintiffs argued that actual litigation of that issue in
1993 should preclude Golden from arguing otherwise in subsequent
litigation. The Supreme Court held that the 1960s decrees were final
and unassailable on the issue of implied limitations in later
proceedings. Evidence from the 1993 litigation could not achieve
indirectly that which would not be allowed directly in this case.
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that judicial estoppel was
inappropriate because Golden had not taken truly contradictory
positions in the same or related litigation."8 Judicial estoppel prevents
a prevailing party from adopting a new legal position in the same or
related litigation which conflicts with an earlier successful position.' 9
Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that Golden did not receive a
benefit as a result of the position it took in the 1993 litigation, another
condition required for the doctrine to apply. Golden was not bound
by their expert testimony in the 1993 litigation because Golden's legal
position throughout that action was that no volumetric limits apply to
Golden's 1960s decrees for its Priority 12 water rights.
The Plaintiffs were successful in arguing however, that factual
allegations of enlarged use since the entry of the 1960s consent
decrees could not be dismissed on the basis of issue or claim
preclusion.20 The Supreme Court held that the claims of enlarged
water use which were based on claims of changed circumstances or
changes in operating procedures by Golden were not precluded by the
1960s decrees as argued by Golden. Golden was not permitted to
enlarge the use of its decreed rights and then use the 1960s decrees as
a bar to the Plaintiffs' claims of injury based on that enlarged use.
Since expanded municipal uses could not have been litigated during
the
those earlier
21 proceedings, those claims were correctly heard by
water court.
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence
in the record to sustain the water court's ruling that Golden generally
had not changed its pattern of diversions in such a manner as to cause
injury to the Plaintiffs. The only issue remanded to the water court
was whether Golden had enlarged its use by increasing the percentage
of Priority 12 water used to irrigate lawns. The water court had not
expressly ruled on that issue, so the Supreme Court deemed a factual
determination necessary before complete conclusion of the case.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
This decision has further defined the extent to which previous

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at* 13.
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at*15.
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change of use decrees can be attacked. Water rights have been
repeatedly transferred and the uses of those water rights have changed
throughout this century. In all likelihood, most change of use decrees
entered before the 1970s do not contain the implied limitations
required by the Orr decision. This recent decision makes clear that
not every change of use decree lacking a volumetric limitation is
vulnerable to attack, although holders of such rights are still required
to ensure that they do not provide grounds for future litigation by
changing or enlarging the uses they make of such water.

THE CITY OF GOLDEN'S APPLICATION FOR
SURFACE WATER RIGHTS: A KAYAK COURSE,
INSTREAM FLOW, DILUTION, OR WHAT?
AMY BEATIE AND JAMES FOSNAUGHT
1.

INTRODUCTION

The City of Golden, Colorado ("Golden") has submitted an
application' to the District Court, Water Division 1, in the State of
Colorado, for confirmation of absolute surface water rights for eight
existing structures in Golden's White Water Rafting Course ("Course")
on Clear Creek in Jefferson County, Colorado, and for conditional
water rights for ten structures Golden intends to add to the course. 2
Various local governments and private water users have filed
statements of opposition to Golden's application. The application tolls
four primary issues that have potentially wide reaching effects on water
allocation: (1) whether Golden "can and will" complete the
conditional appropriations; (2) whether Golden's application
constitutes an instream flow which, by statute, only the Colorado Water
Conservation Board may acquire and administer; (3) whether the
appropriations constitute waste; and (4) whether the appropriation
will affect upstream future developments.
II.

CAN AND WILL DOCTRINE

The statements of opposition raise the issue of whether the City of
Golden "can and will" put the requested conditional water rights to
beneficial use.' In Colorado, an applicant for a conditional water right
1. For a more detailed description of the application and statements of
opposition, see the Colorado Water Rights Applications section of this issue, infra at
358.
2. City of Golden Application for Surface Water Rights, Case No. 98CW448
(Water Division 1, December 10, 1998) (hereinafter Golden's Application].
3. Filed on March 3, 1999, the City of Arvada's statement of opposition requests
that Golden be held to strict proof with respect to "whether the claimed conditional
appropriations can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable
time." City of Arvada Statement of Opposition, § 2(B) (4). Filed on January 26, 1999,
Coors Brewing Company's statement of opposition states that, "[i]f it is proven that a
lawful appropriation has been made, Applicant must then demonstrate that the water
rights can and will be administered in priority." Coors Brewing Company Statement of
Opposition, § 2(G). Filed on March 3, 1999, the Town of Georgetown's statement of
opposition requests Golden be held to strict proof about, "[tihe reasonably
anticipated future legal and physical availability of water for water rights sought."
Town of Georgetown Statement of Opposition, § 3(E)(1).
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must show that the water "can be and will be diverted, stored, or
otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially
used and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and
within a reasonable time.""
The can and will requirement, codified in 1979, is a relatively new
addition to Colorado water law.' The primary goal of the statute's
enactment is to prevent speculation.6 Section 305(b) requires an
applicant to establish a substantial probability that the intended
appropriation can and will reach fruition.7
When reviewing an application for satisfaction of the can and will
doctrine, a court will consider economic capability, need, present
availability of water, the feasibility of the project, and whether the
applicant can complete the project with diligence and within a
reasonable time.' One commentator stated that, although statutory
language fails to address many of the issues that have been litigated
under the rubric of the can and will doctrine, precedent had dictated
that the Colorado judiciary "address heretofore unconsidered issues of
public interest when adjudicating conditional water rights."9
Under section 305(9) (b) an applicant must make a threshold
showing of the reasonable availability of water to put to beneficial use
to prove that the applicant "can" complete the appropriation.'
In
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highland Limited Partnership,"
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that an applicant must
demonstrate the availability of water based upon the "river conditions
existing at the time of the application, in priority and on sufficiently
frequent occasions, to enable the applicant to complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time." 2 The
court, recognizing the necessity of imputing reasonableness into this
availability, noted that availability is based upon "necessarily imperfect
predictions of future events and conditions.' 3 The court further
stated, "[a] showing of reasonable availability does not require a
demonstration that water will always be available to the full extent
applied for in the decree.' 4 The court rejected an argument that the
4. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1998).
5. City of Thorton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 42 (Colo. 1996).
6. Id. (noting legislative goal of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-305(9) (b) is to reduce
speculation associated with conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of the
administration of water rights in Colorado).
7. Id.
8. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715,
718 (Colo. 1984).
9. Mark E. Hamilton, The "Can and Will" Doctrine of Colorado Revised Statute Section
37-92-305(9)(b): Changingthe Nature of Conditional Water Rights in Colorado, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 947, 963 (1994).
10. Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Hines Highland Ltd. Part., 929 P.2d 718, 722
(Colo. 1996).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 43 (Colo. 1996).
14. Id. at 724.

Issue 2

CITY OF GOLDEN'S SURFACE WA TER RIGHTS APPLICATION

275

applicant show, in order to obtain a conditional decree, that water will
be available at any time the applicant wishes to make a diversion. 5
The court held that in order to promote development and maximize
utilization, an applicant for a conditional water right "need only prove
that there is a substantial probability that the appropriation can and
will be completed . . 6
Clear Creek is greatly overappropriated.17 In Hines, Maroon Creek
was underappropriated. Because the decrees sought by Golden do not
remove water from the stream bed, the over or underappropriation of
the stream is less significant as it applies to senior appropriators. Once
the junior appropriator has obtained a conditional water right decree
the junior may not, when prior appropriators need the water, make a
diversion.' The key element needed for Golden to prove it "can"
perfect the right is that enough water actually exists for the City to
complete its appropriation. In Florence, the court rejected a probability
that an appropriation would become available once every twenty-five
years as insufficient to determine that a conditional decree "can"' be
completed.' 9 Golden is better able to show the availability of water.
The U.S. Geologic Survey measures the actual and estimated
streamflow on surface waters throughout Colorado. Diagram 1 shows
the actual and estimated streamflow of Clear Creek at Golden for the
years 1981 through 1997. Peak flows during the May, June, and July
period have exceeded 1,000 CFS in eight of the seventeen years.
Diagram 2 shows the actual or estimated flows for 1996, in which the
flow exceeded 1,000 CFS for a period of approximately four weeks
during the month of June. Because historically water has been
available, it is likely that Golden can satisfy the requirement of section
305-that it can and will be able to complete the diversion.

15. Id. In footnote 13, court states that this requirement would make it impossible
for any new applicant to obtain conditional water rights. Id.
16. Id at 724.
17. City of Thornton v. Clear Creek Users Alliance, 859 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Colo.
1993). The court notes in footnote 4 that a 1985 a report prepared for the Denver
Board of Water Commissioners indicated that the "[p] resent use made of Clear Creek
water is a mix of municipal, industrial, and agricultural. The stream is greatly overappropriated, with water rights totaling about 20 times the average rate of stream flow
and about 50 percent more than the maximum recorded flow during the past ten
years." Id.
18. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(d) (1998).
19. Southeastern Colo.Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715
(Colo. 1984).
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20. USGS Website for Historical Streamflow Daily Values (visited April 25, 1999)
<http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis-w/CO/?statnum=06719505>.
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INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS

Golden's application seeks confirmation of absolute rights and
additional conditional rights for the Course. The diversions do not
remove water from the watercourse of Clear Creek. Of the eight
objectors, five object either overtly22 or impliedly s to the application
due to, inter alia,its resemblance to an instream flow.
In Colorado, authority to appropriate or acquire water for an
instream flow resides solely with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB"). The relevant statutory provision states that:
[T] he Colorado water conservation board is hereby vested with the
exclusive authority... to appropriate... such waters of natural
streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for
minimum stream flows.., to preserve the natural environment to a
reasonable degree....

[N]o other person or entity shall be granted a

decree adjudicating a right to water.., for instream flows in a ....
stream
24
channel between specific points.., for any reason whatsoever
The objectors assert that Golden's failure to physically divert water
from the stream creates an instream flow right, a right exclusively
vested in the CWCB, thereby causing Golden's application to fail as a
legally cognizable claim. Whether Golden's application falls under the
rubric of an instream flow will turn upon analysis of several Colorado
water statutes and the water court's interpretation of the applicability

22. Clear Creek Skiing Corporation and the Colorado Water Conservation Board
overtly object to the appearance of Golden's application as an instream flow
application. Filed on March 3, 1999, Clear Creek Skiing Corporation's statement of
opposition to Golden's application reads: "The Colorado Water Conservation Board is
the only entity in the State of Colorado authorized to obtain minimum stream flow
water rights." Clear Creek Skiing Company Statement of Opposition, § 2(B). Also
filed on March 3, 1999, the Colorado Water Conservation Board's statement of
opposition states that the purpose of Golden's application is "similar in nature to
instream flow use;" "does not constitute a legally cognizable beneficial use of water;"
and therefore violates COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3). Colorado Water Conservation
Board Statement of Opposition, § 3(a)-(c).
23. The City of Arvada, Coors Brewing Company, and the City of Westminster
impliedly object to the instream flow nature of Golden's application. Filed on March
3,1999, the City of Arvada's statement of opposition reads: "Applicant must be placed
on strict proof with respect to each element of its claim for absolute and conditional
surface water rights including, but not limited to... [w]hether applicant can be
granted a decree for the claimed water rights." City of Arvada Statement of
Opposition, § 2(B). Filed on January 26, 1999, Coors Brewing Company's statement of
opposition states that Golden must meet the criteria for a valid appropriation and a
conditional decree, stating specifically that, "Applicant must prove that it has the
requisite authority and intent to appropriate water in accordance with the law." Coors
Brewing Company Statement of Opposition, § 2(F). Filed on March 3, 1999, The City
of Westminster's opposition statement states that: "Applicant must be held to strict
proof that it has diverted and put to beneficial use the portion of water rights claimed
as absolute." City of Westminster Statement of Opposition, § 2(D).
24. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1998); see City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation
Co., 926 P.2d 1, 93-94 (Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d
915, 930 (Colo. 1992).
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of City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins.25
Under Colorado law, an " '[a]ppropriation' means the application
of a specified portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use
pursuant to the procedures prescribed by law. '26 Colorado statute
defines "beneficial use" as: "the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate... and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recreational
purposes, including fishery and wildlife. 2 7 The statute provides that
recreational, piscatorial, fishery, and wildlife appropriations are
beneficial uses; thus, it appears likely a court will find Golden's
declared uses beneficial under Colorado law. Golden's application
names the beneficial uses to which the requested water will be put:
"[b] oating (including kayaking,
rafting and canoeing), piscatorial, and
28
general recreational uses.
The criteria for award of a conditional decree are also statutory.
Any water that "can and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured,
possessed, and controlled" satisfies the requirements for a conditional
decree. According to Golden's application, its existing eight structure
Course controls and concentrates the flow of Clear Creek for boating,
and the intended extension of the Course will do the same. Golden's
application uses language obviously intended to place the application
under the purview of the "or otherwise captured, possessed, and
controlled" language of the conditional decree statute.2 However,
even if a court finds Golden's application does not fall within that
language, Colorado statutes and case law define "diversion" broadly.
Colorado statute defines diversion as "removing water from its
natural course or location, or controllingwater in its natural course. .... "
The Colorado Supreme Court has held the "or" within the statute as
creating two discrete categories;"' thus, "diverting"-physically
removing the water from the watercourse for use 3at
2 another locationis distinct from and not required by "controlling.
25. 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992). In its application, Golden states, "Precedence (sic)
for the requested water right is specifically set forth in City of Thornton v. City of Fort
Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992) and further supported by C.R.S. §§ 37-92-305(9) (b)
and 37-92-103(7)." Golden's Application, supra note 2, at 39. Golden carefully crafted
the language in its application from the holdings of City of Thornton and applicable
statutes. Although reciting a case as precedent cannot force the hand of any court, it
must here. The similarity of Golden's application to Fort Collins' application in City of
Thornton will force a court to examine City of Thornton.
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1998).
28. Golden's Application, supra note 2, at 39.
29. In describing the existing structures for which Golden seeks confirmation of
absolute water rights, Golden describes the eight structures as "designed to control
and concentrate the flow of Clear Creek." Id. at 37. Golden's description of the
intended Extension uses similar language: "The Extension will consist of
approximately 10 additional dam structures, each of which is designed to control,
concentrate, and direct the stream flow ...."Id at 38.
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (1998) (emphasis added).
31. Bloomer v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 942, 946 (Colo. 1990).
32. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 929-30 (Colo. 1992); see
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In City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins,3 the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed an issue strikingly similar to the one here. In City of
Thornton, the court assessed whether the appropriation of water
effectuated by two dams on the Cache La Poudre River constituted
control of water within the meaning of the statutes set out above.
After reasoning that control of water within its natural course could
constitute a valid appropriation," the court held that "water may be
appropriated by a structure or device which ...controls water within
its natural course, assuming such action puts the water to beneficial
use."5 5 Differentiating control from an instream flow, the court stated
that one of the salient features of an instream flow is absence of a
structure or device, whereas diversion or control requires a structure
36
or device.
In City of Thornton, Fort Collins intended two dams, structurally
different and serving different purposes, to satisfy their requested
appropriations. Although the first dam, the Nature Dam, built in
order to divert the Cache La Poudre River back to its historic channel,
is dissimilar from the structures at issue in Golden's application, the
court's holding with respect to the structure is important. The court
held that "to control water within its natural course or location means
that the appropriator exercises control over the water at least to the
extent that the water continues to be put to a beneficial use.""
With respect to the second structure, the Power Dam, a structure
containing both a boat chute and a fish ladder, the court held that,
"boat chutes[,] ... when properly designed and constructed, are
structures, which concentrate the flow of water to serve their intended
purposes. A chute ...therefore may qualify as a 'structure or device'
which controls water in its natural course or location under section 37'
The court remanded the case to the water court to
9 2 -10 3 ( 7 )."ss
determine if the structure can and will put the requested water to
beneficial use.
The instream flow objections to Golden's application echo the
instream flow objections in City of Thornton so much that it seems
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 573, 574 (Colo. 1979).
33. 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992).
34. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930 ("Controlling water within its natural course or
location by some structure or device for a beneficial use thus may result in a valid
appropriation").
35. Id. at 930-31.
36. Id. at 931. The court also stressed that even though preservation of nature, the
beneficial use required for an instream flow, would incidentally manifest from Fort
Collins' application, this similarity in result does not qualify the application as an
application for an instream flow. Id. Furthermore, the Colorado Constitution in
article XVI, section 6 guarantees the right to appropriate water for beneficial use by
diversion or control, and the Colorado Supreme Court has held that provision as
distinct from and not in conflict with the CWCB's statutory right to appropriate water
for instream flows. Board of County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 548 n.4 (Colo.
1992).
37. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 931-32.
38. Id. at 932.
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unlikely, if the issue is litigated, that the opposers will prevail. Golden
will have to show that the water appropriated will serve the beneficial
uses outlined in its application and that the structures will effectively
control the water (i.e., can and will put the water to the beneficial uses
named). Based on the nature of the application, these required
showings do not appear insurmountable.
Golden may trip on a few points, however. Golden's application is
factually distinct from the one at issue in City of Thornton in one crucial
way: where Fort Collins claimed water rights for only two structures,
Golden seeks water rights for eight existing and ten additional
structures, effectively spanning the course of Clear Creek as it flows
through the City of Golden. The court could possibly view this
application as a thinly veiled plan to create an expansion of river
fortressed against future appropriations, establishing Golden as the
future gatekeeper of the water of Clear Creek. 9
The court may also face the possibility that the appropriation is not
solely for the purpose of a kayak course, but a disguised private
instream flow for the purposes of waste dilution. In City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation Co., the Colorado Supreme Court found that Kodak had
no right to dilute its discharges to comply with water quality standards
and, thus, frustrate a challenged exchange."0 The appropriation of
water for an environmentally appealing purpose may hide a purpose of
municipal sewage dilution.
It seems likely that a court will find Golden's stated beneficial use
meets state statutory requirements; that the structures effectively
control the water, even though the water remains within its natural
water course; and that although the application may preserve nature as
an incidental benefit, that result does not force the application under
the rubric of an instream flow.
IV. WASTE
In its statement of opposition, the Clear Creek County Board of
Commissioners requested that Golden "be put on strict proof that the
use of the amount of water claimed is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.""
Colorado statutes define the beneficial use of water as "that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably
efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made.... ., 2 Judicial interpretation of
what constitutes waste is limited, but has established that it "is settled
law that an appropriator is limited in his use of water to his actual

39. See infra Part V.
40. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 89-95 (Colo. 1996).
41. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Clear Creek Statement of
Opposition, § 2(A) (emphasis added).
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1998) (emphasis added).
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needs. He must not waste it, and if there is a surplus remaining after
use, it must be returned to the stream whence it came.""
Golden's application may be subject to attack based on waste, or an
argument that the appropriation of essentially the entire year-round
flow of Clear Creek is not reasonable and appropriate under
reasonably efficient practices. Kayakers, of course, love water and feel
that the more water, the better. However, kayak courses can be
designed for average low water levels, as was the Confluence Kayak
Park in central Denver. The Confluence Park attracts boaters year
round at levels of less than 150 cfs, substantially lower than the levels
Golden intends to appropriate. A course such as Golden's, designed
for up to 1,000 cfs, which occurs at most four weeks per year, may not
be well designed or appropriate for use during the average normal
flow of less than 200 cfs.
The water court, when faced with the upstream implications of the
appropriation, will need to grapple with the issue of whether the size
of the new appropriation is reasonable, or if it constitutes waste of
Colorado's precious water resources.
V.

UPSTREAM IMPLICATIONS

In its statement of opposition, the Town of Georgetown requested
that Golden be placed on strict proof about, "It] he impact on Clear
Creek, to be anticipated from proposed water rights."" The upstream
implications of the appropriation are of interest to existing and
potential water users along Clear Creek. Through the act of
appropriating an amount nearly equal to all of the historical year
round flow of Clear Creek, Golden has effectively precluded the future
development ofjunior direct flow rights and upstream storage facilities
for augmentation of out of priority diversions. The appropriation will
also preclude the ability of other appropriators to operate junior
exchanges to move senior water upstream through Golden. The
immediate effect may be seen in the ability of Golden to deny
Georgetown the capacity to operate its proposed exchange from the
Farmer's Highline Ditch, just below Golden, upstream to Georgetown.
This exchange is eleven days junior to Golden's date of
appropnation.
Georgetown may now be required to find and use
senior exchange water or senior water above Georgetown. This can
only make existing absolute and conditional storage and direct flow
rights upstream of Golden more valuable, including existing
transmountain diversions, such as the Vidler Tunnel; will add value to
existing rights; and may create a viable water market along the upper
reaches of Clear Creek.
43. See Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922).
44. Town of Georgetown Statement of Opposition, § 3(E)(3).
45. See Application for Change of Use of Water Right, and for Plan for
Augmentation, Including Exchange, 98CW439, Resume, Water Division No. 1.
(December, 1998). See also the Colorado Water Rights Applications section of this
issue infra at 358.
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VI. CONCLUSION

If Golden's proposed appropriation is decreed by the water court,
the implications for various water basins statewide could be profound.
For example, one need only imagine the construction of a similar
boating course and appropriation by the City of Grand Junction at the
confluence of the Colorado and Gunnison Rivers. Through the
appropriation of the entire flow of both rivers to provide water for the
beneficial use of recreational boaters all future upstream water
development would be severely affected, if not entirely curtailed
throughout most of Western Colorado.
While the water court may be precluded from considering the
public policy implications of granting Golden what amounts to a large
instream flow right and a gatekeeping function over an entire
watershed, the legislature or the Supreme Court through judicial
interpretation of waste and reasonable use, or a review of City of
Thornton v. City of Ft. Collins, may soon be required to address this
important issue.

PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
The Water Law Review is pleased to present this new section
featuring personal interviews with some of the great water lawyers of
the twentieth century. In May 1999, I was privileged to have
interviewed Mr. Raphael J. Moses, to whom we proudly pay tribute in
this issue. Mr. Moses is an intelligent and delightful gentlemen who
graciously invited me to his home to meet his wife and their adorable
bulldog Churchill, and to share with me his truly incredible life as a
water lawyer. On behalf of the Editors and our readers, I sincerely
thank Mr. Moses for his time and candid insights. I hope all who read
this interview enjoy and cherish it as much as I do.
Debbie Eiland,Editor-in-Chief

Interviewer: Mr. Moses, I notice that you were born in Alabama.
Did you grow up there? When did you come to Colorado?
Mr. Moses: No, my parents died before I was a year old (my
mother at the time I was born, and my father shortly thereafter).
There were four children, and I was the youngest. We were parceled
out to different Aunts and Uncles, and I drew Albert L. Moses, who was
a lawyer in Alamosa at that time. I was less than a year old when I went
to Alamosa, so I don't have much of a Southern accent. My Uncle
Albert and my Aunt Rosa were the only parents I ever knew.
Interviewer: You grew up then in Alamosa, and you liked Colorado
and decided to stay here for college?
Mr. Moses: Well there wasn't much discussion. When I got out of
high school, I got what they called a Regent's Scholarship that paid my
tuition at the University of Colorado, which came to $66.00 a year in
those days. Obviously [because of the scholarship], I decided to come
to the University to go to college. In those days, if one got all of his
required courses out of the way in the first three years, he could go
into law school before he got his AB degree. The first year of law
school counted as electives so that you could get both degrees in six
years, instead of getting your AB before law school. I was able to do
that, and went to the University from 1931 to 1937-I got my AB in
1935, and my LL.B. in 1937. Later, when people started entering the
military, I found out that people who hadJDs instead of LL.B.s went in
at a higher rank. So, I got two degrees at the University-one an LL.B.
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and the other a JD for doing the same work because the University
went back and retroactively gave law school graduates aJD.
Interviewer: So you didn't have to spend more time in school to
get yourJD?
Mr. Moses: No. As it happens, if you went in with an LL.B. you
went in as an Ensign, but if you went in with a JD you went in as a
Lieutenant Junior Grade, which made a difference in allowance, pay,
and everything else.
Interviewer: Did you go into the military after you graduated from
law school?
Mr. Moses: No. I got out of law school in 1937 and went back to
Alamosa, and went into practice with my Uncle. Then when the war
came along, I volunteered in August of 1942 and went to
indoctrination school in Newport, Rhode Island and learned the
difference between the Navy salute and Boy Scout salute-all those
important things.
Interviewer: So you joined the Navy?
Mr. Moses: Yes. I was in Newport three months, and wound up on
destroyer duty in the Pacific.
Interviewer: How long did you serve?
Mr. Moses: I served from August, 1942 to October, 1945, when I
got enough points, as they called them in those days, enough time in
the service, to get out. I was ready to get out. In the meantime, my
Uncle had died so the office was closed for about a year. I had no idea
whether there would be any practice left when I got back or not. At
that time I was married to my first wife, and our little girl was five years
old. When we came back to Alamosa it was touch-and-go for a while,
but in five or six months I started breaking even, and pretty soon I
made a little money. It worked out.
Interviewer: Since your Uncle was an attorney also, did he
somehow encourage you to go into the law?
Mr. Moses: Well, most of my family had been in the law, or in the
Navy. I was the seventeenth in a direct line of my family who had been
commissioned in the Navy, going back to the War of 1812. I have two
brothers who were career naval officers and went to Annapolis. I
wanted to go, but I couldn't pass the physical so I couldn't go to
Annapolis. I went to CU instead. It was one of those things that was
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taken for granted that I would be a lawyer. I wanted to be a newspaper
man. I had been the editor of the newspaper at the University of
Colorado and I liked that, but rationality prevailed.
Interviewer: Newspaper work was not thought to be a good career
back then?
Mr. Moses: I thought it was fun.
Interviewer: What kind of law did you initially practice and how
did you get into water law?
Mr. Moses: I was a country lawyer. In Alamosa, you did everything.
There were only eighteen lawyers in the San Luis Valley at that time.
We all did some water law-represented drainage districts, irrigation
districts, or ditch companies. So I had some of that. My Uncle always
regretted that he didn't have enough money to raise a family and
participate in Bar Association activities the way he would have liked to.
So when I started to work for him he paid me $100.00 a month, which
was about the most anybody in my class got at the tail-end of the
Depression (not that I was worth $100, but he had to support me
anyway). When I got married he raised me to $150. But anyway, he
said, "If you want to go to the Colorado Bar Association meeting at the
Broadmoor in Colorado Springs, I'll pay your way." I practiced with
him until I went into the service in 1942, and when I got out in 1945 I
went to a state Bar meeting for the first time. As it turned out at the
time, they were organizing a water section in the Colorado Bar, and I
was the only person there from the San Luis Valley. The water law
section council was made up of representatives of each of the major
drainage systems in the state, and I was the only one there from the
Rio Grande drainage, so somehow I got on the water law council. I
was twenty-four years old.
Interviewer: That must have opened the door to a lot of other
water related activities?
Mr. Moses: Yes, I've been very fortunate. Governor Thornton
appointed me to the Colorado Water Conservation Board. I served for
five years, then a vacancy occurred in the office of the attorney for the
Board. Felix Sparks had been the attorney for the Board, then became
Director of Natural Resources, so there was an opening for attorney
for the Board and I got it. I served for twelve years as attorney for the
Board. And that, of course, opened a lot of doors for me as far as
water was concerned because I represented Colorado in all its
interstate matters-the Rio Grande Compact, the Colorado River
Compact, etc. Early on I went all over the country representing
Colorado. I remember going down to Yuma to a meeting and to
Washington a couple of times.

Issule 2

PRA CTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE

Interviewer: What was one of your most interesting cases?
Mr. Moses: One of the highlights was a lawsuit that ran for years
and years and years involving the Rio Grande Compact. The parties
included Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and the Republic of Mexico.
Colorado habitually ignored the compact and used more water than it
was entitled to, and was in debt-according to the bookkeeping system
used in the compact-far beyond the permissible amount. Texas and
New Mexico brought suit against Colorado to enjoin us from violating
the compact, and to limit the amount of water the irrigators in the San
Luis Valley could use. I went back to Washington representing
Colorado and met with the Solicitor General, Thurgood Marshall, and
we worked out a stipulation that all the states agreed to. Colorado
could go ahead so long as it did not increase its indebtedness. Well,
that meant very careful management of water in the San Luis Valley.
There were hundreds of irrigation wells down there, and it meant that
the State Engineer had to shut down the use of those wells sometimes,
for fear that we might increase the indebtedness. There was also a
provision in the Compact that set-up Elephant Butte Reservoir, which
is down by Las Cruces, New Mexico. If it ever spilled, all the
indebtedness would be wiped out. It had never spilled, but after the
agreement it did spill and so the indebtedness was wiped out.
After the Elephant Butte Reservoir spill, the people in the San Luis
Valley could go back to using their water and were very careful not to
get back in debt. It's easier to do now because we can regulate the
wells and make fairly accurate forecasts of when the run-off will occur
in the spring of each year, based on a measurement taken at the
gaging stations of Del Norte on the Rio Grande, and sources on the
Conejos River. We have to deliver a percentage of the amount that
passes those gaging stations. If a lot of water goes by we have to deliver
a lot of water. If it's a very dry year, the requirements are pretty
modest. It works out pretty well.
Interviewer:
projects?

Were you involved in any early water conservation

Mr. Moses: We had a project that had been approved since 1936,
which involved the construction of a high dam at Wagon Wheel Gap in
the San Luis Valley just about seven miles before Creede on the Rio
Grande. It would have backed water up almost to Creede. It also
included a future canal called the Closed Basin Drain-a big drainage
ditch which would take water out of what was called the Closed Basin
north of Highway 160 which comes over La Veta Pass to Alamosa. It's
east of Highway 17, which is the highway that comes down from Salida
to Alamosa. Water accumulated in the Closed Basin from irrigation
east of the big canal above Del Norte and fanned out along the west
side of the San Luis Valley and irrigated lands to the east. But there
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was a hydrologic divide north of the river, and about three or four
miles parallel to it, that prevented the irrigation water that was applied
to the lands (good agricultural lands around southern Del Norte and
Monte Vista) from getting back to the River. It just went over into
what they called the sump, and became stagnated-there was a lot of
alkali and phreatophytes (water loving plants). To get the water across
this hydrologic divide a canal was built which turned it back into the
Rio Grande above the state line. That freed up water for farmers in
the western part of the Valley, because it was returning water it had
never returned before. That was a big help to the San Luis Valley.
Interviewer: How did these interstate cases and large projects help
you to build your water law practice?
Mr. Moses: When Eisenhower was elected, a Nebraskan named
Fred Seaton was appointed Secretary of the Interior. He asked
Hatfield Chilson-who later became a Federal judge in Colorado-to
be Assistant Secretary for Power and Water. I'd known Chilson for a
long time. I'd become Attorney for the Colorado Water Conservation
Board when he went into private practice. When he became a federal
judge I took over some of his important water clients, and as a result I
inherited a lot of Chilson's clients. He had a very active water law
practice. For example, he represented ground water users around
Colorado Springs, and Amax/Climax which had a very elaborate and
complicated water system that took water out of the Eagle, the
Arkansas, and Ten Mile Creek. He told me one time that the Amax
system was so complicated that the courts would never be able to
enforce it because no one understood it. Chilson had followed almost
the same footsteps as Gene Breitenstein. Breitenstein had been
attorney for the Denver Water Board then became a Federal judge.
Chilson was also attorney for the Denver Water Board, and then he too
became a federal judge.
Interviewer: You should have worked for the Denver Water Board!
Mr. Moses: Well, I might have become a Federal judge but my
timing was bad. John Carroll was United States Senator, and Bill
Doyle, his brother-in-law, was the one who wanted to be a federal
judge, and he got to be a federal judge. He was a good judge, and I
probably would not have been, so it turned out all right. Its interesting
the way those things work.
Interviewer: Which of the cases you handled do you think was
most important to Colorado water law?
Mr. Moses: I took over representation of all the well owners
around Colorado Springs that Chilson had been representing. I think
one of the more important Colorado decisions is one called City of
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Colorado Springs v. Bender. Chilson had already lost that case, appealed
it the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court sent it back for re-trial.
The facts were pretty simple. Bender had a dairy farm-about seventy
acres. He drilled a hand dug well, and ran it from a tractor with a feed
belt that ran the pump. That wasn't getting him very much water so he
put the pump right over the well and dug the well down to shalesome seventy-five or eighty feet. In the meantime the City of Colorado
Springs had drilled a big well closer to the old bed of Fountain Creek
in that area, and had gone down about a thousand feet. As soon as
they got below Bender's seventy-five feet, Bender's well went dry. The
question was what Bender had to do to protect his water rights. The
Supreme Court said he must do everything within his economic reach
(whatever that means), that he had done that, and the 200 acre feet of
water he had been taking before the City of Colorado Springs drilled
its well preceded the Colorado Springs well in priority, so Colorado
Springs furnished Bender 200 acre feet of water per year. It turned
out to be a fairly landmark decision that followed an Idaho Falls, Idaho
case called Schodde. The Idaho case says once you've done everything
you can, the law protects you. Bender had done that, so he was
protected.
Interviewer: Did you enjoy practicing water law?
Mr. Moses: We had a lot of fun. I was involved in a lot of
litigation. In the Rainbow Bridge case [Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172 (1980)], for example, I was representing Colorado. Clyde Martz
and I were both in that one. Of course, Clyde was a landmark water
lawyer in Colorado. The case was heard before the 1 0 1h Circuit, and
went up to the Supreme Court [cert. denied, Badoni v. Broadbent, 452
U.S. 954 (1981)]. It was a lot of fun to represent a sovereign state. I
also got to go to all the Colorado River Compact meetings. We
organized a thing called the Colorado River Water Users Association. I
had a feeling, and so did some of my contemporaries from other states
who held similar positions, that there was such a bitterness between
the upper and lower basins along the Colorado after the case of
Arizona v. California,that if the people who actually used the water (the
ditch superintendents, members of the Board of Directors of irrigation
districts, etc.) could ever get together and see that their other
contemporaries didn't have horns, but were people just like them
trying to get along, it might be helpful-so we formed such a group.
We had kind of a United Nations Security Council system. We didn't
do anything without unanimous agreement, which meant that we
didn't do anything. But it gave us a place to meet and talk where
people weren't looking over their shoulders all the time in fear that
they would be committed to something the majority would force them
into. The one thing we could agree on was that we wanted to meet in
Las Vegas. So for years we would go back for three days during what
they called the dead ages, between Thanksgiving and Christmas, when
nobody was going to Las Vegas and the room rates were low.
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Interviewer: Who would you say was one of your biggest rivals?
Mr. Moses: I made a living fighting the Denver Water Board. Glen
Saunders was attorney for the Water Board and we battled all the time.
I worked for the Colorado Water Conservation Board because I'd have
starved to death if I worked for the Denver Water Board. Nobody
liked the Denver Water Board-not the good guys.
Interviewer: The Denver Water Board was looked upon badly for a
long time wasn't it?
Mr. Moses: Yes, they had all the water. They had all the water on
the western slope, and pretty much stymied the Arkansas
transmountain diversion for a long time. Glenn was a good friend,
and we got along fine. He couldn't smoke. I have asthma now, but he
had it very badly. So we recognized that and we never smoked. Very
bright mind, really nice guy. We had a relationship that was similar to
what we call "Tavern Appeal." It's on the wall of the Law Club Bar in
New York. It's a quotation that says: "Strive mightily, but eat and drink
as friends." We used to butt heads all day, but go out and drink
together at night.
Interviewer:
philosophy?

Do you think members of the Bar still follow that

Mr. Moses: No, I think the Bar has changed in a lot of ways that I
don't approve of. It used to be a lawyer could call the opposing
counsel for information about a case or agree upon an extension of
time to plead, and the oral stipulation was honored by opposing
counsel. Now you've got to have stipulations and court approval and
all that. We didn't. I think a lot of the informality has gone out of it. I
think a couple of things have caused this. One is the automatic
copying machine which has made it easy to produce paper, and the
use of depositions and interrogatories, all of which I consider to be
piles of paper that consume hours and hours of time. Discovery, I
think, is what makes litigation so expensive. It used to be that if you
had one neighbor fighting another one, they could sue each other.
Not anymore-they can't afford it. In a way that's good, because they
just sit around and work it out among themselves. They know they
can't afford anything else.
Interviewer: What do you think we need to do to change that, or
do you think we can?
Mr. Moses: It takes tougher judges that we've got. Judges can limit
the amount of discovery. It takes a judge who is willing to take the
time and effort. And the judges are overworked, so I can't blame

Issue 2

PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE

them. They've got more than they can handle. We need a lot more
judges and we need to appropriate money for it. Some judges were
pretty tough. When Judge Finesilver used to say, "See you at 7:00
o'clock in the morning," you were there and he went all day.
Interviewer: What do you do in your spare time?
Mr. Moses: My wife and I travel a lot. We've been to seven
continents including Antarctica, and many countries including New
Guinea and Kenya where we took a ten-day trip by camel.
Interviewer: Tell me about Antarctica.
Mr. Moses: We took an ice-breaking ship, and got as close as it
would go through the ice. We stopped at several international science
stations including the French, Chilean, Chinese, and Russian stations.
At the stations we got out and walked around. The U.S. station
wouldn't let us get into it, however.
Interviewer:
horseback?

Tell me about riding camels.

Is it different than

Mr. Moses: Oh yes. We had a very special trip. The camels were
beautiful animals, and we had guides who led the camels, set up camp,
and cooked all our meals for us. My wife played some pretty good
tricks on the guides. They aren't used to technology or American ways.
She had a tape recorder with her. The guides used to sing while we
were riding down the trail. One day, without their knowing it, she
taped their singing. Then one time when we were having lunch she
played it back to them. Oh, they just thought that was unbelievable.
Another thing, she had some bubble gum, and when she blew bubbles
they thought her lungs were coming out. They screamed and ran
away.
Interviewer:
you travel?

Do you specifically spend time choosing the places

Mr. Moses: Oh yes. We've been everyplace except some of the
most obvious ones. Been to Europe probably half a dozen times, but
we've never been to Scotland, Ireland, or Wales. Never was on the
itinerary. We love Spain. We've been to Spain five times. I have some
Spanish blood in me, I think that's one reason. One of my remote
ancestors was court physician to Queen Isabella.
Interviewer:
background?

So you've done some research into your family
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Mr. Moses: Yes, some family members are from Holland and
London, England. The reason I wound up in Colorado is that my
Uncle was here. He was born in Sandersille, Georgia, and he had
asthma there. So he decided he was going to head West to live with an
uncle in a place called Stonewall, Texas (LBJ country). I don't know if
it was much better. But he thought he'd go to Colorado, to Buena
Vista, in 1889. Had a wife and baby that he left in Texas for the time
being. They didn't have law schools in those days in Colorado. He
"read law" as they called it, which means he kind of apprenticed
himself to a lawyer. He'd sleep at the office, they had a thing like an
armoire, and it had a bed in it that folded down, and he slept in that.
He got ajob, $25 a month being the deputy clerk for the District Court
in Buena Vista, which at that time was the county seat in Chaffee
County. He went to work for Mr. Libby who was Chairman of the
Chaffee County Bar Examining Committee. After he'd worked for Mr.
Libby for a couple of years, he went to him and said, "I think I'm ready
to take the bar." They had a three man bar examining committee in
each county. One man on the committee lived in Buena Vista and
another one lived in Salida. So Mr. Libby called up the one who lived
in Buena Vista and said, "We're going to admit Ally Moses to the bar,
I'll meet you down at the Saloon in fifteen minutes." And that's how
he got into the bar. Raphael J. Moses the first was my greatgrandfather. He was admitted to the bar in Florida in 1834 when the
requirements basically amounted to some freeholder of the circuit
vouching for your good moral character, period. That was it.
Interviewer: No test? Just had to have good character?
Mr. Moses: Or, at least somebody who said you did.
Interviewer: Did you have to take the Bar Exam?
Mr. Moses: Yes. I took the January bar. I got out of law school in
August. I'd taken three months off, and had been editor of the
student newspaper at the University. I had an Aunt who found out
there was going to be a meeting of student newspaper editors in
Geneva, Switzerland in June, so she sent me $500, which was a lot of
money in the late thirties. I went to that meeting in Geneva, and as a
result, I missed the spring quarter in law school in Boulder, so I
couldn't take the bar in June. At that time they had the bar in June
and January.
Interviewer: Do you think that water law in Colorado has evolved
in a positive way?
Mr. Moses: I think it's been a leader in the West in water law,
especially surface water. And I think the next challenge ahead of us is
groundwater law. With the Colorado Doctrine of prior appropriation I
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think Colorado has been a leader in surface water law development,
and I think New Mexico is the leader in groundwater. Of course, we
were the ones who developed the daunting non-tributary and not nontributary water law. In that regard, I ,represented a man named
Lawrence Phipps, Jr. who owned a ranch called Highlands Ranch. He
sold it to a group I called the "hats." There were about eight of them,
and when they had a meeting, they all kept their hats on. Marvin Davis
and some of his associates, all nice gentlemen, bought the Phipps
water from Lawrence Phipps, Jr. Much to my surprise they asked,
"Would you stay on and represent us?" And I said "Sure." And then an
outfit called Mission Viejo from California bought the Highlands
Ranch from the "hats," and they asked if I'd stay on with them. And I
said, "Sure." So I got to do the groundwater for Highlands Ranch,
which was non-tributary. In well development in Colorado, I think
that was the biggest case we've ever had. It involved more acres and
more wells than any other. I was flattered that people would keep me
on after I had represented the other side. You had to have everybody's
consent to do it.
Interviewer: Where do you think we need to go with groundwater?
Mr. Moses: I think we've gone about as far as we can go. It's gotten
to a point where we don't have measuring devices accurate enough to
measure the quantities of water we seem to be fighting over. I'm
reminded of my roots in the San Luis Valley. The oldest water right in
Colorado is the Acequia Madre guilt in from 1851, controlled by a
water master called a "major domo." They didn't have enough water
to divide it so they had to have a system of rotation. One man would
have it a couple of days, while another man took a couple of days off.
That way everybody got to irrigate. They divided it up according to
their shares, and they had enough water to make it to the end of the
season. It was just a matter of good common sense. So the Spanish, I
think, were way ahead of us in the development and management of
water.
Interviewer: If you had something you'd change about your life,
what would it be?
Mr. Moses: I don't know. I've enjoyed it all so much. I wouldn't
have contracted asthma, as I did about six or seven years ago, but I
can't think of much of anything else. I've been very fortunate.
Interviewer: What is your goal today?
Mr. Moses: To live out my life pretty much the way I'm enjoying it
now. I'm very happy, and I know we don't live forever, but we keep
finding things that make people live longer. Long as I have a
substantial portion of my faculties-I don't plan to keep them all-I'll
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be happy to go along the way I am. I have a wife who takes very good
care of me.
Interviewer: What do you think is our most compelling water law
issue today?
I think, probably, re-use and recharge of
Mr. Moses:
groundwater-cleaning up the water we use so that it can be recycled
and used again. We sit here in a cosmos that has the same amount of
water in it from the time of creation. Through the hydrologic cycle,
clouds form over the ocean, the wind blows them over the mountains,
precipitation comes down, forms rivers, goes back to the ocean,
evaporates, and the cycle goes over and over. Along the way, we've
managed to pollute most of it. I think our real challenge is to clean up
our discharges and provide for the re-use of water as much as we can.
Interviewer: Do you think that lawyers are in any kind of unique
position to make that happen? What can the Bar do, what can lawyers
do, to be more proactive?
Mr. Moses: I think we have a very active Water Law Section, and, as
you probably know, somehow the legislature seems to have more
lawyers in it than anything else. So I think they've just got to realize
the problem and try to resolve some of their individual differences and
get the job done.
Interviewer: Is there anything you would like to add as we finish
today?
Mr. Moses: I'd just like to share an old saying that I think is still
true today. 'You can kick a man's dog, you can steal his wife, but you'd
better leave his water alone!"
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RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY, University of Colorado Press,

Boulder, CO (1999); 3 4 4 pp; $34.95; ISBN 0-87-81-533-4,
hardcover.
REVIEWED BY FEDERICO CHEEVER
How you look at Western water law and history depends on where
you stand. Lawrence McDonnell, first and long-time director of the
Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado School of
Law, lawyer and consultant, makes a point of standing in a great many
places in his informative and compelling new book about the rise and
fall of reclamation. McDonnell focuses on four Western watersheds:
the Arkansas Valley in Colorado; the Grand Valley in Colorado; the

Carson-Truckee Basin in Nevada; and the Yakima Basin in
Washington, but his observations apply to the dozens of other troubled
river valleys across the American West. He provides a snapshot of a
region in transition: a place in which the old certainties of irrigated
agriculture collapse under the double assault of market-driven
economics and environmental values.
The histories of McDonnell's valleys are different-the people are
different, the weather is different, and the mountains are in different
places. However, they all have some things in-common. In each case,
Europeans came to the land in the second half of the nineteenth
century. In each case, the Europeans came with a single compelling
image of "settled country"-farmland. In each valley, the land was too
dry for farming, and in each the federal government stepped in to
consolidate and expand privately built irrigation systems under the
rubric of "reclamation." The success of these reclamation projects
varied, from famous Washington State apples in Yakima to modest
alfalfa harvests in the desert of the Carson sink, but all enjoyed some
success.
In Part 1: The Lower Arkansas Valley: After the Water is Gone,
McDonnell tells the story of a culture founded on irrigated agriculture
He
from the earliest days of settlement in Eastern Colorado.
chronicles the early history of the area and the slow expansion of
irrigated agriculture from the modest fields kept near Bent's Fort to
grow produce for the Santa Fe Trail through the development of
ambitious private canal projects in the 1880s and the growth of the
sugar beet industry. Inevitably, the federal government played its part,
building bigger and better dams and reservoirs, enhancing the
benefits and exacerbating the problems of irrigation agriculture.
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McDonnell tells the story of the post-war boom's effect on
Colorado's Front Range and the emergence of competitors for
Arkansas River water. The long-standing culture of irrigation shows
signs of crumbling as the water is siphoned off to Colorado's cities.
The Arkansas River farmers, forced to fight off big money bids for
their water while wrestling with the damage that a century of flood
irrigation has wrought on their fields, face hard and unpleasant
choices.
In The Lower Arkansas Valley, McDonnell introduces his main
themes, expanded and developed in later sections. He observes the
plight and nobility of the farmers who represent Western irrigated
agriculture; describes the development of a unique body of Western
water law; notes the long-term environmental trade-offs large scale
irrigation requires; and highlights the role of politics (personal, local,
and national) in water decisions, and the role of money-always, it
seems, wielded by outsiders-on a valuable but cash-poor agricultural
economy.
In Part 2: The Grand Valley, Colorado: Where Fruits, Fish and Growth
Collide, McDonnell moves his inquiry to Colorado's Western Slope and
again shows us the effects of politics, law, power, and money on a
traditional economy of irrigated agriculture. Again, irrigation begins
with private initiative, magnified and transformed by later federal
government action. Here, the natural salinity of rock strata found in
the valley brings the issue of environmental trade-offs into sharper
relief. Well financed Colorado cities suck water out of the system
through high mountain transbasin diversions.
In The Grand Valley, McDonnell adds a new theme, the
environment, embodied in the endangered fish of the upper
Colorado. The Colorado River system, best described as an isolated,
relatively warm, turbid river system, developed, over thousands of
years, its own unique fauna, including the Colorado Squawfish and the
Razorback Sucker. Once common, these species have been driven to
the brink of extinction by the changes in the river system imposed to
support irrigated agriculture. While the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service does everything in its power to smooth over the
conflicts between fish and farmers, there is no escaping the fact that
the fish will require more water to have a hope of surviving. They
become just another group of scaly competitors for a scarce resource.
In The Grand Valley, McDonnell offers a telling observation. While
exercising all of his customary diplomacy, he points out that
traditional irrigation agriculture is fantastically wasteful. Generally,
only a modest fraction of the water actually diverted out of the natural
system ever reaches a field. Even when it does, it is often applied in
wasteful ways. McDonnell suggests that much might be gained from
"conservation"-efforts to make sure more water is used and less
wasted.
In Part 3: The Truckee and Carson Basins: Sharing Water in a Desert,
McDonnell ventures a little farther afield-to the eastern edge of the
Sierra and one of the great sagas of Western water. The Truckee and
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Carson drainages were a desert setting suitable for the greatest
aspirations of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. From its
earliest days, the Bureau set out to make the desert bloom. In Nevada,
irrigation developed later and with more direct government assistance.
The focus of Part 3 is the destruction of two natural systems, the
Stillwater wetlands and the fisheries of Pyramid Lake. A new theme
emerges-the plight of Indian peoples dependent on these wrecked
systems. In 1873, the government of the United States formally
established the Pyramid Lake Paiute reservation around Pyramid Lake.
The area so designated was a relatively sensible scrap of the vast
territory of the once nomadic Paiute reserved for their continued use.
Many members of the tribe depended on the extraordinarily abundant
Lohotan Cutthroat trout and Cui-ui fisheries of Pyramid Lake. Forty
years later, the same federal government that set aside the reservation
diverted a significant portion of the Truckee River water running into
Pyramid Lake, thereby destroying both the fishery and the Indian way
of life. Similar promises and similar diversions settled and starved the
Pauite near the Stillwater wetlands on the Carson River. As the
Reclamation Era waned, the Indians began to fight back, demanding
some semblance of the natural bounty on which they had depended,
becoming another set of competitors for scarce water.
In Part 4: The Yakima Basin, Washington: Making the Old West Work,
McDonnell offers all his established themes-the history, the early
private irrigation, and the transforming influence of the Bureau of
Reclamation. Again we have fish in trouble, the American River
Spring Run Chinook Salmon, reduced to a fraction of their historic
numbers by dams along the Columbia River system. The Yakima
Indians, once dependent on the abundant salmon runs, suffer from
the loss of salmon caused by transforming the rivers for irrigation.
Here more than elsewhere there seems to be hope. Sophistication
on the part of all the parties has led to the creation of institutions like
the Yakima River Watershed Council intended, perhaps, to shepherd
all of the water uses in the valley toward a new age of more sustainable
water allocation. Yet the timing of this transformation remains
uncertain and the shape of this new era of sustainability unclear.
McDonnell provides his four descriptions without significant
editorial comment, focusing his energy on painting a picture of each
valley, its people, its ditches and reservoirs, the history that brought
the people and built the ditches, and the forces of change rising
around them. The greatest virtue of the first four sections of From
Reclamation to Sustainability is McDonnell's commitment to keep his
inquiry at ground level, on the land and among the people who
actually use water. McDonnell's descriptions are a relief from the
traditional run-of-water-law scholarship which tends, too often, to
ignore the specific and dwell on the general. In McDonnell's book,
the reader gets a sense of the verities of irrigation agriculture: who's
upstream, who's downstream; who's senior, who's junior; where the
ditches run and what it means to flood a field; and what price you pay
for water, what price you get for crops.
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Make no mistake, McDonnell likes farmers. While he scrupulously
interviews representatives of all groups interested in water allocation,
he tends to see his valleys through farmers' eyes. This is no vice.
Without exception, the farmers embody most of the history since
irrigation began and are now the ones most threatened by change.
They are the core of the old system, the front line in the century long
battle to turn the West into farmland. Now that so many politicians
and thinkers have abandoned that fight, farmers, carefully rendered as
an abstraction, seem expendable. McDonnell presents irrigation
farmers as human beings and chronicles their pain and bewilderment.
He wants to see them protected; the West will not be the same without
such people in it.
On the other hand, seen from the farmers' point of view, the cities
who demand that they get irrigation water because they can and will
pay more for it, the environmentalists who argue that water should be
allocated to fish and wetlands that cannot pay a dime, and Indian
nations demanding water by treaty right or historical use tend to blend
together into a pack of competitors. Their arguments are distinct, but
they are all strangers to the old order. For farmers, and sometimes for
McDonnell, any victory for cities, environmentalists, or tribes means,
first, another dry field or another neighbor moved away.
In the book's fifth and final section, From Reclamation to
Sustainability, McDonnell distills some lessons from his four valley
stories. Here the previously circumspect author presents his opinions
plainly. More than many scholars, he recognizes the virtues of the old
system. He respects the miracle through which the settlers of the
West, and their government, took one of the great impediments to
development and turned it into the great engine of growth. The dam
and tunnel projects, small and vast, public and private, not only
brought the water to the fields, but also employed thousands on the
job site, in the planning office, and the factory. Not only did they
siphon water out of Western rivers, they also siphoned money out of
Washington, D.C. at a rate unmatched in other regions of the country.
McDonnell also recognizes that the system involves enormous waste
and environmental damage, understandable in the unsettled frontier
country the old farmers remember, but unacceptable in the wellsettled urban West of the next century.
So what does the future hold? More efficiency, less waste, more
players, less community, more talk, more transfers, more expensive
water for farmers, and probably less farming. McDonnell advocates
increased definition of rights and a sense and system to the whole
process. He is a reformer at heart. He has great faith in the resilience
of irrigation farmers and their ability to adapt to a new world.
But it is a new world. In his Epilogue, McDonnell tells us, in no
uncertain terms, that water development in the West has been worth it
and that, so far, the "utilitarianism" of the water diverters has been
more important than "amenity value" of keeping water in the streams.
He knows the future will be different. He suspects dams will come
down. At the same time, he believes that we will continue to control
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the West's rivers to meet human needs. What needs, we must decide.
As he puts it, "the choices we make about water matter."

BOOK NOTES
CHRISTOPHER
MILLER,
ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS:
CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES, Routledge, New York, New York (1998); 218pp;

$85.00; ISBN 0415-17064-8, hardcover.
Christopher Miller explores the concept of environmental rights as
it has emerged through the development of English and European law
and policy. The author challenges the anthropocentric view of environmental rights as a derivative of human rights-valued only to the
extent ecological constraints threaten human existence, by discussing
an emerging ecocentric view-one which gives rights to non-human
species, nature, and inanimate objects. Environmental Rights offers an
academic discussion of a timeless question: does the environment have
rights? Miller examines relevant regulations and case law and exemplifies his theories with case studies, charts, and graphs.
The first two chapters examine the concept of environmental
rights through the history of environmental law and policy development. Miller briefly discusses Hardin's tragedy of the commons as a
precursor to the original environmental remedy in tort trespass and
nuisance. His focus then shifts to European case law and regulations
that confer environmental rights on European citizens. Miller provides a practical illustration of European citizens' rights in law and policy.
The third chapter surveys the arena in which environmental rights
have emerged-town and county planning. Land use planning creates
a forum for debate between individual rights and environmental
rights. Again, Miller provides case studies that demonstrate the importance of planning when structuring arguments for environmental
rights.
The next five chapters explore various areas of environmental concern and the development of individual rights in each area. Chapter
Four focuses on clean air-both as a basic human right and as an environmental right-and the methods employed to regulate air pollution.
Chapter Five provides a similar critique of clean water, analyzing five
European directives. In Chapter Six, Miller concentrates on radiation
by examining statutes, case law, and international efforts. He addresses land protection in Chapter Seven. After discussing the potential conflict of property rights and environmental rights, he focuses on
liability for environmental damage. Chapter Eight discusses the protection of landscapes, species, and habitats through methods such as
parks, planning, and European Community directives. Miller exemplifies this conflict of rights by briefly explaining the clash between the
protected spotted owl and the Pacific Northwest timber industry.
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The final chapter compares ecocentric rights to rights that have
emerged through law and policy. In answer to the question, "Can the
environment have rights?," Miller concludes that recognition of inherent environmental rights has yet to occur; however, as the environment is the sole source of human physiological need satisfaction, humans must recognize the general duty to respect it. In closing, Miller
states that, "[i]f treating the environment... as if it were a rightsbearing entity assists a recognition of the corresponding duties, so be
it; but it cannot make them optional or less onerous."
CandaceDeen

GEORGE COLE, WATER BOUNDARIES, John Wiley & Sons, New York,
New York (1997); 193pp; $59.95; ISBN 0-471-17929-9, hardcover.
Water Boundaries is a comprehensive legal and technical examination of water boundaries. Although authored primarily for surveying
students and practicing surveyors, it will aid and interest anyone involved in coastal land or submerged land legal and policy issues. Each
chapter explores a different water boundary issue, providing charts,
graphs and tables for a more comprehensive understanding.
Chapter One explores boundary definitions in tidal waters. This
chapter demonstrates techniques for locating tidal boundaries by focusing on tidal constituents, tidal datum planes, local variation, sea
level changes, datum computations, and tide gauging techniques,
among other tidal data sources. To illustrate the application of the
theories discussed, Chapter One concludes with two case studies.
In Chapter Two, Cole explores boundary definitions in nontidal
waters by exploring techniques for locating nontidal boundaries. The
chapter explains some methods for determining nontidal boundaries,
including examination of changes in soil composition, examination of
geomorphological features, and review of botanical and hydrological
evidence. Chapter Two also concludes with case studies illustrating
the techniques discussed.
Next, Cole addresses riparian rights associated with upland
boundaries in Chapter Three. This chapter highlights the general
guidelines for determining the boundaries of exclusive riparian rights
associated with upland tracts. It begins with a discussion of division
lines for rights within adjacent waters, focusing on rivers, lakes and
generally applicable rules. The chapter concludes by discussing upland owners' rights to newly formed land.
Chapter Four explores historic boundary locations. Cole notes
that some situations necessitate examining historic shoreline positions.
He begins with a discussion on shoreline changes and moves into
techniques used to locate historic shorelines. Cole also provides some
detailed sources of information for locating historic shorelines, including shoreline topographic maps, other coastal survey products, Bureau
of Land Management surveys, and aerial photography, among other
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sources. Cole concludes by discussing interpretation of historic shoreline maps and surveys.
Chapter Five discusses the use of government land office meander
lines as boundaries. This chapter explores the decision to meander or
not, providing pertinent instructions and the legal significance of meandering. It also explores the location of meander lines.
Chapter Six outlines the general criteria for determining sovereign
waters. It discusses water bodies that are navigable-in-law versus navigable-in-fact. This chapter also explores nonnavigable coves, tributaries, and floodplains adjoining navigable waters.
Cole discusses boundaries between water bodies in Chapter Seven.
He notes that the question of where one water body ends and another
begins is often a difficult and intensely contested issue. This chapter
begins by focusing on boundaries between adjacent navigable water
bodies. It details the definition of bays, entrance points and obstructed entrances. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the
limits of tidal influence in defining boundaries between water bodies.
Cole reviews the background and history of state and federal water
boundaries in Chapter Eight. This chapter also explores boundary
definitions and techniques for locating state and federal water
boundaries.
Chapter Nine explores lateral water boundaries of states, commencing with a discussion of the various types of lateral boundaries.
Cole follows this discussion with an examination of the construction of
equidistant and median lines. He also examines the proportionality
test as a method often used to evaluate lateral and other common
boundaries. The chapter concludes with a case study illustrating the
principles and problems of evaluating lateral water boundaries.
Chapter Ten explores national water boundaries, beginning with
an historic overview. The chapter then reviews baselines for national
boundaries, providing a brief look at the rigid guidelines for baselines
for various coastal configurations developed by the United Nations
Law of the Sea Conferences. The chapter concludes by exploring
techniques for locating national boundaries.
Finally, Chapter Eleven discusses boundaries in nonsovereign waters. This chapter explores water bodies whose submerged lands are
privately owned and frequently used as boundaries because they offer
a relatively permanent and easily recognized monument. This chapter
focuses on boundaries in streams and lakes and concludes with a discussion on changes in nonsovereign water boundaries.
Water Boundaries is a valuable tool for anyone involved in water
boundary issues. It provides a basic understanding of the legal and
technical aspects of this specialized area.
Anna Litaker
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HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, WATER IN THE WEST, High Country News,
Paonia, Colorado (1998); 393pp; $30.00; ISBN 0-9963184-0-4.
This book covers nearly all conceivable aspects of the historical
and contemporary issues dealing with one of the West's most precious
resources-water. Although not geared towards the legal practitioner,
Water in the West is a must have in any water law practitioner's library.
The book sets out the history, present circumstances, and future of water in the West. High Country News, a monthly newspaper dedicated to
covering Western environmental issues, has compiled its coverage of
Western water "hot topics," including dams, federal water projects,
recreation, and Native American water issues, into one of the most
thorough volumes on Western water. The earliest article is from the
early 1980's, but the purview of the book ranges from time immemorial to the future.
Chapter One, History and Background, establishes the background from which Western water issues flow. It reviews prior appropriation, Western settlement, water politics, major river basins, and the
main players involved in Western water issues.
The controversy in the Pacific Northwest over anadromous fish
runs should be familiar to all water practitioners. Chapter Two, Hydroelectric Dams and the Salmon Crisis, chronicles the struggle between hydroelectric power and the decline of native anadromous fish
runs in the Pacific Northwest. The chapter also examines the Endangered Species Act and salmon, recent court cases, and the change in
the paradigmatic view of ecosystem viability.
Chapter Three continues the dam theme. The Taming of Glen
Canyon Dam covers the history of the Dam's construction, the Dam's
engineering and design, damage to the Dam's spillway, and the environmental movement to tear the Dam down. The articles in this chapter also discuss the major players in the Glen Canyon Dam project, including tribes, the federal government, local environmental groups,
and the courts.
Chapter Four covers three federal water projects-the Central
Arizona Project ("CAP"), the Central Utah Project ("CUP"), and Animas-La Plata ("A-LP"). The articles in this chapter inform the reader
about the history of these projects, the engineering behind these projects, and the problems surrounding each of the projects. CAP cost $4
million to build, one of the biggest and most expensive water projects
in the nation's history. The project "provides water, but few can afford
to buy it." Water from CAP costs more than groundwater; thus, the
project, in 1991, used less than one-third of the water it could have
sent through its system. CUP cost over $1 billion in federal and local
money. A-LP is reviewed in the last portion of this chapter.
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Chapter Five examines two urban water projects-Denver's
Two Forks Dam and the City of Las Vegas. The articles on the Two
Forks Dam cover the history, opposition, and eventual death of the
project. The articles on water for Las Vegas detail the area's growth
and water needs, and suggested solutions for watering one of the largest and most arid cities in the country.
Chapter Six addresses one of the West's most contentious legal
and political water topics-Native American water rights. The chapter
details the history of tribal water rights, beginning with the Winters
Doctrine. It addresses the federal government's role in tribal water issues and the tribes' constantly dashed hopes that their rights will be
quantified fairly.
Recreation has also become a hot topic in Western water.
Chapter Seven focuses on topics ranging from golf courses and skiing
to fishing and boating. Although some would think that all recreationists have similar water use goals, this is often not the case. For example, when boaters want high flows, native brown trout need low flows.
This conflict exemplifies the often intractable disputes over Western
water.
Chapter Eight addresses water quality issues. The articles cover
pollution sources including irrigation, mining, ranching, and the petroleum industry. The chapter also reviews salinity of the Colorado
River and efforts to clean up polluted rivers.
Chapter Nine covers jurisdictional disputes. The chapter is divided into three sections: instream flows and wilderness water rights,
interstate competition for water, and rural water. The section on instream flows and wilderness addresses the conflict between water rights
and water for wilderness. The interstate competition section addresses
conflicts over the Arkansas, Missouri, and Colorado river basins. River
compacts are common in the West, but are often sources of major disputes. The rural water section examines two case studies. Water battles in the West tend to focus on water for municipalities; left in the
dust, often literally, are rural areas.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regulates dam relicensing. The articles in Chapter Ten explain FERC's
structure-an independent agency chaired by five commissionersand itsjurisdiction over natural gas, electric utilities, oil pipeline industries, and hydropower. Dam relicensing is a hot topic in Western water
and its implications are far reaching. Dam decommissioning may herald an implicit admission by the federal government that dams have a
deleterious effect on riverine ecosystems. Damming issues involve
every player in Western water-municipalities; federal, state and local
governments; tribes; and environmental groups, to name cnly a few.
This chapter surveys the history, present, and future of dams in the
West.
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Chapter Eleven addresses water allocation and management.
It examines the possibility of water marketing, the role of the Endangered Species Act in water management, dam deconstruction, and innovations intended to stretch the West's most precious resource to its
maximum viable capacity, among other topics.
This book is a great introduction to water issues for those unfamiliar with them, and is also perfect for those intimate with them. It
identifies the major players, issues, problems, solutions, and histories,
leaving no stone unturned.
Amy Beatie

JON KUSLER AND TERESA OPHEIM, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND
HERITAGE, A PROTECTION GUIDE, 2ND ED., Environmental Law In-

stitute, Washington, D.C. (1996); 147pp; $29.95; ISBN 0-911937-65X, softcover.
Our National Wetland Heritage, A Protection Guide is a comprehensive
book for anyone interested in wetland protection and restoration
through local government or citizen action. The authors address issues surrounding wetland protection and utilization, and creation of
effective regulatory programs.
Chapter One provides information about the nation's wetland
heritage and why we should strive to protect wetlands. A detailed timeline delineates important developments in wetland protection law.
This chapter also provides a detailed history of wetland protection,
and an explanation of the scientific functions and value of wetlands to
the environment, such as flood conveyance and water purification.
Chapter Two explains general scientific principles concerning wetlands, including highlighting their critical characteristics. This chapter also discusses differing types of wetlands and provides an explanation of the three main definitions of "wetland" used nationally. Several
diagrams explain wetland hydrology and health under different conditions.
Chapter Three discusses what citizens can do to protect wetlands.
Citizens can utilize several strategies to protect wetlands, including
forming citizen action groups and creating land trusts. Special sections provide information about what to do when a dispute arises and
how landowners can maximize the wetlands on their private property.
Chapter Four deals with potential local government action for wetland protection. It explains regulatory and non-regulatory approaches
available to local officials, and their advantages and limitations. Some
ideas discussed include public education, land use regulations, and
real estate tax incentives.
Chapter Five presents some of the main issues concerning wetland
protection. Difficult issues include how to define the term "wetland"
and how to delineate wetlands in the field. A chart provides informa-
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tion about sources that can be used to aid in wetland delineation. This
chapter also discusses ways to avoid legal problems, including communicating with landowners and providing technical assistance to landowners.
Chapter Six discusses basic standards used at the federal and state
level for wetlands protection programs, and details performance standards, their application, common related activities and processes requiring control, and the impact of uncontrolled uses. This chapter
ends with a discussion of ways to reduce impacts of specific land uses.
Chapter Seven provides an in depth analysis of how to evaluate
wetland permits. It outlines six main issues that must be addressed in
such evaluations: (1) how wetland impacts will be determined; (2) how
the necessary data will be obtained; (3) how the regulatory standards
will be applied; (4) whether there are any conditions attached to the
permit; (5) how to assure the success of restoration programs; and (6)
the necessary monitoring and enforcement procedures.
Chapter Eight discusses a variety of federal programs that address
wetlands. The chapter explains the federal government's progressive
changes in its policy toward more stringent wedand protection. This
chapter explains Clean Water Act section 404 and the process the government must follow under section 404. The chapter also explains the
opportunities available for citizen participation in federal programs.
Chapter Nine provides a similar overview of various state wedand protection programs. It explains the regulatory and non-regulatory approaches taken by some states as well as how states may implement
statutes.
Chapter Ten provides more detail about using local regulations to
protect wetlands. It explains ordinance types and implementation of
local regulations. The chapter provides some examples of zoning and
by-law provisions. A chart shows the steps involved in creating local
regulations.
Chapter Eleven suggests several non-regulatory approaches to enhance wetland protection. One of the most important non-regulatory
actions endorsed by the authors is public education; people need to
understand wetlands and their role in the environment. This may motivate more people to protect wetlands. Other non-regulatory approaches suggested include coordination of tax and assessment policies or private acquisition of wetlands through a variety of techniques.
Several appendices in the back of the book provide detailed information about who to contact, sources, and drafts of legal documents and
regulations.
Overall, Our National Wetland Protection Heritage, A Protection Guide,
gives excellent background and legal and scientific information about
wetlands. It also provides many useful ideas for actions by various parties concerned with wetland protection and conservation.
Shana Smilovits
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RANDALL BAKER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT

(1997); 269pp; $65.00; ISBN 0-275-95262-2, hardcover.
Environmental Law and Policy in the European Union and the United
States is a thorough comparative analysis of environmental law in the
European Union and the United States. Chapter One describes the
book's rationale: to fill a "gap in literature comparing the two most
economically developed areas on earth and how they go about tackling
the wide range of environmental consequences of their rapid development."
Chapters Two and Three analyze the two systems of decision making in the European Union and United States. Chapter Two discusses
the European Union's purpose of integrating European communities
through the Maastrich Treaty while preserving some autonomy for the
individual countries. The author analogizes the European Union system to the United States Constitution and the autonomy of individual
states, concluding that the United States (with federalism) and the
European Union (with integration) will face similar problems in environmental decision making. Chapter Three discusses the history and
purpose behind the European Union.
Chapters Four, Five, and Six describe the role of international law
in both the European Union and the United States. Chapter Four examines international environmental law and concludes that it may become influential in the world arena. Chapter Five compares the assumed international environmental obligations of the United States
and the Netherlands. It concludes that the United States frequently
fails to meet its international obligations, unlike the Netherlands,
which has a strong record of compliance. Chapter Six discusses the
need for transparency in decision-making when enacting European
Union Directives and the individual's ability to bring a citizen suit in
the European Union. The chapter concludes that more transparency
in the decision-making process is necessary and that the individual's
ability to bring a suit should be increased.
Chapters Seven and Eight discuss environmental management and
policy. Chapter Seven gives a history and overview of the policy and
management of environmental issues in the European Union and describes the various environmental action programs promulgated by
European Union governing bodies. Chapter Eight analyzes the United
States counterpart and details the history of environmental law development in the United States.
Chapters Nine and Ten describe air quality management. Chapter
Nine discusses the problem of air pollution in the European Union
and, specifically, acid rain. Chapter Ten analyzes the Unites States' solution to air pollution and gives an overview of the Clean Air Act. The
United States and European Union systems are similar. They both establish that air pollution must be addressed, and both set limits for
specific pollutants.
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Chapters Eleven through Sixteen address water quality management. Chapter Eleven discusses the European approach to water pollution. The European Union has issued numerous directives regarding water pollution control. These directives address drinking water,
bathing water, fish, shellfish, and fresh water. Chapter Twelve describes water pollution control in the United States, giving an overview
of the Clean Water Act. Chapter Thirteen analyzes the differences between Indiana and Maryland in their approaches to construction site
erosion and sediment control by reviewing historical settlement of the
two states. Chapter Fourteen describes various mechanisms for water
management in the Netherlands and implementation of those mechanisms. Chapter Fifteen analyzes the issues that arise when attempting
to solve water pollution problems in the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes
issues are compounded because both Canada and the United States
contribute to the pollution and must work together to alleviate it. The
chapter suggests various ways these problems could be solved, such as
national and international coordination or creation of an autonomous
Great Lakes Authority. Chapter Sixteen addresses Rhine River Basin
management in the European Union and analogizes the basin to the
Great Lakes. The Rhine River is the most important waterway in Western Europe and traverses numerous countries that are European Union members.
Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen address waste management.
Chapter Seventeen discusses the European approach to waste management and the European Union directives that address waste management. It describes the issue of waste as a commodity and its unrestricted movement across the borders of member countries. Chapter
Eighteen describes the United States' approach to hazardous waste
management. It gives an overview of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. Both countries agree on the concept of free waste
movement. They also agree that there is a rapidly growing need for
hazardous waste management.
ChristineWise-Ludban

GOVERNMENT REPORTS
TODD OLINGER, INDIAN WATER LAw-1997 TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS
IN FEDERAL WATER POLICY; A SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW
ADviSORY COMMISSION, THE COMMISSION, Springfield, VA (1997);
National Technical Information Service; 109pp; Govt. Doc # Y 3.W
52/2:2 IN, softcover.
The Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 created the Western
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission ("Commission") to conduct
a comprehensive review of federal activities in nineteen Western states
concerning the synchronization of federal and local water policy
In this legislation, Congress noted that the federal
objectives.
government recognizes its "trust responsibilities to protect Indian
water rights and to assist tribes in the wise use of water resources." The
Commission held meetings to categorize tendencies in the federal
government's method of protecting tribal water resources and to
propose recommendations for improvements in federal policies. This
report summarizes the Commission's meeting in Phoenix, Arizona on
March 17-18, 1997. Olinger divided this summary into five sectionsfour specific sessions and the letters of testimony from tribes.
The first session, entitled 'Western Water Trends and Directions,"
provided general accounts from scholars, water law practitioners, and
tribal members of the history and future of tribal water resources.
Professor David H. Getches emphasized the importance of tribal
participation in the Western water policy revolution for tribal survival,
and the need for tribes to also lead the change in Western water policy
trends. Attorney Susan M. Williams focused her discussion on general
stream adjudications and whether they adequately resolve Indian water
right quantifications. Tribes hold vast water rights, but many are not
quantified. Tribes face the difficult task of balancing the advantages
and disadvantages of quantification; often when they decide to
quantify their rights, the process fails. Chelsea Congdon, a Water
Resource Analyst at the Environmental Defense Fund, discussed the
effects of environmental water issues on tribal water management. She
focused on the importance of cooperation between conservationists
and tribes-they face similar challenges and share a lack of political
power. Other issues explored in this session included the necessity for
stronger leadership focused on Indian water rights, the sacredness of
water to many Indian peoples, and the failure to apply Western water
law to Indian water rights.
Governance and the
Session II focused on 'Watershed
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Management of Indian Water Resources." In this section, Olinger
printed a summary of each speaker's remarks and recommendations.
The speakers, with perspectives from different tribes and reservations,
expressed similar concerns. Each highlighted the necessity for the
federal government to actualize its federal trust obligations by
providing adequate funding and legal support. The speakers also
expressed problems with the multiplicity and overlap of water
resources management responsibilities among federal, state, local, and
tribal authorities. Specific tribal worries included the flooding of
350,000 acres of tribal land by federal dams on the Missouri River
without tribal compensation, and the settlement agreement between
Colorado and the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation that has never been
fulfilled.
The third session, "The Water Settlement Process and Resolution
of West-Wide Water Issues," presented the perspectives of various
parties involved in Indian water law. The book included summaries of
remarks made by practitioners, members of Congress, members of the
Clinton administration, and members of the Indian communities.
Practitioners urged tribes to have a clear vision of their goals before
entering the settlement process and to use non-financial forms of
leverage and power to their advantage. A minority professional staff
member of the Indian Affairs Committee recognized that the federal
government's refusal to provide funding for settlements encouraged
water rights litigation. The representative from the Department of the
Interior stressed the Clinton Administration's commitment to working
with tribes to resolve settlement issues. Tribal representatives focused
on the necessity of federal commitment and support in settlement
negotiations, emphasizing that barriers to the process, such as time
and cost, tend to make it unsuccessful.
Session IV, "Enhancing the Role of Tribal Leadership and
Participation in Shaping Federal Water Policy-Outlining a Water
Resources Action Agenda for Indian Country," discussed ways to repair
current problems with the settlement process. This section declared
that despite settlement process flaws, settlements remain the best
solution for tribal water rights quantification.
The Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs discussed its budgetary
constraints and the need for tribes to recognize that a ranking process
prioritizes fund requests.
The last section of Olinger's summary included testimonial letters
from various tribes to the Commission. These letters expressed
feelings of exclusion from the public participation process, and doubt
that the federal government and the Bureau of Indian Affairs will
follow their trust obligations. These letters demonstrated the federal
government's preferential treatment of hydroelectric interests and
subsequent exploitation of tribes by the government's failure to
consult or, if proper, compensate affected tribes. The letters also
addressed the tribes' inability to market their water, the lack of federal
funding to conduct major repairs and upgrades on tribal irrigation
systems, and the ensuing tribal crop losses.
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Olinger concluded his report with comments made by Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt on the last day of the Commission's
meeting. As he began, Babbitt promised "to see if [he] can point
towards some directions that can take us out of this season of obvious
discontent, or frustrated expectations and, indeed, of uncertainty
about where we go in the future." First, he discussed some history of
Indian water settlements. He correlated this history to the current lack
of tribal leverage in the settlement process. He also focused on
monetary concerns (addressed on multiple occasions at the meeting)
concluding that "we are all locked into a budget-reduction dance" and
little can be done aside from seeking alternative funding sources.
Lastly, he advised the Commission to use "imagination" in its final
report because the Commission has the potential for great impact.
Melinda B. Barton

D. CRAIG BELL, WATER IN THE WEST TODAY: A STATES' PERSPECTIVE:
REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY
COMMISSION, Western States Water Council, National Technical

Information Service, Springfield, VA (1997); 58pp; Shipping List
Number 97-0359-P, softcover.
Water in the West Today is a general description of the Western
states' approach to water issues. Author D. Craig Bell, Executive
Director of the Western States Water Council ("WSWC"), makes clear
from the beginning that the book is an illustrative examination of
Western water. WSWC posed five questions, at the request of the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, to individual
Western states via questionnaire and telephone interviews. The five
questions were asked in order to identify states' water concerns and
programs adopted to address those concerns in the past decade. Water
in the West Today is a culmination of the states' responses to those
questions.
The report begins with an introduction to Western water
Bell describes federal, state, and tribal roles in
management.
protecting water resources. The book also discusses the administrative
process by which water is allocated among the states. Bell describes
the past few decades as an "era of change," exemplified by the rise of
public interest in water resources and the desire to preserve instream
flows.
The first question asked the states to identify and describe current
and anticipated significant water problems, and received the most
uniform responses. As the most urbanized region in the country, the
West faces serious problems with adequate water supply and
distribution. Practically all of the states noted "growing and changing
water supply demands for both offstream and instream needs." Areas
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of concern also included poor distribution of supplies and difficulties
providing rural and tribal communities with adequate resources.
States also said that with the rise of environmental regulations and
mandates at all levels of government, they struggle to balance these
governmental initiatives with their own demands for water.
Additionally, certain regions reported flood and drought planning as a
primary concern. Finally, federal involvement in water management
was observed as either "inadequate or inappropriate."
The WSWC intended the second question to help identify
problems facing rural communities in relation to water supply, potable
water treatment, and wastewater treatment. The question also sought
responses about state programs providing assistance to these
communities.
The states' responses to this question were fairly
uniform as well.
Inadequate water supply for rural communities
ranked highest on the list. Additionally, the Clean Water Act and the
Safe Drinking Water Act create financial burdens on rural
communities often lacking funds necessary to meet the federal
standards. Furthermore, states cited inadequate training of water and
wastewater treatment facility operators as a major problem.
In
response to some of these problems, several states sell general
obligation bonds and grants which provide funding for insufficient
supplies. Technical assistance programs are also common.
The third question requested descriptions of state water needs,
opportunities to augment existing supplies, and conservation. The
states' responses varied due to differences in population growth
development patterns. The majority of the states listed conservation as
the primary method to augment existing supplies. Another method
involved construction of surface reservoirs or new distribution facilities
for existing sources. Several states cited development of groundwater
supplies, management of groundwater recharge projects, reoperation
and modification of existing storage facilities, and reallocation of water
supplies as potential augmentation methods. Some states mentioned
weather modification, recognizing that such a measure has not yet
proven effective.
The fourth question asked about regional, state, and local
innovations in water management, water use, water law, and other
water-related areas. Many states commented on programs that fund
water development.
States also frequently mentioned water
conservation as a method to "stretch" existing supplies and cited
examples of conservation techniques, including water recycling,
desalinization, reallocation of existing sources, conjunctive use, and
changes in water rights permitting laws. Additionally, many states
mentioned innovations used to meet environmental needs.
For
example, to increase instream flows, many states changed their laws
and institutions.
Furthermore, several states listed water quality
protection and management of existing supplies as primary concerns.
To more efficiently manage existing supplies, some states suggested
better groundwater management plans, flood and drought planning,
water conservation plans, and improvements in obtaining reliable
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water availability data. Finally, meeting institutional challenges, such
as local watershed coordination initiatives, generated a wide variety of
state responses. Plans directed at solving these problems included
basin water resource management, watershed planning efforts,
regional water plans, advisory committees, and water rights
settlements.
The fifth question asked the states to discuss the effect of federal
water-related programs on each state and to explain their facilitation
of these programs. In general, federal and state government initiatives
cooperate regarding water use. Several states noted positive impacts of
the federal programs, from meeting water resource needs of rural
communities, to the success of the endangered fishery recovery
program. Federal programs also provide economic and recreational
benefits. However, states noted areas in need of improvement. One
was federal funding. States have doubled their spending in order to
implement federal regulations while the federal fiscal role has
diminished. States seek greater flexibility in implementing federal
programs and need more federal government cooperation.
Water in the West Today provides a comprehensive overview of
Western water concerns. For a topic that is both broad and daunting,
Water in the West Today offers a simple and clear look.
Karina Serkin

WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, REPORT TO
THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION,

Springfield, VA (1998); National Technical Information Service;
387 pp.; Doc # PB 99100026, softcover.
This report was published as part of the Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission's ("Commission") efforts to review and
report present and future water resource problems and to determine
methods to meet future water demands. The Commission also set out
to address water allocation, water quality, water planning, and flood
control issues.
In Chapter One, the Commission studied current trends and the
status of water resources today, including an evaluation of climate,
riverflows, precipitation, availability of groundwater, and storage
methods in the West. It also gathered information on the federal
government's contribution to irrigation and hydroelectric power and
the benefits of those contributions. Additionally, the study examined
current consequences of water development, including loss of
wetlands and riparian zones, disruption of fish migration, and loss of
native fish species.
Chapter Two addressed research regarding current demographics
in Western cities. This research included a commentary on the
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resulting pressure put on water resources as the population grows.
The commentary addressed changes in the Western economy and how
those changes affected water use. The study noted that farming and
natural resource industries have become less prevalent, while service
The Commission also compared
industries are on the rise.
agricultural and urban water use, including the costs involved in each
type of use.
Chapter Three analyzed the future of water development, with an
investigation and analysis based on the changing political landscape.
The study noted that the decentralization of federal agencies has
resulted in their lack of authority to implement comprehensive
development programs. Agencies are reluctant to compromise with
each other to develop one cohesive plan. In addition, many agencies
possess modest budgets and have little support, making it difficult to
meet new challenges.
The Commission addressed future challenges of water
management in Chapter Four. The study posited that sustainable
development is the best option, but to accomplish this many factors
must be considered. Some of these factors include establishing new
hydrologic baselines for basins and watersheds, heightening the role of
tribal water rights, and incorporating flood control and groundwater
management. Sustainable water management also requires policies
that include local, state, and federal government as well as other
The Commission
stakeholders in the decision making process.
suggested forming partnerships to accomplish the task.
The study also addressed the need for recognition of
nonconsumptive uses in order to protect landscapes and support
wildlife. Additionally, the study suggested that a groundwater use
regime, similar to surface water regulation, should be developed since
many states allow groundwater to be depleted faster than the recharge
rate.
In Chapter Five, the Commission stated that the diminishing water
supply necessitates augmentation by desalinization, water treatment,
importation, and conservation. Those who put water to a sustainable
use ought to be rewarded, and an effort should be made to eliminate
unsustainable uses. Water marketing should be increased and users
should be encouraged to invest in water conservation. Water banking
would also reduce wasteful use of excess water. Risk-based strategies
must be developed for periods of drought as well. Protection of the
environment and efforts to restore aquatic ecosystems and water
quality are also key issues. Preservation of agricultural communities is
also important, since many new economic and demographic changes
are putting demands on resources that were previously available for
agriculture.
The Commission also investigated the history of federal water
programs and how those programs originally developed. In the past,
the federal government supported hydroelectric power and irrigation
for settlers and Indian tribes. The federal government is currently
involved in many conservation and environmental regulation
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programs, including attempts to protect forests and manage
watersheds. The study reviews the roles of the Bureau of Land
Management and the Forest Service, as well as various independent
water resource commissions. Those commissions reported that the
federal government must promote more efficient water use and must
coordinate its various agencies to cooperate in developing new forms
of water resources development.
Next, the study reviewed private, tribal, federal, state, local, and
special interest agencies' abilities to sustain water management in the
West. Findings concluded that states are playing a larger role in water
development, focusing on increasing efficiency, although groundwater
management still lags behind. States also consider water quality,
public health, and environmental concerns when issuing water rights
by attempting to restore environmental quality to rivers, wetlands, and
riparian ecosystems.
Federal water issues primarily pertain to environmental protection
and assistance to tribes in defining their water rights; however, the
Bureau of Reclamation still grapples with construction projects and
maintenance. Currently, the Army Corps of Engineers addresses flood
plain management, in addition to reviving native aquatic species,
restoring wetlands, promoting flow augmentation, and protecting
endangered species. Historic water development projects have been
overtaken by concerns of balancing water development with
enforcement of numerous environmental statutes.
Lastly, the Commission made recommendations for the future,
although there is no simple solution. Endeavors should be made to
seek solutions that distribute burdens and minimize social disruption.
Such solutions ought to ensure sustainable uses, maintain national
goals, provide incentives to achieve those goals, respect existing rights,
and encourage innovation and participatory decision making. The
study emphasized the need to integrate management between
agencies and jurisdictions in order to improve decision making, clarify
goals, and increase efficiency. Restoration of resources, ecosystems,
and water quality should be a priority. Land and water management
should also be integrated, as there is a growing understanding that use
of one resource affects the other. Water facilities require improved
management as demands increase. There is also a need to augment
current resources through reuse and recycling, as well as through
groundwater and drought management.
Conservation is a key
component, and flood management should be promoted.
The report is a valuable overview of the status of the West's water
and the pressures that necessitate change in management processes.
The Commission's suggestions should be actively pursued if the West
hopes to maintain its current water resources.
StephaniePickens

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

GENE I. REETz, PH.D., WATER QUALITY IN THE WEST: REPORT TO THE
WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, National

Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA (1998); 183pp;
softcover.
Water Quality in the West highlights water quality issues with a focus
on federal programs. While compiled for the Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), this book will be useful for anyone looking for a big-picture
overview of water problems unique to Western states.
The first few chapters cover the quality of ground, surface,
drinking, and tribal waters in the West. Each chapter summarizes the
relevant issue, cites major sources of contamination, and gives
recommendations. For example, the use of agricultural pesticides is a
major threat to drinking water quality-nitrates are the most common
public and domestic well contaminates.
Those involved in Indian and tribal water issues should find the
tribal water section interesting. Since Western reservations account for
nearly eighty percent of all tribal lands within the continental United
States and also for a large portion of the West itself, tribal water issues
play a dominant role in the Western water quality picture. EPA's
Indian Policy guides its work with tribal environmental organizations
to overcome problems of water quality due to population increases,
land use on and off reservations, and large demands on water
resources.
The Sixth Chapter focuses on several different agencies' federal
water quality programs. The chapter divides these programs into
several categories: education/public involvement, research, planning,
incentives, disincentives, prohibitions, and permitting.
The
disincentives section outlines agencies' arrangement and promotion of
clean up efforts for contaminated sites. For example, the Department
of Energy developed a clean up program for the Rocky Flats facility
located between Boulder and Golden, Colorado. Some agencies, like
the EPA and the Department of Agriculture, participate in most of
these areas. Especially noteworthy is the Department of Defense's role
in planning, disincentives, and permitting. One of their larger roles,
through the Army Corps of Engineers, is permitting for dredge and fill
material discharged into national waters. This permitting authority
comes from the Clean Water Act. The seventh chapter follows with
descriptions of federal agency relationships to state water quality
programs throughout the West. Highlighted programs include the
nitrate reduction initiative in the Central Platte Valley of Nebraska and
the Chino Winds Demonstration Project on the problems of grazing in
Arizona.
The Eighth and largest chapter of the report looks at major water
quality issues separately, with each section again providing
recommendations and comments on existing regulations successes
and failures.
Water quality issues explored include: irrigated
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agriculture, livestock production, mining, hydromodification and
instream flow, pesticides, forestry, and urban growth. The Colorado
River salinity problem is briefly mentioned, as is municipal discharge.
This chapter also looks at the effect of Total Maximum Daily Loads
("TMDL") requirements of the Clean Water Act on water quality
decisions. A section on water quality monitoring examines surface and
ground water monitoring, and discusses the role of the
Intergovernmental Task Force on Monitoring Water Quality, and the
National Environmental Monitoring Initiative.
The final chapter discusses innovations in water quality
management. The watershed approach and the Wellhead Protection
Program receive the most extensive coverage.
The watershed
approach attempts to achieve environmental improvements by joining
public and private sectors to prevent point source discharges into
water ways. This approach is recommended by the University of
Colorado's Natural Resources Law Center because of its ability to work
extra-jurisdictionally to address entire watersheds and all interested
parties. The Safe Drinking Water Act created the Wellhead Protection
Program, whereby each state submits to the EPA a wellhead protection
plan outlining ways in which a state will identify sources of ground
water contamination and implement a management plan for the area.
An important part of the Wellhead Protection Program focuses on
ground water and surface water interaction, and the spread of
pollutants from one to the other in the "hyphoreic zone." This book
explains the EPA's national and international efforts to fund, research
and create possible management plans for this problem.
The report's references, an extensive bibliography and four
appendices, provide starting points for anyone delving into these water
quality issues. Appendix A lists all Western state nonpoint source
programs. Appendix B provides an outline of the National WaterQuality Assessment Program, also available online. This program is
not only an outline but also a detailed bibliography of information on
Western water quality reports, articles, abstracts, and papers.
Appendix C lists a summary of state ground water information for the
Western region. Finally, Appendix D is a group of detailed maps of
water quality concerns resulting from Western mining. In summation,
this book provides the reader with thorough information on Western
water quality issues and programs, while simultaneously providing
encyclopedic references.
Jennifer Lee

COURT REPORTS

FEDERAL COURTS
Montana v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 137 F.3d 1135 (9h
Cir. 1997) (holding Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
regulations granting treatment-as-state ("TAS") authority to the Tribe
valid and reflected appropriate delineation and application of
inherent Tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting nonmembers, and irrigation districts and irrigators who did not possess a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
had no significantly protectable interest allowing them to intervene).
The State of Montana challenged a grant by the EPA of TAS status
to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), which allowed Tribes to establish water quality
standards ('VQS") for water located within the boundaries of the
Flathead Indian Reservation. The Tribes applied for TAS status with
respect to all surface waters within the reservation. A large lake
located within the boundaries of the reservation provided water for
domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes. The lands within the
boundaries were controlled by Tribal and non-tribal entities. The
Tribes identified several facilities on fee lands within the reservation
that could potentially impair water quality and beneficial uses of tribal
waters. These facilities included feedlots, mine tailings, dumps, and
landfills. The State alleged the regulations established by the EPA
which allowed the Tribes to exercise authority over non-members was
broader than the inherent tribal powers recognized as necessary to self
governance. The Flathead Joint Board of Control, two irrigation
districts, and four individual irrigators who owned land situated within
the boundaries of the Reservation in fee moved to intervene. The
district court denied the intervention and entered summary judgment
for the EPA and the Tribes. Montana appealed.
The EPA may treat Tribes as states for the purposes of
promulgating water quality standards under CWA § 518(e). The EPA
guidelines set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 require that (1) the Tribe be
federally recognized and exercise governmental authority; (2) the
Tribe have a governing body carrying out "substantial governmental
duties and powers"; (3) the water quality standards program which the
Tribe seeks to administer "pertain to the management and protection
of water resources ... [located] ... within the borders of an Indian
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reservation;" and (4) the Tribe reasonably expects to be capable of
carrying out the functions of an effective water quality program in a
manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the Clean Water Act
and regulations. The dispute in this case pertained to the intent of the
third requirement.
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Tribe
has "inherent power" to regulate the activities of non-members if the
regulated activities affect the "political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the Tribe." These potential impacts must
be serious and substantial. Generally, however, a Tribe lacks authority
over non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation. Montana
argued that the scope of inherent tribal authority was a question of law
for which EPA receives no deference. It further alleged that the EPA
committed a mistake of law in the delineation of the scope of inherent
tribal authority based on the Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.

Although the court agreed that the EPA receives no deference in
delineation of the scope of tribal inherent authority, it did not agree
that the EPA committed any material mistakes of law in this
delineation. The EPA acted carefully in establishing its regulations. In
applying the standards of both Montana and Brendale to this case, the
EPA found that the non-member activities posed a serious and
substantial threat to Tribal health and welfare and that Tribal
regulation was essential. The court agreed and recognized that threats
to water may invoke inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.
Additionally, the court rejected the motion to intervene. It held
that since the Intervenors held a NPDES permit, the transfer of the
right to establish WQS from the state to the Tribes will have no
immediate or any foreseeable, demonstrable effect. Thus, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Tribes.

Kimberley Crawford

Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, No. 93-654L, 1998 WL
784551 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 19, 1998) (holding no Fifth Amendment taking
of submerged land when: 1) the submerged land is subject to a United
States navigational servitude; 2) the majority of original parcel, of
which the submerged land was a part, sold for a substantial gain; and
3) the remaining non-submerged land was not restricted from all use).
In 1956, the predecessors to Palm Beach Isles Associates ("PBIA")
purchased a 311.7 acre parcel in Riviera Beach, Florida, for $380,190
that included submerged lands in Lake Worth. In 1967, PBIA applied
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for and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") granted
a permit to dredge and fill the property located within Lake Worth.
However, PBIA did not undertake work pursuant to the permit. In
1968, PBIA sold 261 acres of the 311.7 acre parcel for approximately
$1,000,000 and retained 50.7 acres, of which 49.3 acres were
submerged lands below the mean high water mark, and 1.4 acres were
adjoining shoreline.
In 1988, PBIA filed an application with the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation ("DER") to dredge and fill the 50.7 acres of
lake-bottom and adjoining shoreline in order to develop single family
homes.
In denying PBIA's application, DER found the proposed
development would eliminate wetlands, disrupt marine life, adversely
affect water quality and navigation of the waterway, and set a
precedent for similar development. Lake Worth is part of the Atlantic
Intracoastal Waterway, which is a federal navigational channel that
subjects submerged lands below the mean high water mark to a
The proposed
navigational servitude of the United States.
development was also contrary to public interest pursuant to Section
403.918(2) of the Florida Statutes. However, the DER, in the denial
notice, stated that a design incorporating features resulting in minimal
environmental impact such as docks and boardwalks could be
pursued.
In 1989, PBIA filed a permit application with the Corps pursuant
to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401467 (1988) and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1988), twenty-two years after PBIA's first permit application had
been approved. The Corps denied this application, stating that
issuance would be contrary to 404(b) (1) guidelines and public
interest, but stipulated that all viable development options of the 50.7
acre parcel had not been explored.
PBIA filed this suit for damages alleging that the Corps' denial of
PBIA's application for a permit to dredge and fill the 50.7 acre parcel
constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Both sides filed cross-motions
for summary judgment.
The court held that the United States was not obligated to
compensate PBIA for the alleged taking of the submerged 49.3 acres
because it was subject to a navigational servitude. The navigable waters
of the United States are public property and under the exclusive
control of the federal government under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. In addition, the court held PBIA's claim of
a per se taking of the remaining 1.4 acres of adjoining shoreline invalid
because the entire parcel of either 311.7 acres or 50.7 acres must be
considered for the purposes of assessing the critical property at issue.
Here, PBIA made a substantial financial gain when it sold the 261
acres in 1968 and had not been denied all beneficial use of the
remaining 1.4 acres by application denial of either the DER or the
Corps. PBIA still had the right to apply for a permit from the Corps
and a zoning variance from the state and local authorities that would
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allow water dependent uses of the parcel. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States.
ElaineSoltis

United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the
defendant criminally liable for violating and conspiring to violate the
Clean Water Act and other state and local laws by dumping industrial
waste from his business into storm and sewer drains).
In September 1997, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas
Iverson for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Washington
Administrative Code ('"AC"), and the City of Olympia's Municipal
Code. The prosecution charged Iverson with both violating and
conspiring to violate these laws between 1992 and 1995.
The
indictments arose out of illegal disposal of industrial waste from
Iverson's business, CH20,Inc. ("CH20").
Iverson was the company's founder and served as the president and
chairman of the board. The company blended chemicals to create
numerous products, including acid cleaners and heavy-duty alkaline
compounds. The company shipped the blended chemicals to its
customers in drums, and asked the customers to return the drums
when finished. When the drums were returned, they were often not
cleaned properly and contained a chemical residue which had to be
removed before the drum was used again.
To remove the residue, CH20 instituted a drum-cleaning
operation, which generated wastewater. On several occasions, the
defendant asked the local sewer authority if it would accept the
wastewater. However, because the metal content of the wastewater was
so high, the sewer authority refused to accept it.
Subsequently, the defendant discharged the wastewater, and
ordered his employees to discharge the wastewater, either on the
industrial plant's property, through a sewer drain at an apartment
complex the defendant owned, or through a sewer drain at the
defendant's home. He continued these discharges for about eight
years until he hired someone to dispose of the wastewater properly.
CH20 either paid a waste disposal company to dispose of the
wastewater, or shipped the drums to a professional outside contractor
for cleaning. However, these procedures cost the company thousands
of dollars each month and Iverson discontinued this program four
years later.
Shortly thereafter, Iverson bought a warehouse in Olympia and
restarted its drum-cleaning operation at the warehouse and disposed
of its wastewater through the municipal sewer. Iverson did not obtain
a permit to make these discharges. Iverson continued this method of
wastewater disposal for three years, until CH20 learned it was under
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investigation for illegal discharges of pollutants into the sewer.
The defendant had a jury trial, where they found him guilty on all
counts. The district court sentenced Iverson to one year in custody,
three years of supervised release, and a $75,000 fine. Iverson appealed
his conviction. Iverson's primary arguments were that (1) the CWA,
the WAC, and the Olympia Code, when read together, allowed his
discharges; (2) the statutes were unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the
trial court erred in formulating its "responsible corporate officer" jury
instruction. All of Iverson's claims of error relied on the premise that
the WAC and the Olympia Code allowed discharges of industrial waste
that did not affect the water. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed.
For the first issue, the defendant argued that the Olympia Code
defines "pollutant" based on the effect of the discharge. However, the
code also expressly provides that if state standards are more stringent,
then state law applies under the Olympia Code itself. Iverson argued
that state law also measures discharges based on their effect on the
water. However, the WAC lists certain discharges as always prohibited,
including a discharge into municipal sewage of substances prohibited
by the Clean Water Act. The CWA defines "pollutant" to include any
industrial waste discharged into water. Additionally, the CWA requires
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW") to create their own
regulatory programs. Authorities deem those local regulations as
pretreatment standards under the CWA. When all the CWA provisions
are read together, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any trucked or
hauled industrial waste, regardless of the effect on water, except at
discharge points designated by the POTW. The court held that the
CWA, the WAC, and the Olympia Code prohibited the discharge of
hauled or trucked industrial waste except at certain discharge points.
Regarding the vagueness challenge, Iverson argued that a conflict
in the definitions of "pollutant" in the three statutes created vagueness.
However, the court stated that a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would understand from reading the statutes that all three
prohibit the discharge of any hauled or trucked industrial waste except
at certain discharge points. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because it incorporates other provisions by reference. A
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would consult the
incorporated provisions.
Next, Iverson argued that a corporate officer is "responsible" only
when the officer in fact exercises control over the activity causing the
discharge. However, the CWA holds criminally liable any person who
knowingly violates its provisions. The CWA defines "person" to include
any responsible corporate officer. When Congress' intent of the
statute and the ordinary and common meaning of words are
considered, a person is a "responsible corporate officer" if the person
has authority to exercise control over the corporation's activity causing
the discharges. There is no requirement that the officer in fact
exercise such authority. Additionally, the CWA has a knowledge
requirement. A defendant must know that the substance discharged
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was a pollutant. Here, the defendant's involvement with the prior
discharges tended to prove knowledge and familiarity with the
company's industrial waste. Because Iverson was personally involved
and had authority to exercise control over the illegal discharge of
industrial waste, he was a responsible corporate officer and was
subsequently criminally liable for the company's wastewater disposal
practices.
Eric V Snyder

Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp. 2d 815
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that summary judgment for the defendant
in a suit for contribution for response costs was proper where the
plaintiff could not prove the defendant caused the contamination, and
where the plaintiff based its theory of liability solely on speculation and
possibility).
Plaintiff, Kalamazoo River Study Group ("KRSG"), filed this suit
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Michigan Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"). It also sought
contribution for response costs incurred in response to releases of
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") into the Kalamazoo River. KRSG
filed this suit against eight other companies with facilities on or near
the Kalamazoo River. The issue before the court was defendant
Benteler Industries, Inc.'s ("Benteler") motion for summary judgment.
Based upon studies conducted between 1972 and 1989, the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") determined
that a three mile portion of Portage Creek, from Cork Street to the
Kalamazoo River, and a thirty-five mile portion of the Kalamazoo
River, from this confluence downstream to the Allegan City Dam (the
"Site"), contained large amounts of PCBs. In 1990, the EPA listed the
Site on the National Priority List as a Superfund site pursuant to
CERCLA, and the MDNR listed the Site as an environmental
contamination site under the Michigan Environmental Response Act.
The MDNR identified three paper companies as potentially
responsible parties as a result of their past recycling operations from
1957-1971.
The recycling operations included the de-inking of
carbonless copy paper, which contained PCBs. James River Paper
Company joined HM Holdings, Inc., Georgia-Pacific Corporation, and
Simpson Plainwell Paper Company to form KRSG, an unincorporated
association. KRSG alleged that the eight other companies contributed
to PCB contamination and sought reimbursement or contribution for
their response costs.
Benteler manufactures automobile parts. Benteler purchased the
Galesburg manufacturing facility at issue in this case in 1986. The
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facility was located upstream of the Kalamazoo Superfund site, about
3,200 feet from Morrow Lake. There was a drainage ditch on
Benteler's property that ran from a headwall next to the Benteler
parking lot south, approximately 3,200 feet toward Morrow Lake.
Morrow Lake was an impoundment of the Kalamazoo River formed by
Morrow Dam. Morrow Dam was approximately 4.25 miles upstream
from the Site. When Benteler purchased the Galesburg facility, there
were transformers and capacitators in the manufacturing buildings
which contained PCBs. In the process of responding to a leak,
Benteler discovered PCBs throughout the plant, in the ditch near the
headwall, and in the drain lines leading to the ditch. In 1993, Benteler
took remedial actions to remove PCBs from the drainage ditch, and, in
1996, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality issued
Benteler a clean closure letter.
Benteler and KRSG agreed that in order to hold Benteler liable for
response costs that KRSG had and would incur at the Site, KRSG must
establish that: (1) there was a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance; (2) the site of the release or threatened release
was a "facility" as that term was defined in the statute; (3) the release
or threatened release had caused KRSG to incur response costs; and
(4) Benteler was among the statutorily-defined group of persons,
which included the owner or operator of a facility. Benteler only
challenged KRSG's ability to demonstrate the third element: i.e.,
whether PCBs from Benteler's property contributed to the
contamination of the Site.
Benteler contended that the condition of the ditch and the soil
were such that PCBs from its facility would not have migrated all the
way down the ditch to the river and that any water running in the ditch
would have been absorbed into the soil before reaching the river.
Benteler also presented evidence that they confined the PCBs in
Benteler's ditch to the area near the headwall.
The court stated that because Benteler had shown that KRSG
could not prove the causation element, the burden shifted to KRSG to
present some evidence that there was a material issue of fact that
Benteler was in fact a source of PCB contamination in the Kalamazoo
River. KRSG presented evidence based on a U.S. Geological Society
Survey Map, stormwater discharge documents showing Morrow Lake
as the discharge point for the ditch, soil samples showing PCBs at
three feet and eighteen feet from Morrow Lake, and challenges to the
conclusions of Benteler's experts.
The court held that summary judgment was appropriate because
KRSG based its entire theory of liability upon the assumption that
water flowed down the ditch to Morrow Lake. The court did not find
that KRSG had presented evidence on which a jury could reasonably
find Benteler liable because KRSG based their assumption solely on
speculation and possibility. The court stated, "[t]he existence of a
possibility does not create a material issue of fact for trial because
KRSG bears the burden of proof to show that Benteler did contribute
to PCBs in the Kalamazoo River, and not that it is possible that it might
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have contributed to the PCBs."
Finally, the court stated that "KRSG [had] utterly failed to come
forward with any evidence that would tend to show that water did in
fact flow down the ditch in sufficient quantity to carry PCBs from the
northern part of the ditch to Morrow Lake." The court reasoned that
KRSG "did not connect the dots" to show a flow of PCBs from the
Benteler facility.
Matt DiUman

STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Maricopa Superior Court, (No. CV-950161-SA) 1999 WL 4128 (Ariz. Jan. 7, 1999) (holding most of the
statutory changes at issue unconstitutional because they applied
retroactively to affect vested property rights, thus violating the due
process and separation of powers clauses of the Arizona Constitution).
The perpetual puzzle in water law: the demand for water
constantly surpasses the available supply. Priority and quantification
determinations attempt to alleviate this problem. In 1974, the Salt
River Valley Water Users' Association filed its petition for adjudication
of its water rights under A.R.S. §§ 45-231 to 45-245. (Later changed
to A.R.S. §§ 45-251 to 45-260). In 1995, the Arizona Legislature
enacted House Bills 2276 and 2193 which revised many statutes
dealing with surface water rights and the adjudication process. The
San Carlos Apache Tribe filed this special action challenging the
constitutionality of these two enactments and the Arizona Supreme
Court sitting en banc accepted jurisdiction. The court then remanded
the matter to the trial court for briefing and oral argument.
The court first analyzed House Bill 2276. The primary issue dealt
with the retroactivity of the statutory changes. All parties agreed on
the basic rule that procedural, not substantive, changes may apply
The federal parties argued the enactments were
retroactively.
unconstitutional because they consisted of substantive retroactive laws
that impaired vested property rights thereby violating substantive due
process. The state argued that all substantive changes are only
prospective and that some of those appearing retroactive were actually
clarifications of previously ambiguous law. The trial court stated, and
the Arizona Supreme Court agreed, that the statement of the
Legislature's intent in amending the adjudication process
unequivocally showed that retroactivity would apply to both substantive
and procedural changes. The court emphasized, however, that
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legislation might not disturb any vested substantive rights by
retroactively changing the law that applies to already completed
events.
Since Arizona follows the prior appropriation doctrine, it is
impermissible for subsequent legislation to change the legal effect of
acts that resulted in acquisition and priority of water rights. Thus, any
implementation of the retroactive intent to affect vested substantive
rights to water creates a due process violation. The court listed the
specific statutes in question and declared them invalid due to their
potential alteration of past events.
The second issue pertaining to House Bill 2276 was whether these
provisions also violated the separation of powers doctrine. This issue
addressed the invalidation of statutes pertaining to de minimis use, onfarm water duties, maximum capacity rules, settlement agreements,
prior filing presumptions, the role of the Arizona Department of
Water Resources, changes regarding the special master, and public
trust. The court held some of the provisions violative of separation of
powers. An equal protection question also arose within this analysis;
however, the court held that none of the statutes in question violated
equal protection principles.
The court then analyzed House Bill 2193. It recognized that the
previous analyses applied to many of these statutes, thereby
invalidating them. The court then decided to strike down the statutes
in their entirety, and let the Legislature decide whether to reenact the
provisions that satisfied constitutional requirements.

Melinda B. Barton

COLORADO
Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, No.
97SA343, slip op. at 1 (Colo. Mar. 29, 1999) (holding that volumetric
limitations will not be implied as a matter of law upon an earlier
change in use decree, fully litigated as to its terms and conditions).
The City of Golden ("Golden") applied for a change in use of its
decreed Priority 12 water rights in Clear Creek to use the water for
municipal purposes. In September 1995, several junior appropriators
in Clear Creek filed objections to the application, asserting injury to
their vested rights because Golden had expanded its water use beyond
the scope decreed.
The Clear Creek Priority 12 water right, initially decreed in
October 1884, carried an appropriation date of May 1861. The City of
Golden, appellee, and Consolidated Mutual Ditch Company
("Consolidated Mutual") are the majority holders of Priority 12 rights.
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Appellants own Clear Creek water rights junior to Priority 12. The
water court decreed Golden's share of Priority 12 water in two 1960's
proceedings. These decrees expressly quantified Golden's Priority 12
rights based on historic consumptive use. They gave Golden the right
to annually divert water up to 4.66 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), from
May through October. The water court required Golden to abandon
part of its flow entitlement to protect junior users. The Colorado
Supreme Court decided the existence of express flow limitations in the
1960's change decrees precluded appellants' claim. Thus, courts may
not read acre-foot volumetric limitations into Golden's Priority 12
decrees, as a matter of law.
Courts traditionally quantified Colorado water rights using a twopart measurement. First, the court determined the rate of flow
measured in cubic feet per second. Second, the court adjusted that
amount, if necessary, to account for historic consumption and the
proposed use.
The court used this method to determine the
Georgetown's 1960's decrees. Since the passage of the 1969 Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act, Colorado has been
firmly committed to the idea of using volumetric limitations in overappropriated basins. Clear Creek is such a basin. In modem change
decrees, the court generally imposed an acre-foot limitation on the
amount of water it allowed an appropriator yearly. Appellants here
urged the court to impose such an acre-foot volumetric limitation on
Golden. They argued that Golden's water engineer, Gary Thompson,
had already implied this measurement in a 1993 case involving
Consolidated Mutual.
The first change decree proceeding began in 1957 when Golden
approached James Mannon and William Vaughn, the then owners of
the Priority 12 rights, seeking to purchase them. Before sale, the
owners had the courts change their decree by changing uses from
irrigation to municipal. At the hearing, Golden's expert water
engineer, W.W. Wheeler, testified that the change in use would not
harm junior right holders. Golden would balance its municipal use to
consume an equivalent amount as that used for irrigation. Wheeler
determined that transferring 2.86 cubic feet per second to Golden
would not injure junior users. The water court denied Mannon and
Vaughn's petition. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case to the water court to determine whether a
change decree with limiting conditions would prevent injury to
juniors. In 1961, before the case was re-heard, the parties entered into
a court-approved consent decree.
The consent decree limited
Golden's maximum annual diversion to 2.86 cubic feet per second.
The court imposed three conditions for approval including the
removal of Mannon and Vaughn's land from irrigation, the
abandonment back to Clear Creek of .84 c.f.s., and a diversion
limitation allowing use between May and October.
Golden's second Priority 12 decree arose out of a 1964 purchase of
1.8 c.f.s. from then owners Mauz and Thuet. The second decree also
involved a change in use from agricultural irrigation to municipal
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consumption. Again W.W. Wheeler determined that transferring 1.8
c.f.s. to Golden for municipal use would not injure junior Clear Creek
appropriators. The 1964 decree contained similar conditions as the
1961 decree, including limiting Golden's diversions to the period of
May through October each year. Importantly, neither of these 1960's
decrees involved an acre-foot volumetric limitation on Golden's annual
consumption.
In 1993, Consolidated Mutual applied to change the use of its
Priority 12 rights, from agricultural to municipal use. Golden objected
arguing the change in use would injure Golden's Priority 12 rights
unless the court imposed volumetric limitations on Consolidated
Mutual's decree. By computing the average total consumptive use of
Priority 12 water at 411 acre-feet, and subtracting the amount allocated
Golden in the 1960's decrees, Gary Thompson arrived at an acre-foot
volumetric limitation on Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12. In
determining Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12, Thompson
implied Golden's remaining acre-foot share. Thompson determined
Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12 was 124 acre-feet per year,
and by implication set Golden's share of Priority 12 at 287 acre-feet per
year. It is this implied volumetric limitation of Golden's share of
Priority 12 that appellants sought to have the court read into Golden's
current change of use application.
The water court imposed
Thompson's 124 acre-feet per year volumetric limitation on
Consolidated Mutual's decree of Priority 12 in approving its change in
use application.
The current litigation began in 1995 when appellants filed claims
in District Court, Water Division No. 1, against Golden alleging the city
had infringed on their junior rights by expanding its water use beyond
that decreed in the 1960's proceedings. Appellants brought three
claims against Golden. First, due to the 1993 Consolidated Mutual
litigation and Gary Thompson's findings, these had established a 287
acre-feet per year volumetric limitation of Golden's Priority 12 rights.
Additionally, Golden's use had exceeded its 287 acre-feet per year
amount, injuring junior Clear Creek appropriators. Appellants argued
the court should read this limitation into Golden's 1960's decrees as a
matter of law. Second, appellants contended that Golden had
impermissibly expanded its use by changing its use pattern from peak
flow use to base flow use. Peak flow rights satisfy municipal demand
during the summer months, while base flow rights satisfy municipal
demand outside of the summer months. Finally, appellants alleged
Golden had impermissibly enlarged its use by increasing the lawn
acreage it irrigated with Priority 12 water.
In response, Golden filed a motion to dismiss. The city claimed
the court should bar, under claim preclusion, the modification
requested by appellants, to establish a volumetric limitation for each of
Golden's 1960's decrees of Priority 12 use. The appellants filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment arguing issue preclusion and
judicial estoppel relating to the Consolidated Mutual litigation and a
1994 report Golden filed with the State Water Commissioner
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regarding its water transfers for that year. Its 1994 transfers exceeded
Wheeler and Thompson's estimates of historic consumptive use under
the 1960's decrees. The water court denied both motions.
The water court reasoned that, after interpreting Orr v. Arapahoe
Water & Sanitation District, appellants' claims were permissible as they
were not previously litigated and asserted injury resulting from
Golden's expanded use. The water court determined that the 1960's
decrees conferred the right to change the point of diversion, and to
change the use to municipal uses, but that the decrees included an
implied volumetric limitation preventing Golden from expanding the
historical consumption of its Priority 12 rights. In denying appellants'
cross-motion for summary judgment, the water court found that Gary
Thompson's testimony in the Consolidated Mutual litigation did not
judicially estop Golden from arguing against modifying its prior
decrees to reflect volumetric limitations. The water court did not
address the appellants issue preclusion argument.
The trial began in May 1997. Expert testimony covered all three of
the appellants' claims of injury. The water court reversed its 1996
holding that Golden's change decrees were subject to implied
volumetric limitations. Contrary to its initial interpretation of Orrthat decrees are subject to implied volumetric limitations as a matter of
law-the court instead decided Orr requires courts "imply volumetric
limitations in decrees when historical consumptive use was not at issue
in an earlier proceeding." Because the parties already litigated both
the historic consumptive use and the future municipal consumptive
use associated with Golden's Priority 12 rights in the 1960's change
decree proceedings, the water court could not imply volumetric
limitations into those decrees. The court also rejected appellants'
attempts to bind Golden to Thompson's 1993 testimony with issue
preclusion and judicial estoppel.
Regarding the appellants' second claim of injury resulting from
Golden's changing its pattern of use from peak flow to base flow, the
court agreed with Thompson that there had been no change in
Golden's pattern of use in forty years. The court made no finding
regarding the third injury asserted by the appellants. They claimed
injury from Golden's increasing the total lawn acreage irrigated with
Priority 12 water. Appellants appealed the decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
The supreme court agreed with the water court and barred the
appellants' request that the court read the implied volumetric
limitations into the express terms of Golden's 1960's decrees under
claim preclusion. Affirming the water court's analysis of Orr, the
supreme court found that implied volumetric limitations were
developed to prevent injury to juniors when a prior change decree did
not address or contemplate the question of historic consumptive use.
The court also found support from its decision in In re Application for
Water Rights of Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, about the
preclusive effect of a prior quantification of historical consumptive use
The court thus denied
on a subsequent augmentation plan.
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appellants' claim under Orr,as Golden's 1960's decrees addressed the
historic consumptive use of Priority 12 water. The supreme court
rejected appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on issue
preclusion grounds.
The court decided that the appellants' second and third claims of
injury were not precluded, and addressed each. The appellants'
second claim was that Golden had expanded its use beyond the c.f.s.
limitations decreed in the 1960s by changing its pattern of use from a
peak flow to a base flow. The court accepted the water court's factual
conclusions as sufficiently supported by the record. The water court
had relied on and accepted Gary Thompson's testimony that Golden
had not changed its pattern of use in forty years. As the water court
failed to address the appellants' third claim, regarding the increase in
law acreage irrigated by Golden's Priority 12 water, the supreme court
remanded the issue for determination of the validity of the claim.

Chip Cutler

In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause v. Brandon, 960 P.2d 672
(Colo. 1998) (holding that in setting the title for a proposed statutory
amendment, the initiative title setting board did not abuse its
discretion by omitting the definition of the term "nonexempt well,"
and that the fiscal impact statement which did not specify which
"taxpayers" a possible refund provision would effect did not mislead
voters).
The Title Initiative Setting Board ("Board") fixed a title, ballot title
and submission clause, and summary for a proposed statutory
amendment. The amendment called for the installation of water
meters by the state engineer on all wells in the unconfined aquifer in
Water Division 3, which were not exempt pursuant to Colorado
Revised Statutes § 37-92-601 and § 37-92-602. The initiative summary
included a fiscal impact statement ("Impact Statement") which
outlined the costs associated with the proposed amendment. The
Impact Statement indicated that due to state spending limits, the state
might have to refund some fee revenues generated by the initiative to
taxpayers.
Registered voters petitioned the court to review the action taken by
the Board claiming that the titles and summary misled the electorate
because the Board failed to (i) properly define the term "non-exempt"
well; and (ii) specify which taxpayers might be entitled to a tax refund,
and therefore abused its discretion.
The court explained that the scope of review in such a case is
limited to ensuring that the title, ballot title and submission clause,
and summary fairly reflect the proposed initiative in a way that does
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not mislead petition signers and voters into support for or against a
proposition by reason of the words employed by the Board.
Furthermore, the court must conduct the review with all legitimate
presumptions in favor of the Board, without addressing the merits of
the proposed legislation.
Following those standards, the court found that the Board did not
abuse its discretion in using the term "nonexempt" well without
further defining the term. The court pointed out that the actual
verbiage used in the tide and summary referred to wells not exempt
under the Colorado Revised Statutes. The court further explained
that due to potential future legislative and judicial interpretation the
Board could not define the complex definition contained in the
statutes without a detailed statutory explanation.
The court also rejected the petitioners' claim that the Impact
Statement misled voters by failing to specify which taxpayers might
receive a refund. The court noted that the initiative itself did not
include a reference to a refund. Furthermore, the Impact Statement
mentioned only a possibility of a refund, and the General Assembly
would determine the appropriateness of such an action. The court
further explained that mentioning the refund served only to promote
and clarify the statewide implications of the proposal. To that end, the
Board properly used its discretion in determining how to describe the
fiscal impact of the proposal without creating prejudice for or against
the proposal.
Stephen Lawler

Ed. note: The Colorado electorate defeated the initiative in the
November 1998 general election.

City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co.. 962 P.2d 955 (Colo.
1998) (holding that the court will not make a conditional exchange
right absolute where the applicant does not have a legal right to use
the point of diversion identified in the proposed absolute decree).
In order to complete a large water project, the City of Lafayette
("Lafayette") acquired several water rights through agreements with
numerous entities for a right to divert water. One of the rights
included a conditional right of exchange with the Anderson Ditch,
owned by the New Anderson Ditch Company. In 1987, the water court
granted Lafayette's application for various conditional rights. Part of
the final decree included language which stated that if Lafayette had
not obtained a legal right to use the Anderson Ditch by April, 1993,
the right to this point of diversion would terminate. Subsequently,
Lafayette entered into a contract with New Anderson which permitted
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it to obtain water in exchange for an annual fee. The agreement, later
amended, continued in effect until 1994, at which time the contract
expired and Lafayette discontinued use of the diversion.
In 1993, Lafayette filed an application for determination of water
rights and requested that the court make the Anderson Ditch and four
other exchanges absolute. New Anderson opposed the application as
Lafayette failed to satisfy the condition in the 1987 decree. The water
court found that overall, Lafayette had demonstrated reasonable
diligence as to many of its exchanges and made portions of them
absolute. However, it did not grant the city an absolute right to the
Anderson Ditch, finding that Lafayette had allowed its contract to
expire. The water court held that "absent a permanent means of
transporting water, there can be no absolute water right."
Lafayette appealed the water court's judgment. It argued that
employing water for a beneficial use is the only requirement to convert
a conditional right into an absolute right. Lafayette further contended
that the water court erred when it considered the absence of
transportation facilities in its decision whether to grant an absolute
right. In its cross-appeal, New Anderson argued that the water court
erred by continuing the conditional right where the 1987 decree
required the cancellation of the exchange if Lafayette did not acquire
a legal right to use the ditch. Thus, the issue was whether Lafayette
had demonstrated reasonable diligence to allow the water court to
extend the decree for another period.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that Lafayette had
.monstrated reasonable diligence in developing its various rights and
that the water court had correctly continued the city's conditional
right to the Anderson Ditch. It further held that since Lafayette did
not have a current legal right to use the ditch, in keeping with the
terms of the 1987 decree, it was not entitled to an absolute right. The
court also agreed with Lafayette that the water court erred when it
required that a permanent means of transporting water exist in order
to perfect a right. An appropriator may arrange a legal means of
diversion that is perpetual for a term of years.
The court determined that reasonable diligence requires a
consideration of all relevant factors, including a present right and
prospective ability to use structures and facilities. It noted that
Lafayette had made consistent progress to complete the project as a
whole by working with governmental agencies, expending a large
amount of money to develop an appropriation, developing property to
be served by the water, and constructing facilities for water
transportation. The court also stated that since Lafayette had not met
the requirements of the 1987 decree, it had no legal right to the
Anderson Ditch. Therefore, consistent with the terms of the decree, it
was not entitled to an absolute decree.
The supreme court also mentioned in footnote 2 that the water
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Lafayette's claim that
stock ownership in the New Anderson Ditch created a right to operate
the exchange. The court stated that this claim was not ancillary to a

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

water matter. It also noted that New Anderson was a proper party in
the proceeding despite the fact that the entity had dissolved.
Stephanie Pickens

Rice v. Brandon, 961 P.2d 1092 (Colo. 1998) (holding that ballot
initiative #105, requiring Rio Grande Water Conservation District to
make payments for benefit of public school districts, did not violate
the Colorado Constitution's single-subject requirement; titles and
summaries for three proposed initiatives (#105, #102, and #103) were
not misleading or confusing; and initiative title setting board did not
abuse its discretion in setting titles and summaries for the three ballot
initiatives).
Registered Colorado electors brought suit challenging various
actions of the Initiative Title Setting Board (the "Board"). Colorado
Constitution article V section 1 states that before an initiative is placed
on the ballot, the Board must affix a title and summary to it that
informs the voters about the initiative's purpose. The Board had
approved the titles and summaries affixed to three ballot initiativestwo statutory amendments and an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution, all up for voter approval in the 1998 election year. The
electors brought suit in an effort to keep the initiatives off the ballot,
due to their fear that the new laws' passage would adversely affect their
water rights. A common theme throughout the case was the electors'
assertion that titles and summaries affixed by the Board were
misleading because they omitted the proponents' overall scheme,
allegedly crucial to voter understanding of the initiatives.
Initiative 105 would have amended the Colorado Constitution by
adding a new section requiring that the Rio Grande Water
Conservation District pay $40 to the state per acre-foot of water
pumped from aquifers under state trust lands for use by the Closed
Basin Project. The Closed Basin is located in Colorado's San Luis
Valley, and is characterized by a sump area that collects water flowing
into the basin. The water cannot escape to the nearby Rio Grande
River due to a natural barrier at the southern boundary of the basin.
Water trapped there is lost to evaporation and evapotranspiration.
The Closed Basin Project, authorized by the Reclamation Project
Authorization Act of 1972, was designed to withdraw water from an
unconfined aquifer in the Closed Basin for delivery to the Rio Grande
River, through which it flows to New Mexico and Texas to help satisfy
Colorado's obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. The lands
under which the aquifer lies are state trust lands.
Under Colorado's Enabling Act, the legislature granted certain
public lands in trust to the people for the purpose of funding public
schools and governmental activities (e.g., erecting public buildings for
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the legislature and judiciary). Initiative 105 would have required the
Rio Grande Water Conservation District to reimburse the state for all
water it had pumped and would have pumped in the future from
beneath the state trust lands in the Closed Basin. The initiative
earmarked the money for use by public schools located in Water
Division 3.
The electors asserted that Article V section 1(5.5) prohibited the
Board from affixing a title and summary to Initiative 105 because the
initiative encompassed more than a single subject (the single-subject
requirement limits the scope of an initiative, and that scope must be
expressed in its title). The Colorado Supreme Court found that
although Initiative 105 denoted two steps for assessing and allocating
fees for water pumped from beneath the Closed Basin, the two steps
did not comprise two separate subjects.
The electors also alleged that the tides and summary were
misleading because: (1) they omitted any statement of effect on the
public school fund and Division 3 school districts; (2) the fiscal impact
statement grossly underestimated the costs of the new law to the
conservation district and failed to state which taxpayers would receive
a refund; and (3) they omitted information about the proponents
overall reasoning, crucial for voter understanding. In reviewing
whether the Board's titles and summary fairly reflected the proposed
initiative so as not to mislead petition signers and voters, the court
found that the titles and summary were not misleading because: (1)
they identified the uncertainty of the initiative's effect; (2) the fiscal
impact statement adequately described the impact on the conservation
district; and (3) the tides' and summary's failure to specify which
taxpayers would receive a refund did not render the initiative
confusing.
The two statutory amendments directly affected the Rio Grande
Water Conservation District. Initiative 102 would have required that
members of the District's board of directors be elected rather than
appointed to office. It would also have increased each director's term
from three to four years, implemented staggered terms, and imposed
specific qualifications on those seeking election. Initiative 103 would
have required the District's board of directors to refund all monies
received from court judgements during a ten year period (from 19851995)to the taxpayers. The electors asserted that the Board's titles and
summaries for these two initiatives were misleading for various reasons.
However, the court again held that the Board properly affixed the
titles and summaries.
Justice Hobbs, in his dissent, articulated the electors' concerns
about their water rights. Justice Hobbs agreed with the electors'
assertions that Initiative 105 encompassed more than a single subject,
and that the titles and summary contained a material omission
regarding the initiative's effect. Justice Hobbs found that income
generation to benefit public schools was only one purpose of the
initiative. He also found that Initiative 105 would convert a locally
owned water rights decree into a state trust asset, for the use of which
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the state could charge water appropriators a fee.
Under Colorado Constitution Article XVI, waters of natural
streams are public property subject to appropriation. Closed Basin
water was found by the water court in Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v.
Rio Grande Water Conservation District to be within a natural surface
stream system subject to appropriation, and was so appropriated under
Water Division 3 decree W-3038. Pursuant to W-3038, the Rio Grande
Water Conservation District owned a vested property right to Closed
Basin waters. Initiative 105 would convert Closed Basin tributary water
from a vested property right into a state trust asset, for the use of which
the state could charge a fee. Justice Hobbs held that the Board's
failure to alert the voters about this conversion constituted a material
omission in its Initiative 105 summary because such conversion would
compromise Colorado's over one hundred year old constitutional and
statutory water rights acquisition scheme.
Debbie Eiland

Ed. Note: The Colorado electorate defeated all three initiatives in the
November 1998 general election.

USI Properties East, Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1997)
(holding that the terms of stipulation among various parties
unambiguously limited the effect of the call limitation provision to
Beaver Creek, and the water court's denial of water users' motion for
declaratory judgment concerning the stipulation was not inconsistent
with the court's granting the City of Englewood's summary judgment
motion).
USI Properties East, Inc. ("USI") appealed from the water court's
decision concerning the interpretation of a stipulation regarding the
water rights between USI and the City and County of Denver
("Denver") and Climax Minerals ("Climax"). The water court had
denied USI's motion for declaratory judgment and granted summary
judgment for the city of Englewood.
In 1951, USI's predecessor in interest, Sloan, diverted water from
In 1955, Englewood
Beaver Creek to supplement ditch flow.
purchased conditional water rights on the Cabin-Meadow Creek
System, in the Fraser River Basin, and sought a point of diversion on
Beaver Creek. Subsequently, Englewood, Denver, and Climax entered
into an agreement regarding the Cabin-Meadow Creek System water.
In 1970 Englewood, due to the conditional water right, filed for a
finding of reasonable diligence. Sloan opposed the application. As a
result, Sloan, Englewood, and Climax entered into a stipulation. The
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water court approved the stipulation effective as of March 1971.
The stipulation stated that Englewood, Denver, and Climax would
not make a call on the waters of Beaver Creek to supply any of their
water right priorities in the Fraser River Basin, if the call would prevent
owners of specified water rights from making maximum use of the
water claimed under said rights. This stipulation was to apply
regardless of priority dates.
Subsequently, in 1991, Sloan sold USI certain water rights subject
to the stipulation. USI sought various changes in the point of
diversion and the place of use. As a result of the opposition to the
application, USI and Englewood entered into a stipulation regarding
diversions to particular ditches. In 1995, USI sought clarification of
the Englewood stipulation in an effort to prevent Englewood from
asserting specific water rights. The court found that the stipulation, by
its own terms, applied only to Beaver Creek and did not affect
Englewood's rights on the Fraser River.
USI sought the same clarification from the court regarding the
stipulation with Climax and Denver. It asserted that the stipulation
applied to the Fraser River as well as Beaver Creek. Adhering to basic
contract interpretation, the court found no ambiguity in the
stipulation and the plain and ordinary meaning limited the effect of
the call provision in the stipulation to the waters of Beaver Creek.
Tracy Rogers

Watson v. Vouga Reservoir Ass'n, 969 P.2d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding association's assessment for restoration of reservoir outlet was
a "repair" within the meaning of the statute which allowed forfeiture of
shareholder's shares for nonpayment).
The Vouga Reservoir Association ("Association") organized under
Colorado's Ditch and Reservoir Companies statute. Plaintiff, Watson,
owned thirty-five percent of the company's shares. In 1994, the
Colorado State Engineer discovered a defect in the reservoir's outlet
pipe. After failed attempts to correct the defect, the Colorado Division
of Water Resources ordered that the Association could not store water
in the reservoir until it took appropriate remedial measures.
The majority shareholders authorized that the Association levy a
pro rata assessment on the shareholders pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §
7-42-104(1) to pay for the remedial measures, which cost in excess of
$1 million. Watson refused to pay his pro rata assessed amount, and
the Association forfeited his shares as allowed under the statute.
Watson sued to enjoin the dam repair and to dissolve and liquidate
the Association. He also alleged conversion of his shares by the
Association. Watson argued that the extent of the work constituted a
reconstruction rather than a repair authorized by the statute. The trial
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court agreed that the Association had exceeded its authority and
found the Association had committed theft and conversion of Watson's
shares.
The appellate court reviewed de novo the trial court's
interpretation of the statute. Rather than interpreting only the word
"repair," it examined the phrase of the statute which allowed
a
reservoir company "to keep its reservoir in good repair." The court
held that the meaning of the phrase was apparent on its face. The
Association existed solely to supply water for irrigation to its
shareholder's land. To fulfill its sole purpose the statute must allow
the assessment to keep the reservoir in good condition. The court
held the statute authorized the assessment, including the forfeiture of
Watson's shares.
DarrellBrown

GEORGIA
City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 508 S.E.2d 161 (Ga.
1998) (upholding a consent judgment which designated to one
municipality all the service area outside another municipality's
exclusive service area).
In 1995, the Superior Court of Houston County entered a consent
order ("1995 Order") submitted by the City of Centerville
("Centerville") and consented to by the City of Warner Robins
("Warner Robins"). The 1995 Order resolved a dispute between
Centerville and Warner Robins concerning the provision of water and
sewer services. The 1995 Order designated a specific tract of land as
the exclusive water and sewer area of Centerville. All other areas
serviced by either city would continue to be served by the respective
municipality. The 1995 Order prohibited each municipality from
providing water and sewer services to areas within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. Additionally, the 1995 Order estopped
each municipality from annexing any area within the exclusive service
area of the other municipality. In 1997, Warner Robins filed a
complaint seeking an injunction against Centerville from carrying out
plans to provide water and sewer service outside Centerville's exclusive
service area. A second order was entered in 1998 ("1998 Order") by
the superior court concluding that the original 1995 Order was a
consent agreement and that all the area outside the Centerville
exclusive service area comprised Warner Robin's exclusive service area.
Thus, the 1998 Order enjoined Centerville's plans for providing water
and sewer service. Centerville raised three issues on appeal: (1)
whether the 1995 Order was properly deemed a "consent judgment;"
(2) whether the superior court usurped control over the legislative
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function of annexation; and (3) whether the 1998 Order properly
interpreted the 1995 Order to grant all the area outside the exclusive
service of Centerville to Warner Robins.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held: (1) the 1995 Order was
properly treated as a consent judgment; (2) the superior court did not
usurp control over a legislative function; and (3) the superior court
properly interpreted the 1995 Order to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside the exclusive service area of Centerville.
First, the court recognized that the original 1995 consent order
resulted from an affirmative act of the parties, rather than the
judgment of the court following litigation of the issues. The court
noted that a consent judgment is a voluntary stipulation by the parties
entered into in order to resolve a dispute. The 1995 Order was the
culmination of settlement efforts of Centerville and Warner Robins in
determining service areas.
Thus, the superior court properly
characterized the 1995 Order as a consentjudgment.
In deciding the second issue, the court recognized that the power
of annexation is a legislative function, not subject to control by the
judiciary. However, the superior court did not attempt to usurp
control over this function, it merely enforced the 1995 Order. In the
1995 Order, Centerville agreed not to seek annexation of property
within the Warner Robins service area. Thus, the superior court
merely sought to enforce that agreement.
Finally, the court noted that the 1995 Order failed to clearly
describe the Warner Robins service area in the same detail as it
described the Centerville service area. However, the superior court
properly used the general rules of contract construction in referring to
the record in order to construe the ambiguity. The record clearly
indicated the intent of the parties to designate to Warner Robins all
the area outside of Centerville's exclusive service area. Thus, the
superior court properly interpreted the 1995 Order.
CandaceDeen

KANSAS
Water District No. 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d 239 (Kan.
1998) (holding water district had an exclusive right under the Water
District Act to provide pressurized treated water by pipeline within the
district's boundaries and that this exclusive right did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
A privately owned Kansas Water Company ("KWC") obtained its
water supply from Kansas City, Missouri. In 1990, Water District No. 1
("District"), pursuant to the Kansas Water District Act ("Act"),
voluntarily annexed the area served by KWC. Therefore, Mission Hills

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Country Club ("Club") became subject to the District's service area.
In 1994, the District developed a new rate structure to enhance its
water supply facilities and distributions, due to the large requirements
of the Club. As a result, the Club's water bill increased dramatically.
To combat the increased rate, the Club sought alternative means of
water distribution and entered into a lower priced purchase
agreement with the water department of Kansas City, Missouri. The
Club intended to construct a private pipeline to transport the water for
its greens and fairways.
The Club notified the District of the agreement and the District
objected on the grounds that it had an exclusive right to supply treated
water to citizens within its boundaries. The Club informed the District
of its intent to disregard the rule and the District brought suit to
enjoin the Club from obtaining an alternative water source.
The issues before the Supreme Court of Kansas were: (1) whether
the District had an exclusive right under the Water District Act to
provide treated water by pipeline within the District's boundaries; and
(2) whether this exclusive right violated the Commerce Clause. The
supreme court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in
the negative.
The supreme court recognized that exclusivity in municipal
services has received judicial endorsement in Kansas. The legislature
reasoned that two water districts could not serve a territory at the same
time by adopting McQuillin Municipal Corporations §7.08:
"[I] ntolerable confusion instead of good government would obtain in
a territory in which two municipal corporations of like kind and
powers attempted to function coincidentally."
The court also focused on the phrase "supply and distribution
system" used throughout the Act in rendering its decision. A Kansas
statute, § 19-3509, provides that "the water district board shall ... have
the exclusive control of the water supply and distribution
facilities.... ." The control of water supply and distribution prohibited
any other person or entity from controlling the supply and distribution
of water. Thus, the court concluded, the Club could not use a pipeline
to bring treated water into the District's boundaries.
The Club argued that, in Kansas, utility customers are not normally
precluded from obtaining their own supply of heat, light or water for
private use. The court stated that the Club misconstrued the statute it
was asserting and that it only applied to the first part of the statute
concerning telephones, telegraphs or conveyance of oil and gas.
The Club also argued, pursuant to statute, that if a city grants a
franchise to furnish water services that the franchise cannot be
exclusive. However, the court stated that the legislature granted the
District exclusive power. As the municipality involved, the District was
a "quasi-municipal body corporate with the power of eminent
domain."
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Kansas
Constitution does not prohibit municipalities from granting exclusive
franchises.
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In supporting its claim that the District's exclusive right violated
the Commerce Clause, the Club relied on C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown. In Carbone,the United States Supreme Court held that an
ordinance violated the Commerce Clause because it required all incounty possessors of trash to use a specific transfer station, thus
depriving in-state and/or out-of-state processors of waste processing
and disposal business. The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished this
case from Carbone in that the District, itself, performs the entire piped
pressurized water production and delivery operation within its
boundaries; thus, it provided a municipal service.
The supreme court also relied on U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon. The court applied the reasoning in U.S.A. and held that in
creating the District, Kansas had not favored in-state water producers
over out-of-state competitors nor had it hindered business from
competing against a group of local proprietors. Based on this
reasoning, the supreme court found the market participant exception
inapplicable. The State of Kansas eliminated the market for piped
water when it created the District, which, in turn, fulfilled a
governmental duty. Therefore, no market existed due to the exclusive
nature of the municipal services. Furthermore, the District did not
impose any burdens on interstate commerce and arguably, the benefits
of the municipal services would outweigh any burdens that may have
been placed on interstate commerce.
Anna Litaker

MAINE
Dorey v. Spicer, 715 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998) (holding that the owner of
downstream property had no flowage rights relative to upstream dam
when: (1) he did not own lot on which dam was located; (2) the
easement he relied upon, created by conveyance of half-interest in the
sawmill, was extinguished when gristmill owner gave back that interest
to sawmill owner; (3) any appurtenant easement, created by the Mills
Act, was incapable of existence separate from the land containing the
dam).
Peter M. Dorey ("Dorey") the downstream owner of property along
Gristmill Brook ("Brook"), which originated from Foster Pond
("Pond"), filed an action naming as defendants forty-four owners of
waterfront property on the Pond. Dorey sought a declaration of his
rights to operate the Pond dam, inclusive of a right to flood the
waterfront land of the Pond. Dorey also sought an injunction stopping
any defendants from interfering with those rights. Dorey used the
connection between the original dam and the current surrounding
land rights as a basis for his claim.
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A downstream gristmill owner conveyed the land near the outlet of
the Pond to a sawmill owner in 1839. The sawmill owner constructed
the dam in question during that same year to power a sawmill
operation. At one time, the sawmill owner conveyed a one-half
interest in all his sawmill property, along with "the right to draw water
for the use of any mills," to the downstream gristmill owner. However,
the gristmill owner relinquished that one-half interest back to the
sawmill owner in 1860. As time passed, early owners divided and sold
the land surrounding the Pond to various purchasers.
Dorey
purchased most of the gristmill property, and tried to acquire the
original sawmill property, near the dam, to generate electrical power
for his residence downstream. Dorey was able to purchase only small
portions of the original sawmill land, along with "the flowage rights
relative to the sawmill lots purchased." The previous owners conveyed
the sawmill land to Dorey through a single deed, and they conveyed
the flowage rights through a separate deed, which stated that the
flowage rights would be appurtenant to the sawmill land just
purchased.
Dorey claimed a private right to operate the dam and flood the
property of upstream waterfront owners, based on the Mill Act, 38
M.R.S.A. §§ 651-59 (1989). Dorey claimed his rights under the Act by
virtue of three sources. First, Dorey claimed that he had flowage rights
to the dam because he owned the gristmill land and, at one time, the
sawmill owner gave the gristmill owner a one-half interest in the water
rights connected to the dam. Second, Dorey claimed to have flowage
rights through his ownership of part of the original mill site. Lastly,
Dorey claimed the flowage rights due to the separate deed that gave
him those rights appurtenant to the sawmill lots he had recently
purchased. Eight of the defendants moved for summary judgment,
asserting that Dorey had no flowage rights, of any kind, to the dam.
The Maine Supreme Court held that summary judgment for the
defendants was proper. The court refused to allow any of Dorey's
alleged connections to the dam's flowage rights through the Mills Act.
Under strict construction, the Act's intent was to promote the control
of water flow for early industrial uses. The Act tied the water rights
directly to the ownership of the land, in the nature of an appurtenant
easement, benefiting the mill sight as the dominant tenant.
The court reasoned that the flowage rights at issue came into
existence when the mill owner built the sawmill and dam in 1839. It
was undisputed that the sawmill was no longer operational and Dorey
did not own the dam lot. To the extent that these flowage rights still
existed, they were in the nature of an appurtenant easement to the
dam lot alone, and could not exist apart from that lot. Therefore,
since Dorey owned some land once connected to the original sawmill,
but not the dam lot, he did not possess any flowage rights. In addition,
because the flowage rights could not exist separate from the dam lot,
other owners of the sawmill lots could not convey any flowage rights by
a separate deed, as Dorey alleged.
Finally, the court held that Dorey had no flowage rights through
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the ownership of the gristmill lots. The court reasoned that when the
gristmill owner relinquished his one-half interest in the sawmill
property back to the original owner, he merged that land under a
single owner. Any flowage right to the dam that might have existed
with the gristmill property ended with that merger.
Joseph A. Dawson

MARYLAND
A. H. Smith Assoc. Ltd. Part. v. Maryland Dept. of the Env't, 695 A.2d
1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (affirming the imposition of civil fines
for violation of consent order and wastewater discharge).
A.H. Smith Associates Limited Partnership ("Smith"), owned and
operated a sand and gravel processing facility. The facility operated by
Smith required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit for discharges of wastewater. The Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") administered the NPDES
for the state of Maryland as authorized by the Environmental
Protection Agency. In March 1991, prior to the issuance of a permit,
MDE and Smith entered into a consent order allowing for the
discharge of wastewater. Both the consent order and NPDES permit
authorized the discharge of wastewater, consisting of sand and gravel,
wash water, and stormwater runoff. This discharge was subject to a
daily maximum and a monthly average maximum effluent limitation
for total suspended solids ("TSS"), and an effluent limitation on
turbidity with a daily maximum and a monthly average limit. MDE
monitored these limits once per week utilizing a grab sample. A grab
sample consists of a container filled directly from the outflow of the
source at a given point in time. During the period of the consent
order and later after issuance of the permit, MDE personnel found
numerous violations of the daily and monthly effluent limitations for
either TSS, turbidity, or both.
MDE filed suit in the circuit court for Prince George's County
seeking $297,000 in civil penalties and an injunction against further
violations of the permit. The court imposed $49,000 in fines against
Smith, but refused to issue an injunction. Smith appealed alleging:
the trial court abused its discretion in construing the consent order
and permit language in favor of MDE, thereby improperly imposing
liability; the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellant violated
both the consent order and the permit; and the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding $1,000 per violation despite clear and
uncontroverted mitigating factors in favor of MDE. Finding no error
on the part of the trial court, the appellate court affirmed.
Smith's appeal contended the state's sampling methods did not
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comply with the language of the consent order and Discharge Permit
and that a grab sample is not "any given sample representing 24-hours
flow" and, thus, is insufficient to be the basis for a finding that Smith
exceeded the effluent limitations in the consent order and permit.
The court rejected Smith's theory, noting .... "MDE would be
required to obtain an unspecified number of samples over a twentyfour hour period and then average the results obtained... this is not
what is called for under the applicable terms of the [c] onsent [o] rder
and permit." The court reasoned that under EN § 9-331(4), MDE may
require a permit holder "[t]o sample discharges in accordance with
the methods, at the locations, at the intervals, and in the manner
[MDE] requires." The MDE imposed grab samples as a requirement
upon Smith under both the consent order and permit. Smith could
only obtain the permit if it accepted those conditions, which it did.
Additionally, the court held that under the consent order, Smith
contractually agreed that grab samples would determine violations. As
to the amount of the penalty for each violation, the court found Smith
agreed to accept liability of $1,000 for each violation waiving any right
to contest the amount of the penalty. The court found no abuse of
discretion by the trial court's refusal to release Smith from its bargain.
As to permit violations, the trial court was entitled to impose fines up
to $360,000. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's consideration of three factors: (1) the amount of the penalty to
which Appellant had agreed in the consent order; (2) the factors
applicable to the imposition of fines in administrative adjudications as
set forth in EN § 9-342(b); and (3) the court's decision that it would
not impose more than one fine per day regardless of the number of
permit terms contravened on that day. The court rejected Smith's
argument that foreign courts have faced more egregious cases and
imposed lesser fines on a percentage basis.
James Fosnaught

MICHIGAN
K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 575 N.W. 2d
531 (Mich. 1998) (holding that a trial court must use a balancing test
to determine whether a denial by the Department of Natural
Resources for permit to fill wetlands constitutes a categorical taking,
and must consider the property as a whole in its analysis).
J.F.K Resort Company ('JFK") owned eighty-two contiguous acres
of property divided into four parcels. Some of the parcels contained
wetlands. JFK had previously developed one of the parcels. The
remaining three undeveloped parcels were at issue in this case. K & K
Construction Company ("K & K"), as general contractor, and J.F.K., as
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owner, held a building contract on one of the three undeveloped
parcels.
Plaintiffs applied for permits to build on two separate occasions.
The first permit plan proposed to fill part of the wetlands to build a
restaurant and sports complex. The Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") denied the permit finding that Michigan's Wetland
Protection Act protected twenty-eight acres of wetlands included in the
plan.
Plaintiffs then filed the instant action without taking
administrative appeal. Plaintiffs made a second application for a
development plan that would leave most of the wetlands undeveloped.
The DNR denied the second permit application as well.
The trial court limited its takings analysis to one parcel and found
that the permit denial constituted a taking. It required the DNR to
compensate plaintiffs for loss of the full property value. The DNR
then allowed construction to begin under the second plan to mitigate
losses. Even so, the trial court held DNR liable for almost $4 million.
The court of appeals affirmed.
In its analysis, the Michigan Supreme Court first determined which
parcels of land to include in the "denominator parcel" for
consideration in the takings analysis. The trial court had only
considered one parcel. Generally, the "nonsegmentation principle"
holds that a court should consider the property as a whole in assessing
the regulation's effect on that property. The Michigan Supreme Court
held in the instant case that the takings analysis must include all three
undeveloped parcels since contiguity, common ownership, and a
common development plan bound these parcels together.
The court then discussed whether a regulatory taking had
occurred. Land use regulations may constitute a taking in two
situations.
First, a taking occurs if the regulation does not
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest." The defendants
conceded that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting and
preserving wetlands.
Second, if the regulation denied the owner all economically viable
use of his property, this may also constitute a taking. A denial of
economically viable use can constitute a taking in two different ways.
First, a categorical taking occurs if an owner was deprived of all
economically beneficial or productive use of his land. The court
found in this case that the permit denial did not render the property
economically worthless by the regulations, and thus a taking did not
occur under this analysis.
Second, a balancing test may determine whether a taking has
occurred. The court stated that the plaintiffs in this case must satisfy
this test to prove a taking had occurred. The court must consider
three factors: the character of government action; the economic effect
of the regulation; and the extent by which the regulation interfered
with investment backed expectations.
In any takings analysis based on denial of economically viable use,
the court must also compare the value of the land before and after the
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regulation. Since this court did not know the value of the three
parcels together, it remanded for consideration of the reduction in
Further, the court directed the trial court to
property value.
determine whether to include the fourth parcel in the analysis.
Shana Smilovits

MINNESOTA
Johnson v. City of Eagan, 584 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1998)
(municipalities cannot impose an otherwise legitimate fee to recover
public improvement costs from parties who previously received a
judicial determination that the original assessment value exceeded the
benefit a particular property received from the improvement).
In 1992, the City of Eagan authorized an improvement project,
and assessed the value of the project against the benefiting subdivision
properties. The city charged all landowners that benefited from the
improvement project based on the number of frontage feet the
benefiting property had. The Johnsons challenged the original
assessment for their property and received a judicial determination
that the amount the Johnsons were charged exceeded the benefit they
received. Accordingly, the court reduced the Johnson's fee by
approximately 50 percent.
When the Johnsons decided to connect to city water in 1996, the
city charged a standard connection fee. In addition, the city also
charged a "lateral benefit water fee" which essentially compensated the
city for the original 50 percent reduction in the special assessment.
The city only charged the "lateral benefit water fee" to those
landowners who had received judicially reduced assessments.
The Johnsons did not challenge the standard connection fee, but
contended that the additional fee was improper and requested a
refund. Although both the trial court and court of appeals believed
the additional fee was "a permissible means of recovering the full cost
of the improvement," the Minnesota Supreme Court found the
additional fee, in light of the previous judicial assessment, was an
unconstitutional taking of the Johnson's property.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that municipalities have
the authority to levy special assessments against benefiting landowners
as a legitimate means of recovering costs for a public improvement
project. The court also recognized, however, that "[a] n assessment in
excess of the benefit conferred by the local improvement on the
property assessed is an unconstitutional taking of private property."
When an improvement's cost exceeds its benefit, "the difference must
not be borne by a particular property, but instead by the municipality
as a whole."
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Addressing the city's contention that Minnesota statutes allow it to
recover costs through use, availability, or connection charges, taxes, or
special assessments, the court stated that this authority is limited. Both
the Johnsons and the court recognized that a city has the power to
collect improvement costs via availability or connection charges,
special assessments, or taxes. A municipality is not allowed, however,
to recover judicially disallowed fees through an otherwise legitimate
exercise of its authority. The court noted that "such a charge is
impermissible if it is imposed discriminatorily as a way of subverting [a
reduction or avoidance of an assessment]."
Because the "lateral benefit fee" was assessed against only those
landowners that received judicially reduced assessments, the court
determined that the fee in this case was an improper special
assessment.
The court held that "this fee constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property and is impermissible
regardless of whether the recoupment effort is under the guise of an
assessment or a connection charge." Accordingly, the Johnsons
received a refund for the amount that exceeded the previous judicial
decree.
MichaelFischer

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1998) (holding that grantor
intended to convey title of land extending to lake's shore line and that
non-riparians did not gain right-of-way to the beach outside of
delineated boundaries by a prescriptive or a deeded right-of-way).
Defendant owned riparian lots on Newfound Lake ("Lake") in
Bridgewater, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs owned non-riparian lots
with ten-foot-wide right-of-way easements for access to the Lake's
beach. The plaintiffs used the beach in front of and near the right-ofway for forty years. Beginning in the 1980s the defendants asked the
plaintiffs to restrict their use to the area inside the right-of-way's
boundaries. Because the plaintiffs refused, the defendants constructed
barriers and posted "no trespassing" signs on either side of the right of
way.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants to quiet title claiming deeded
and prescriptive rights to use the beach up to the natural high water
mark. The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' contention and ruled
that the defendants owned the beach to the high water line and owned
exclusive littoral rights to the water and lakebed. However, the court
found that the location of the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way extended
beyond the delineated boundaries; thus, the plaintiffs could traverse
additional land.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Both parties appealed the superior court ruling. The plaintiffs
challenged the court's finding that the defendants' property extended
to the high water mark. The defendants challenged the location of
the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the superior court
ruling that the defendants' property extended to the high water mark.
Because the grantor worded the defendants' deed ambiguously, the
Court used extrinsic evidence to find the grantor's intent. The
defendants introduced, and the court accepted, a letter from the
grantor's attorney that stated that the grantor intended to convey
complete title extending to the shore. Further, the supreme court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they owned the land by
prescription by finding that the defendants permitted the plaintiffs to
use the beach; thus, the plaintiffs did not satisfy prescription's adverse
element.
Additionally, the supreme court overturned the superior court
ruling concerning the location of the plaintiffs deeded right-of-way.
The supreme court found that the ruling of the lower court
contradicted the deed's plain language because it created a right-ofway that bisected the defendants' properties. Both the defendants' and
the plaintiffs' deeds dictated that the right-of-way separated the
defendants' properties.
Madoline Wallace

OHIO
Long Beach Association, Inc. v. Jones, 697 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1998)
(holding that a plat for a block containing a lagoon did not create a
separate subdivision which would prevent owners of lots in other
blocks of the subdivision from using the lagoon).
In 1923, the Long Beach Company ("Company") submitted a plat
for subdivision. It included blocks A, B, and C. The Company
subdivided only blocks A and C into lots at this time. The Company
did not subdivide Block B, situated between blocks A and C, into lots
until the Company submitted a separate plat in 1927. The 1927 plat,
entitled "Long Beach Subdivision of Block B," stated that Lot E, which
included a lagoon and private lane, "[was] for the use of lot owners
within the subdivision." The appellants purchased lots in Block B and
contended that the language in the plat dedication supported the
claim that the lagoon was for the exclusive use of the residents of
Block B. The trial court dismissed all of the appellants' claims. Upon
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the counterclaims of trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and affirmed summary judgment on the claim of
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 1927
plat and found in favor of the appellants as to the meaning of the
language in the plat.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wording in the 1927 plat
was clear and unambiguous in stating that all residents of the Long
Beach subdivision had use of the lagoon, which included the residents
of Blocks A, B, and C. The court noted that where terms in an existing
contract are clear and unambiguous, the court could not in effect
create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear
language employed by the parties. Applying this principle, the court
concluded that if the drafters intended to delineate an entirely new
subdivision, they would have done so by eliminating any reference to it
as being a part of the general subdivision. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the language in the plat clearly established Block B as
part of the general subdivision. The court rejected the appellants'
argument that there was any language to indicate an intent to remove
Block B from the general subdivision, which would give exclusive use
of the lagoon to residents of Block B. Therefore, the use of the private
lane and the lagoon were not exclusive to the residents of Block B.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeal's decision
and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

PENNSYLVANIA
Adams Sanitation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390
(Pa. 1998) (holding that the Department of Environmental Protection
is permitted to order an owner or occupier of land to remedy a
contaminated condition, regardless of fault or knowledge).
Adams Sanitation Company ("ACS") entered into a lease with
Netta S. Deatrick to operate a sanitary landfill on a 108 acre parcel
and, in 1979, obtained a permit from the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") allowing it to dispose of solid waste
on the site. In October of 1983, Keystone Sanitation Company
("Keystone") acquired ASC's assets, name, tradename, lease rights, and
obligations to Deatrick. In November, 1983, Keystone assigned its
rights and obligations under this lease to its new, wholly owned
subsidiary, known as Adams Sanitation Company, Inc. ("Subsidiary").
At that time, ASC had filled seventy-eight acres of the 108 acre parcel
of land. The Subsidiary applied and received a permit from DEP
allowing it to fill the remaining thirty acres. DEP notified the
Subsidiary that it was responsible for the water supply contamination
on a residential tract of land adjacent to the seventy-eight acre site
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previously filled by ASC.
DEP directed the Subsidiary to provide a replacement water supply
to the residence according to Section 1104(a) of the Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.1104(a)
and to develop and implement a program to abate groundwater
contamination emanating from the landfill pursuant to Sections 104
and 602 of the Solid Waste Management Act, Sections 5, 316 and 610
of the Clean Streams Law, and Section 1917-A of the Administrative
Code.
Subsidiary appealed to the Environmental Hearing Board
("EHB"). EHB granted partial summary judgment in favor of DEP.
Subsidiary was directed to restore and replace the water supply, and
comply with DEP's order to submit and implement a groundwater
abatement program. Subsidiary then appealed to the commonwealth
court, which affirmed EHB'sjudgment.
The issue was whether a party who leases a parcel of land for the
operation of a business could be required to abate groundwater
contamination pursuant to Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law
where the record failed to demonstrate that the party either caused or
knew of the contamination. The court held that Section 316 of the
Clean Streams Law allows the DEP to order either the owner or the
occupier of land to correct the condition caused by pollution,
regardless of that party's fault in causing the contamination. The clear
and plain language of Section 316 does not require the DEP to prove
that an owner or occupier of land either knew or should have known
of the existence of the pollution before requiring that party to correct
the condition caused by the contamination.
The court found this construction of Section 316 in accord with
the General Assembly's stated objective in Section 4 of the Clean
Streams Law-that clean, unpolluted streams are absolutely essential
to attract business, to attract tourists, for recreational purposes, and "to
prevent further pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth...
[and] ...to reclaim and restore to a clean, unpolluted condition every
stream in Pennsylvania ......
The court rejected Subsidiary's argument that a party is only liable
for the water pollution it either caused or knew to exist before leasing
or operating on the property. Rather, it found that this interpretation
would undermine the DEP's efforts to achieve the legislature's
mandate set forth under 35 P.S. § 691.4 because it would require the
DEP to conduct an extensive investigation into the cause of the
pollution, before ordering remediation of the polluted site. This
extensive investigation would delay the clean up of the water and cause
the polluted condition to increase while the DEP searched for the
party that caused the pollution.
The court further found a tenant has a proprietary interest in the
land at common law. Here, Subsidiary occupied and had a proprietary
interest in the contaminated site. Therefore, the court permitted the
DEP to order Subsidiary under Section 316 to correct the condition
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without having to prove that Subsidiary caused or knew of the
pollution.
The court also rejected Subsidiary's argument that this was an
abuse of the state's police powers. The court held Subsidiary failed to
explain or demonstrate that the DEP's directive would have a severe
economic impact on its business, or that the directive was a physical
intrusion by the government.
Melody Divine

WASHINGTON
Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 969 P.2d 75 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that submerged tree stumps which caused plaintiffs injuries
while boating were "artificial" within the meaning of the applicable
statute as a matter of law, but whether stumps represented a "latent"
condition was a question for the trier of fact).
To increase the production of electricity from Long Lake Dam, the
Washington Water Power Company ("WWP") raised the level of water
in Long Lake Reservoir over a period of years. Raising the water level
submerged the bases of trees around the perimeter of the lake. WWP
removed the trees but left their stumps, which, when WWP holds the
reservoir at maximum level, lie below the surface of the water. While
boating on Long Lake Reservoir, the plaintiff was injured when his
motor hit one of the submerged tree stumps. The stump flipped the
motor into the boat, striking the plaintiff in the head and shoulders.
The Washington Supreme Court's analysis turned upon the
Washington recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210. Washington's
Revised Code 4.24.210 exempts landowners from liability for injuries
sustained by the public while recreating on the landowner's property
except where the injury stems from a "known dangerous artificial
latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously
posted."
The purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to hold
their property open to the public for recreational purposes without
the fear of liability. A landowner's potential for liability is narrow-it
applies only to specific, limited conditions over which the landowner
presumably has more control.
The issues in this case pertaining to the first defendant, WWP, were
whether the stumps created an "artificial" and "latent" condition as a
matter of law, thereby supporting summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. The court held that the condition was artificial due to the
"man-made change in the natural condition of the water channel ....
"
The court reasoned WWP created the injury-causing condition by
cutting dead trees down, leaving their stumps near the middle of the
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water channel, raising the level of water covering the stumps, and
failing to place buoys where the stumps remained. The court
reasoned that human effort creates an "artificial" condition.
"Latent," as defined by Washington case law, means "not readily
apparent to the recreational user." An additional inquiry is whether
the injury-causing condition is "readily apparent to the general class of
recreational users, not whether one user might fail to discover it." The
court held the record inconclusive about the latency of the tree
stumps; thus, the issue was a matter of fact precluding summary
judgment.
The dissent disagreed with the court's interpretation of "artificial."
The dissent stated that the purpose of the statute combined with the
statutory language and previous case law dictate that "artificial" should
be construed narrowly; thus, the majority's definition was overbroad
and contrary to the purpose of the statute. The dissent also attacked
the majority's latency analysis.
Against the second defendant, the County of Spokane, the plaintiff
challenged the public duty doctrine's barring of his claim that he was a
third party beneficiary of a funding agreement between the County
and the State Parks and Recreation Commission. In Washington, the
public duty doctrine bars negligence claims by individuals against a
governmental entity absent clear statutory legislative intent to identify
and protect a "particular and circumscribed class of persons"- the
"legislative intent exception." The intent to protect a specific group
must be clearly expressed; it will not be implied. The exception allows
a plaintiff to bring a claim against the governmental entity for statute
violation if the plaintiff can show his or her membership in the clearly
identified class.
Here, the plaintiff argued that an agreement between State Parks
and the County made pursuant to the state boating safety grants and
contracts program defined the duty of the County toward recreational
boaters thereby creating a specific class apart from the public at large.
The court held that the County, in the agreement, did not assume
responsibilities beyond those existing in statutory and tort law;
therefore, the public duty doctrine barred the plaintiffs claim.
Amy Beatie

Wedden H v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that an ordinance banning personal watercraft is not in conflict with
other state law, and does not violate county's police powers or
substantive due process).
After reviewing the negative effects of motorized personal
watercraft (essentially 'jet skis" or "PWCs") on marine life and tourism,
San Juan County passed an ordinance banning the use of them "on all
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waters of San Juan County" and "on Sportsman Lake" in the county.
This case presented an appeal from the decision by the trial court that
held the ordinance void. The standard under which the Washington
Supreme Court reviewed the case was de novo. The court made its
decision in response to three issues: whether the ordinance was in
conflict with other state law; "[wa]s an unreasonable exercise of [the
county's] police power," therefore violating the Washington State
Constitution; and whether it violated substantive due process.
In analyzing whether the ordinance violated the Washington
Constitution, the court first considered whether the ordinance
conflicted with other state law. The respondents claimed the
ordinance conflicted with the state boat permitting law and public
trust doctrine, specifically the Shoreline Management Act ("SMA")
and the Marine Recreation Land Act. The court held that the permit
law merely stated a "precondition to operating a boat" in Washington
by requiring a permit, and did not create "an unabridged right to
operate PWC in all waters throughout the state." Next, the court
found the ordinance consistent with the policy of the SMA since it
"favors 'the resources and ecology of the shoreline; over recreational
interests.'
Finally, respondents claimed a violation of the Marine Recreation
Land Act ("Act") because as a recipient of funds created by the Act
through fuel taxing on boats, San Juan County "must keep [their]
facilities open to 'all motorized vessels."' The court dismissed this
claim based on findings that while the language of the county's
agreement with the interagency committee for outdoor recreation
(established by the Act to distribute funds) provided that facilities will
"be kept open for public use," there was no language prohibiting the
county from "restrict[ing] the manner in which the public uses the
facilities."
A two-part test determined "the validity of a statute passed
pursuant to police power."
The court looked at whether the
ordinance "promote [d] the health, safety, peace, education, or welfare
of the people" and if it bore "some reasonable relationship to
accomplishing" the statute's underlying purpose.
Since the
ordinance's language conveyed an intent to protect the safety of other
boats, swimmers and wildlife of the area, the court concluded the first
part of the test met. Respondents took issue with the ban as an
inappropriate means to the ordinance's end. They claimed mere
public displeasure with PWC might not dictate the county's action, and
that the ordinance extended beyond local boundaries, affecting PWC
users and retailers outside of SanJuan County.
The court responded to these points by looking at the inadequacy
of existing noise regulations, the evidence of aquatic damage unique
to PWCs, and bans on PWCs in other jurisdictions "held reasonable."
In finding the ordinance "purely local," the court utilized a hunting
analogy: "[a] ban on hunting within a city is a valid exercise of the
police power." Since the ordinance only affects PWC activity within
San Juan County, and does not "preclude [county] residents from
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using PWC outside the County, nor does it regulate activities beyond
geographical limits," the court found the ordinance within county
police powers.
An "unduly oppressive" test determined violations of substantive
due process, and the court balanced the "public's interest against
those ... regulated." The court held that "[i]t defies logic to suggest
an ordinance is unduly oppressive when it only regulates the activity
which is directly responsible for the harm." Since PWCs directly
caused the harm to the public and environmental problems cited in
the evidence presented at trial, and their owners" are not being forced
to bear a financial burden or solve a societal problem not created by
PWC," the ordinance cannot be found unduly oppressive.
Jennifer Lee

DiBlasi v. City of Seattle, 969 P.2d 10 (Wash. 1998) (holding a
municipality liable for damages to adjacent landowner's property
caused by surface water that collected, channeled, and thrust onto the
property from a public street).
In 1924, a real estate developer dedicated certain roadways to the
City of Seattle ("City") for public use. The dedication also granted the
City the right to slope the original grading of the streets for cut or fills.
In 1975, Patricia DiBlasi, the plaintiff, built her house on the downhill
slope of 38" Street near the edge of a ravine. The developer allegedly
filled the ravine to extend 38" Street. Consequently, the City installed
a berm to stop surface water from running onto 38" Street. However,
in the spring of 1991, the City removed the berm when it resurfaced at
nearby Barton Street. Local residents and hydrology experts stated
that the removal doubled the amount of water flowing over 38"' Street.
This tore the street apart. After several complaints, the City reinstalled
the berm, but this failed to control water runoff during heavy rains.
The removal of the berm created a tension crack that extended 40 feet
east, across the south end of 38" Street and onto the plaintiffs
property. The City did not act to remedy the situation. In early April
1991, water pressure in the tension crack caused a landslide, which
destroyed a portion of the plaintiffs property. A landslide and
hydrology expert opined that the City could have prevented the severe
damage if it acted sooner and that the impermeable nature of the
street caused the collection of the surface waters.
The plaintiff asserted three theories for the City's liability. First,
Plaintiff claimed that the City failed to maintain its prescriptive
easement.
Second, Plaintiff asserted the street collected and
channeled surface waters in a manner different than the natural flow
of the water thrust onto the property of the plaintiff causing damage to
her property. Third, Plaintiff averred that she was entitled to inverse
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condemnation because the City failed to use reasonable care to keep
its streets safe for adjacent landowners and that failure created a
nuisance, a taking, and a trespass. The City denied liability and
alleged that the developer who filled the ravine should be apportioned
liability. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment on all of her claims except inverse condemnation. The
court of appeals reversed and dismissed Plaintiffs suit. It held that a
municipality could not be liable for damages caused by surface waters
that could not percolate into the ground due to the impermeable
surface of the street. It also held that the City did not thrust the
surface waters onto the plaintiffs property; therefore, the City
maintained its prescriptive easement. Finally, the court of appeals
held that a municipality's duty to use reasonable care only extended to
the travelling public, not to adjacent landowners.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
court addressed three points. First, the court reversed the court of
appeals holding of municipal liability in general. The supreme court
held that a municipality may be liable for damages caused by a street
that collected, channeled, and thrust surface waters onto the property
of an adjoining landowner, in a manner different from the natural
course.
Next, the supreme court addressed the specific issue of the City's
liability for 38h Street. The court held that, generally, a municipality
may be liable for damages, but it remanded on the question of
whether 38' h Street specifically collected, channeled, and thrust surface
waters onto the plaintiffs property.
Finally, the supreme court addressed the issue of the municipality's
duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the streets for adjacent
landowners as well as for travelers on the street. The court hesitated to
create a new duty to adjacent landowners. The court feared the risk of
unlimited liability and innumerable lawsuits against municipalities if it
extended the municipality's duty to adjacent landowners. The court
held that a duty of care to adjacent landowners and travelers created
too broad a category of liability for municipalities.
The concurring opinion agreed that the City was not liable to the
plaintiff for negligence. The opinion also stated that the majority's
opinion had not changed the surface water law in Washington.
Generally, municipalities are not liable to adjacent landowners for
runoff on roads caused by grading or pavement of the roads. Liability
arises only if the manner or amount of flow changes and causes
damage.

Sheela S. Parameswar
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WISCONSIN
Gillen v. City of Neenah, 580 N.W. 2d 628 (Wis. 1998) (holding that:
(1) the specific procedures for injunction took precedence over the
general procedures requiring notice of claims against a governmental
body; and (2) a citizen asserting a violation of the public trust doctrine
may directly sue a private party).
In 1952, the legislature granted the rights to land near the south
shore of Little Lake des Morts to the City of Neenah ("City"). The City
was obligated to hold these lands in public trust for the benefit of all
citizens. In 1951, continuing to 1975, Bergstrom Paper Company
("Bergstrom"), the predecessor to P.H. Glatfelter Company
("Glatfelter"), placed sludge material in the grant area. Furthermore,
in 1951, 1974, and 1984, the city leased a portion of the grant area to
Bergstrom and Glatfelter Companies for construction and operation
of a wastewater treatment plant.
In 1995, Minergy Corporation ("Minergy") sought a lease from the
City to construct and operate a commercial facility for paper sludge
processing on a different part of the grant area. The Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR"), City, Glatfelter and Minergy entered a
settlement agreement. As part of this agreement DNR agreed not to
pursue enforcement action under its public trust authority. Thereafter
Minergy and the City entered into a lease authorizing commencement
of Minergy's proposed facility. The City conducted public meetings
and finally the facility was approved. The DNR subsequently issued a
final air pollution control permit and indicated that an environmental
impact statement would not be necessary.
The plaintiffs, environmental activists, initiated suit in the circuit
court as individuals, "and in the name of the State of Wisconsin,"
challenging the Minergy lease and the actions of Glatfelter. The
plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the construction of
the Minergy facility. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
and they appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the case
upon certification from the court of appeals.
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim against the City barred their
action against the City. The court determined that there were two
statutes in conflict. One statute required notice before an action
against a governmental entity and the other specifically provided for
injunctive relief. The supreme court held, "[w]here general and
specific statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific provisions take
precedence" and therefore, the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
notice obligation did not bar their claims.
The supreme court then addressed the issue of whether the public
trust doctrine allowed a citizen to directly sue a private party. The
court held the public trust doctrine, "establishes standing for the state,
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or any person suing in the name of the state for the purpose of
vindicating the public trust to assert a cause of action recognized by
the existing law of Wisconsin." The court then examined the history
and text of the Wisconsin statute providing for actions by citizens for
abatement of public nuisances (plaintiffs claimed the proposed
Minergy development was a public nuisance). The court found no
basis in the history or text to prevent the plaintiffs' standing. The
court held the plaintiffs' claims could therefore go forward.
The concurring opinion agreed that the plaintiffs' failure to file a
notice of claim with the City did not bar their claims. However, the
concurring opinion criticized the per curium opinion stating the
"holding and rationale ... do not apply to the facts of the case ......

The court's unpredictable applications of the notice of claim
requirement, "leaves attorneys and courts guessing about when a
notice of claim must be filed and calls into question the status of cases
now pending or already decided by the courts."
ChristineWise-Ludban

Turkow v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 576 N.W. 2d 288
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the agency has authority over
navigability determinations and that the proper avenue for a challenge
to agency action is through § 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes, not
through a declaratory judgment motion).
In 1942, the construction of Big Lake Road created an artificial
outlet ("the stream") of Big Lake. In 1957, the Public Service
Commission ("PSC") found that the stream was not navigable. After
the PSC finding, Lawrence Turkow purchased the property that
contained the stream. A walkway and a metal fence blocked the
stream at the time he purchased the property.
Mr. Turkow
subsequently erected another walkway that also obstructed the stream.
In 1989, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR")
received complaints from citizens regarding the walkways and the
fence. These obstructions prevented anyone from traveling down the
stream. The DNR investigated and found that the stream was
navigable. After additional complaints from citizens, the DNR wrote to
Turkow advising him as to their finding of navigability. It ordered him
to remove the obstructions within forty-five days or face citation. In
response to the DNR's action, Mr. Turkow filed a complaint against
the agency and both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff based
on his declaratory judgment action. The trial court found that the
DNR lacked jurisdiction due to the PSC's finding of non-navigability.
The trial court precluded the DNR's authority and equitably estopped
the agency from finding that the stream was navigable. The DNR
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appealed this decision. The main issues in the case were whether the
DNR had authority to determine that the stream was navigable and
whether a challenge to agency action not pursuant to § 227 of the
Wisconsin Statutes was valid.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial court
improperly concluded that the DNR was estopped from reconsidering
the navigability of the stream. The Court of Appeals also reversed the
declaratory judgment action stating that it was barred by principles of
sovereign immunity and specific remedies for agency action found in §
227. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in not
granting the DNR's motion to dismiss based on the improper method
of remedy sought by the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 31.02 of the Wisconsin
Statutes entrusted the DNR with the regulation of navigable streams.
This section also gave the DNR the authority to make navigability
determinations. The court found that equitable estoppel did not
apply because the DNR had authority for its navigability
determination. The court established that the PSC's finding was
irrelevant under the circumstances. The court also reasoned that a
declaratory judgment was inappropriate because it bypassed the
exclusive means of administrative review set forth in the Wisconsin
Statutes. A plaintiff cannot circumvent the review provided therein.
The appellate court also confirmed that the principle of state
sovereign immunity extended to state agencies. Thus, an action
against the agency entailed only those remedies found in § 227. This
section provides for both administrative and judicial review of agency
action. Mr. Turkow did not pursue any action pursuant to § 227.
Based on this reasoning, the trial court improperly denied the DNR's
motion to dismiss. The DNR had the authority and jurisdiction for the
navigability decision it made regarding the stream.
A proper
challenge to agency action must go through the proper channels and
since Mr. Turkow ignored this principle, his action lacked standing.

Kristen L. Cassisa

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FROM TOWN OF GEORGETOWN FOR A CHANGE OF USE OF
WATER RIGHT, AND A PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION INCLUDING
EXCHANGE, IN CLEAR CREEK COUNTY. Case No. 98CW439 (Water Divi-

sion 1, Dec. 1998). Applicant: Town of Georgetown (Atty. Cynthia F.
Covell)
1. Application
The Town of Georgetown's ("Applicant") water supply has historically come from the Georgetown Ditch and Reservoir, an 1866 water
right that is subject to call during the irrigation season. Georgetown
seeks a consistent and reliable water supply for its customers. Applicant plans to accomplish this by contracting to purchase 1h shares of
Farmers Highline Canal and Reservoir Company, and change the use
from irrigation to irrigation, municipal, augmentation, replacement,
and exchange.
Georgetown also seeks to use depletion credits from its Farmers
Highline shares to augment Georgetown's out of priority municipal
depletions, and to divert those depletion credits by exchange to
Georgetown Municipal Intake, Georgetown Reservoir, and Georgetown Lake. The Municipal Intake is allocated 1.14 c.f.s. from October
1" to May 1", and 3.0 c.f.s. from May 1 to October 1", pursuant to the
1866 Georgetown Ditch water right, decreed in Case No. CA41340, on
October 9, 1914. Georgetown Reservoir, included in the 1866 decree,
has a capacity of .286 acre-feet. Georgetown Lake is an on-channel
reservoir, the subject of a companion application by Georgetown for a
junior priority storage right.
The Georgetown Farmers Highline shares were historically used to
irrigate 12.7 acres of land in Jefferson County, Colorado, the 'Wardle
Property." Since 1970 the water has been consistently used to irrigate
the Wardle Property for growing hay. Ralston Creek received irrigation return flows from the Wardle Property. The Wardle Property has
been permanently removed from irrigation by the Georgetown Farmers Highline shares.
Applicant proposes to divert water from its 1866 Georgetown Ditch
and Reservoir right for municipal uses when such water is legally and
physically available. Georgetown seeks to augment its out of priority
municipal depletions by using depletion credits available from its
Farmers Highline shares. Releases of water stored in Georgetown Lake
may also be used to augment out of priority municipal depletions, if
that right is decreed.
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When the Farmers Highline Canal is flowing, Georgetown's shares
will be diverted in priority at the Farmers Highline headgate in
Golden, Colorado, and released into Clear Creek from an augmentation station located above Ralston Creek. These releases comply with
depletion factors computed by Georgetown's water engineer. Remaining depletion credits may be released directly into Clear Creek to
augment out of priority depletions from the Georgetown municipal
water system, or as necessary from waters stored in Georgetown Lake
or Reservoir. Applicant will prepare and submit the necessary records
to account for its use of water and depletion credits from the Farmers
Highline shares.
Georgetown's proposed exchange of depletion credits from its
Farmers Highline shares to Georgetown Lake, the municipal intake,
and Georgetown Reservoir, will have an appropriation date of December 21, 1998. Notably, this priority is eleven days junior to an application filed by Golden, which seeks an appropriation on Clear Creek for
recreational boating purposes. The exchange reach is from the Farmers Highline Canal headgate up Clear Creek to Georgetown Lake and
up South Clear Creek to Georgetown municipal intake, and Georgetown Reservoir. The exchange will be operated only in priority and is
not to exceed 1 c.f.s. The maximum amount of water from the
Georgetown Farmers Highline shares used or stored by exchange will
not exceed 25 1 acre-feet annually.
2. Opposition
Twelve statements of opposition were filed. Objecting are: The
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company, City of Thornton, City of
Westminster, City of Golden, Farmers' Highline Canal and Reservoir
Company, City of Arvada, The Agricultural Ditch and Reservoir Company, The Golden Canal and Reservoir Company, The Consolidated
Mutual Water Company, Harold D. Simpson and Richard L. Stenzel,
Public Service Company of Colorado, City of Northglenn, and Coors
Brewing Company.
Objectors claim the proposed change in use and plan for augmentation may adversely affect the vested rights of water users in Clear
Creek, Farmers Highline Canal, and the South Platte River. They seek
to hold Georgetown to a standard of strict proof to show no injury to
these rights, and that the proposed use and plan for augmentation will
not expand the historic use of the water rights at issue, nor alter the
priority of those rights.
Objectors request that Georgetown be held to a showing of strict
proof that it is capable of fulfilling the requirements of the "can and
will" doctrine, and that applicants are able to show that the water
rights described have not been wholly or partially abandoned. They
also request that Georgetown show by what method its proposed
change in use and plan for augmentation will be administered by the
State Engineer.
Additional objections stem from the lack of specificity in George-
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town's application. The opposition asks that if the Applicant is claiming to use any municipal effluent return flows for augmentation or exchange, appropriate wastewater treatment standards and accounting
procedures be specified to prevent injury or loss of water quality to
downstream users. Resulting injury could change the regimen of
Clear Creek administration, causing calls at times when there have historically been none. They request sufficient conditions be imposed to
prevent such occurrences.
Chip Cutler

APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS.
Case No.
98CW448 (Water Division 1, December 10, 1998) Applicant: City of
Golden (Atty. Porzak Browning &Johnson).
1. Application
The City of Golden ("Golden" or "Applicant") seeks confirmation
of absolute water rights on Clear Creek for eight separate existing
structures which constitute the City of Golden White Water Course
("Course"); approval of additional conditional water rights for the
same eight structures during the months of May, June, July; and approval of conditional water rights for ten additional structures which
Golden plans to construct to extend the course.
The existing Course is located in the NWI/4 of the NE1/4 of section 33, T.3 S., R. 70 W. of the 6h P.M., Jefferson County, Colorado.
The structures within the Course begin with a rock deflector designed
to control, concentrate, and direct stream flow for the beneficial uses
of boating, piscatorial, and general recreation, and include seven dams
following the rock deflector.
The extension of the Course for which Golden seeks conditional
water rights will consist of approximately ten additional dams designed
to control, concentrate, and direct the stream flow for the beneficial
uses of boating; piscatorial; and general recreation. The extension will
be distributed within the channel of Clear Creek immediately below
Structure 8 (the last dam in the existing Course), extending the
Course approximately 2,750 feet within the channel, terminating at a
point in the SW1/4 of the SWI/4 of section 27, T. 3 S., R.70 W of the
6th P.M., approximately 1,300 feet north of the south section line and
800 feet east of the west section line, in Jefferson County.
The Applicant seeks confirmation of absolute water rights initiated
November 15, 1996, by the formation of intent to appropriate coupled
with actions that manifested such intent sufficient to put third parties
on notice, including, but not limited to, the City of Golden's approval
of the Course and appropriation of money for the construction of the
Course structures. The Applicant claims absolute water rights in the
following amounts as measured in cubic feet per second ("cfs") at the
Clear Creek at Golden U.S.G.S. stream gauge: January - 101; February
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- 75; March - 96; April - 255; May - 836; June - 992; July - 768; August
- 559; September - 251; October - 143; November - 103; December 128; and seeks conditional rights for any portion of the above amounts
not found absolute.
The Applicant requests additional conditional water rights for the
course in the amounts of 164 c.f.s for the month of May, 8 cfs for the
month ofJune, and 232 cfs for the month ofJuly, allowing it to divert a
total of 1,000 cfs during the months of May, June, and July. Additionally, the Applicant seeks conditional water rights equal to the above
rights for the proposed extension of the Course.
2. Opposition
The Clear Creek County Board of County Commissioners, the
Clear Creek Skiing Corporation, the Coors Brewing Company, the
Town of Georgetown, the City of Idaho Springs, the City of Arvada, the
Colorado Water Conservation Board, and the City of Westminster have
filed statements of opposition to the Application.
The City of Arvada's Statement of Opposition exemplifies the general grounds of opposition by the objectors. The City of Arvada filed
opposition based on two broad grounds. First, water rights to divert
from Clear Creek, including but not limited to water rights in the decrees entered in Case Nos. W-8762-77, 82CW359, 85CW409, 85CW410,
88CW105, W-7484 and 89CW224, may be adversely affected without
proper limitations and conditions placed on the application. Second,
the Applicant should be held to strict proof regarding: its ownership of
or enforceable property interest in the structures included in the application; the required steps under Colorado law to initiate the
claimed rights; whether the Applicant can be granted a decree for the
claimed water rights; whether the claimed conditional appropriations
can and will be completed with diligence; whether the claimed diversions were within priority and in what amount; and measurement, recording, and water handling obligations in compliance with any terms
and conditions in any decree entered.
The Clear Creek County Board of County Commissioners and the
City of Idaho Springs requested in their statements of opposition that
the court hold the City of Golden to strict proof that the amount of
water requested is reasonable and without waste.
In addition, the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")
filed a statement of opposition claiming the City of Golden's request
for absolute water rights and conditional water rights resembles an instream flow. The CWCB objects to the application pursuant to Section
37-92-102(3) C.R.S. which provides that, "no other person or entity
[other than the CWCB] shall be granted a decree adjudicating a right
or interests in water for instream flows in a stream channel between
specific points ... for any purpose whatsoever."
James Fosnaught

